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This dissertation studies international linkages between stock returns and information 
trading in options.  
In Chapter 2, “How Important are Foreign Ownership Linkages for 
International Stock Returns?” joint work with Söhnke M. Bartram, John Griffin, and 
David Ng, we look develop a simple measure of international ownership linkages and 
show that this measure is of similar importance as the traditional effects coming from 
country and industry fundamentals. International ownership linkages are not explained 
by omitted country/industry variations, wealth effects or other explanations like 
liquidity, investment style, or fund flows. We find that ownership linkage is a 
summary measure of investment locale that links investor capital around the world. 
Beyond the level of foreign ownership, the specific ownership composition of a stock 
is an important facet of international equity returns – a finding which has important 
implications for diversification.  
In Chapter 3, “Trade Linkage and Cross-country Stock Return Predictability”, 
I test whether cross-predictability exists among trade-linked industries across 
international borders, and explore possible explanations. I find strong evidence of 
cross-border stock return predictability among trade-linked industries. A trading 
strategy of buying industry portfolios whose trade-linked industry had high returns, 
and shorting industry portfolios whose trade-linked industry had low returns, yields an 
annualized return of 12%.  I find some evidence against the leading explanation, 
 which posits information segmentation as the only reason for cross-predictability, and 
find support for illiquidity as a new channel of explanation. 
In Chapter 4, “Information based Trading in Index Options and Futures”, joint 
work with Seung Won Woo, we study intraday information based trading. The trade 
imbalances of index options with the largest leverage contain better information 
content on intraday KOSPI 200 return movements compared to that of options with 
smaller implicit leverage. We find that domestic brokerage proprietary traders are 
better informed on KOSPI 200 intraday returns among investor groups. However, we 
show that the futures trade imbalances of foreigners contain superior information 
content in predicting KOSPI 200 intraday return movements during the recent sub-
prime mortgage crisis in 2008. This indicates that foreign traders may possess better 
information processing skills on news that originates from outside of Korea. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation studies two topics in international finance. First two chapters investigate 
economic linkages between stocks across country boarders, namely linkages created by 
international institutional investors and linkages that are naturally formed through international 
trades. Last chapter studies information based trading in options market. It touches upon issues in 
international finance and investigates whether local or foreign investors are at advantage when 
trading options on local index.   
In Chapter 2, “How Important are Foreign Ownership Linkages for International Stock 
Returns?” joint work with Söhnke M. Bartram, John Griffin, and David Ng, we look develop a 
simple measure of international ownership linkages and show that this measure is of similar 
importance as the traditional effects coming from country and industry fundamentals. 
International ownership linkages are not explained by omitted country/industry variations, 
wealth effects or other explanations like liquidity, investment style, or fund flows. We find that 
ownership linkage is a summary measure of investment locale that links investor capital around 
the world. Beyond the level of foreign ownership, the specific ownership composition of a stock 
is an important facet of international equity returns – a finding which has important implications 
for diversification.  
In Chapter 3, “Trade Linkage and Cross-country Stock Return Predictability”, I test 
whether cross-predictability exists among trade-linked industries across international borders, 
and explore possible explanations. I find strong evidence of cross-border stock return 
predictability among trade-linked industries. A trading strategy of buying industry portfolios 
whose trade-linked industry had high returns, and shorting industry portfolios whose trade-linked 
industry had low returns, yields an annualized return of 12%.  I find some evidence against the 
leading explanation, which posits information segmentation as the only reason for cross-
predictability, and find support for illiquidity as a new channel of explanation. 
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In Chapter 4, “Information based Trading in Index Options and Futures”, joint work with 
Seung Won Woo, we study intraday information based trading. Using KOSPI 200 (the Korea 
Stock Index 200) index options and futures data, we find that the trade imbalances of index 
options with the largest leverage, the out-of-the-money options, contain better information 
content on intraday KOSPI 200 return movements compared to that of options with smaller 
implicit leverage. We find that domestic brokerage proprietary traders are better informed on 
KOSPI 200 intraday returns among investor groups. However, we show that the futures trade 
imbalances of foreigners contain superior information content in predicting KOSPI 200 intraday 
return movements during the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. This indicates that 
foreign traders may possess better information processing skills on news that originates from 
outside of Korea. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW IMPORTANT ARE FOREIGN OWNERSHIP LINKAGES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
STOCK RETURNS? 
(Join with Söhnke M. Bartram, John Griffin, David T. Ng) 
1. Introduction 
What drives stock price variation in international securities? A large literature debates the 
relative importance of country and industry forces in affecting variation in stock returns and 
international diversification. This is predominantly a cash flow view of international stock 
variation. We recast this debate by creating a summary measure of international ownership 
linkages and show that this measure is of similar importance as the traditional economic 
channels. 
We build upon a growing literature that predominantly points to the relevance of stock 
ownership for international equities. Froot and Dabora (1999), Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003), 
and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show in different contexts that when a stock switches its country 
of trading its covariation shifts. Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) use this intuition to 
formalize a view where investors in certain investment ‘habitats’ move capital in and out of the 
securities they hold and drive their return comovement. We find that the importance of our 
ownership return variable is largely because it is a summary measure of investor habitat (or 
capital locale). We add to the literature by: a) providing a new and intuitive measure to capture 
stock linkages, b) documenting the economic importance of foreign ownership on a large and 
systematic scale, and c) decomposing and empirically analyzing the channels through which 
ownership matters. By proposing a specific channel of foreign ownership linkage and showing 
that this channel has similar economic importance as stock return variation due to traditional 
  4
country and industry effects, our paper provides important evidence on how global investments 
connect stocks.1 
In order to capture a stock’s connectedness to foreign securities, we construct a measure 
of the foreign equity returns of the stock’s shareholders. For example, for Samsung, a Korean 
firm, we first find that its largest shareholder is an investment company called Capital World 
Investors. Second, we calculate the value-weighted return of all non-Korean stocks held by 
Capital World Investors. We perform this calculation for all institutions holding Samsung and 
then use the weight of the funds’ ownership in Samsung to calculate an average (foreign) 
ownership return. Because the ownership return captures the returns of other stocks held by 
Samsung shareholders outside of Korea, it is a measure of foreign ownership linkage.2 Using 
detailed holding data from the LionShares Holdings database, we are able to capture ownership 
for 8,791 firms domiciled outside of the United States. 
Using weekly, monthly, and quarterly data, we document that foreign ownership returns 
are important for driving cross-sectional variation in returns. For stocks with more than five 
percent foreign ownership, a one percent increase in the ownership return is associated with an 
economically large 0.395 increase in a firm’s stock return, even after controlling for the local 
market and industry movements. In time-series analyses, we use the approach of Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Zhang (2009) to analyze the covariance structure of international stock returns and 
find that the ownership return captures considerable covariation beyond the local market, global 
market, and industry returns. Here we show that the ownership return is important even beyond 
the inclusion of local and global versions of size, value, and momentum factors. To see if the 
                                                 
1 On a broader scale, this finding is in contrast to Forbes and Chinn (2004), who examine channels of cross-market 
linkages and find that financial markets are connected through global trade but not through foreign investment. Bekaert 
and Wang (2010)’s survey article concludes that global betas are linked to financial openness. 
2 The Samsung example is illustrated in Appendix A. We initially focus on variation due to ownership returns outside of 
a country because ownership returns within a country are highly correlated with the local market return, making the 
interpretation more difficult. Nevertheless, we also show similar effects for domestic ownership returns. 
  5
ownership return is capturing some unobserved preferences of institutions for stocks in certain 
countries and industries, we calculate a ‘non-ownership return’ where each stock in a stock’s 
ownership return is replaced with a stock with matching country, industry, and size 
characteristics, but with no ownership linkage. This ‘non-ownership return’ is completely 
unrelated to stock returns, indicating that ownership is not capturing unobserved country/industry 
fundamentals. The role of the ownership return is also not explained by stock liquidity levels, the 
level of foreign ownership, market integration channels, nor even the change of ownership 
itself.3 We use a quasi-natural experiment, which is a shift in ownership composition around an 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) or Global Depository Receipt (GDR) listing date. 
Consistent with the ownership linkage relation being driven by the owners of the stock rather 
than an omitted firm characteristic, we find that the cross-listed stocks become more highly 
correlated with the new owners’ other stock holdings following the listing. 
Having established the importance of ownership for stock returns, we consider additional 
explanations for why ownership returns matter. Our primary contenders are investor habitat and 
wealth effects. In Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005)’s explanation of investor habitat, 
investors with certain views move capital in and out of related securities in a correlated fashion. 
In the model of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), overconfident investors cause 
covariation as they misinterpret signals arising from economic factors. Consistent with these 
explanations, we find that stocks with common ownership have strong related changes in 
institutional ownership. Additionally, we classify stocks into low, medium, and high ownership 
linkage and find that ownership changes in a stock are most closely related to those stocks with 
                                                 
3 Under the market integration explanation, stocks with low institutional ownership may be segmented from the rest of 
the world, while stocks with high institutional ownership are more integrated. The importance of foreign ownership 
returns can then be captured by a world index that is tilted towards stocks with high foreign ownership, but this index 
has no effect on the ownership return. 
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the most similar ownership habitat. Return covariation is also strongest for stocks with the most 
common ownership habitat. We further explore the implication of a stock’s habitat by regressing 
returns on a decomposition of the change in ownership where we are also able to separate out the 
effects of flows. We find that the return and ownership linkages are clearly distinct from 
investment flows. The value fluctuation of a stockholder’s holdings in other securities in the 
investment locale bears the largest relation to returns. Although most of our paper focuses on 
foreign ownership, we also find that the domestic return habitat also plays an economically 
significant role. 
Inconsistent with wealth effects, we find that institutions are no more likely to invest in a 
stock when their other stocks’ returns increase. Inconsistent with some related time-specific 
contagion explanations, we find no evidence of asymmetry around negative returns or of the 
ownership return effect clustering in times of crisis.  
We briefly examine the practical diversification implications of our findings. Institutions 
can increase diversification by avoiding stocks with high ownership return linkages. If a fund 
adds a security with a high ownership linkage to its portfolio, the average covariation of that 
security with the fund portfolio is 77 percent higher than if the fund were to add a security with a 
low ownership linkage. While the level of foreign ownership is also important, the magnitude of 
ownership linkages is economically larger. Since investors hoping to obtain diversification 
cannot easily escape the effects of other foreign investors in a firm’s investment habitat, 
investment locales transcend country and industry boundaries. 
Our paper relates to and yet extends the growing domestic and international literature 
relating ownership structure and returns.4 In a domestic context, Anton and Polk (2010) show 
                                                 
4 Papers examining the behavior of international investing at the fund level include Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 
(2004), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006), Ferreira and Matos (2008 and 2009), Covrig, 
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that covariation between stock pairs is related to their common ownership. Coval and Stafford 
(2007) find that common flows in or out of a stock can cause long-term price dislocations, while 
Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) show that U.S. mutual funds with highly correlated fund flows 
exhibit higher volatility and correlations.5 Internationally, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai 
(2011) find that mutual fund flows from domestic markets can drive emerging market returns, 
and Hau and Lai (2012) provide evidence of fire sales pressuring prices by examining losses due 
to financial firms during the financial crisis. Our paper differs from this literature in that we 
construct a specific measure of ownership linkage, provide a unique decomposition of the change 
in institutional ownership, find that the fund flow channel in previous studies is not the primary 
driver of our findings, and demonstrate practical diversification implications of ownership 
linkages. While a growing literature has illustrated the effects of various habitats [Pirinsky and 
Wang (2004), Greenwood (2005 and 2008), Sun (2008), Green and Hwang (2009), and Kumar, 
Page, and Spalt (2010)], our paper provides a new and important way of summarizing the effects 
of ownership habitat and details the large economic importance of this channel. 
Section 2 briefly introduces our statistical measure and relates it to the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the ownership data, while our main 
cross-sectional and time-series findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 examines 
alternative explanations for our findings, while Section 6 examines investor habitat and wealth 
effects. Section 7 offers further insights into the role of institutional ownership by decomposing 
it into economically meaningful elements. Section 8 discusses diversification implications. Our 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fontaine, Jimenez-Garces, and Seasholes (2010), and Hau and Rey (2009). Faias, Ferreira, Matos, and Santa-Clara (2011) 
examine the country/industry diversification issue for various levels of foreign ownership that we also examine in 
conjunction with the ownership return in Section 7. The importance of capital flows at the market level is examined by 
Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002), and Froot and Ramadorai (2008), 
among others. 
5 Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Lou (2011) find domestic evidence of flows moving prices. Ellul, Jotikasthira, and 
Lundblad (2011) find fire sales in the bond market. Calomiris, Love, and Peria (2011) argue that negative global equity 
returns during the financial crisis are related to price pressure as proxied for by previous turnover. 
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conclusions are presented in Section 9. 
2. Ownership Channels and Testable Implications 
In this section we seek to provide a brief overview of the channels in which ownership may 
relate to variation in stock price movement. 
2.1 Country/Industry Variations and the Ownership Return 
The international finance literature typically decomposes realized return variation into common 
country and industry variations [Roll (1992), Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994)]. Returns of stock 
i can be written as follows:6 
 Ri ,t   CRC ,t  IRI ,t  ei ,t     (1) 
where RC ,t is stock i's country market return in period t, and RI ,t is the industry return for stock i. 
Note that unlike Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), this framework allows beta to differ from one, 
which is recommended by Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009). The country component can also 
be refined into global and local components as follows:7
 
 Ri   GRG  LRL  IRI  ei  (2) 
where RG is the global market return and RL is the local market return. All returns and errors are 
measured at time t. 
If foreign investors facilitate the globalization of a security, stocks owned by foreign 
institutions have higher global betas (βG) and lower local betas (βL). Under this scenario the level 
                                                 
6 Other papers analyzing country and industry sources of variation include Griffin and Karolyi (1998), Carrieri, Errunza, 
and Sarkissian (2004), and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009). Papers analyzing the importance of exchange rates in 
determining return covariation (like Jorion (1990) and Ng (2004)) generally find only a small role for exchange rates. 
7 We examine covariation of realized returns. In the international asset pricing literature, local and global factors depend 
on the degree of integration/segmentation [Stulz (1981a), Errunza and Losq (1985)]. This literature is surveyed in 
Bekaert and Harvey (2003) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003).  
  9
of foreign ownership matters, but the specific composition of ownership is unimportant.8 If the 
specific holders of a security influence the price of the stock, then we would expect to see stocks 
held by common owners as an important source of covariation. In that case, the ownership return 
is a part of the determinants of a stock’s return in the following equation: 
 Ri   GRG  LRL  IRI  ORi ,O  ei   (3) 
where Ri,O is the ownership return which is specific for each stock i.9 To capture the combined 
effect of all ownership-linked securities, the ownership return is the value-weighted average 
return of the holdings of a stock’s owners. Ri,O measures the return of stock i’s holders’ stock 
holdings:
  
 
Ri ,O  Wi ,n
n1
Ni Vk,nRk
k1
Ki

  (4)  
where n=1 to Ni denote the institutions that have ownership holdings of stock i. k=1 to Ki are the 
stocks held by these institutions. Wi,n is the percentage of market capitalization of stock i held by 
institution n at the end of the previous quarter. Vk,n is the percentage of market capitalization of 
stock k in the equity portfolio that institution n holds at the end of the previous quarter. Rk 
denotes the return of stock k. For simplicity, we suppress the time subscript t, but it should be 
understood that the weights are as of the end of the last quarter, while the returns are over the 
course of the current period. 
For empirical analysis, it can be advantageous to divide the ownership returns into a part 
due to foreign stocks that investors hold, and a part due to domestic stocks. Note that we 
                                                 
8 In a related fashion, the model of Dumas, Lewis and Osambela (2011) predicts that once domestic stocks become 
familiar to foreign investors, they would be willing to hold more of such domestic stocks and require less expected 
returns. Hence, again the level of foreign ownership is important as it proxies for the familiarity of foreign investors with 
the stock. 
9 Note that since the ownership return is unique for each stock, it is not a factor. To avoid introducing a bias by 
regressing a stock on itself, our local market indices also exclude the stock of examination. For consistency, the 
value-weighted global industry return only includes stocks in a given industry outside of the country of examination. 
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distinguish between foreign and domestic relative to the country of incorporation of stock i and 
not the location of institution n owning the stock. Since the foreign ownership return comes from 
a diverse set of countries, it leads to clear identification, whereas a domestic ownership return 
can be highly correlated with local market returns. Hence, we first focus on foreign ownership 
returns in most of the paper, but for robustness also examine the domestic ownership return. An 
example of the ownership return calculation for Samsung is discussed and illustrated in 
Appendix 1. 
In our empirical implementation of ownership return measures, we impose that the 
observed ownership weights sum up to one: 

iN i ,n
n
W
1
1
  and  
iK k,n
k
V
1
1
. (5)  
This makes it easier to interpret our results since foreign ownership returns of different stocks 
will be comparable. The ownership return captures the composition of the holdings of the owners 
of a stock, but not the level of foreign institutional ownership. We expect (and confirm in 
Supplemental Table S2.1) that the ownership return is more important for stocks where the 
holders represent a large fraction of the shares. Therefore, for our main results, we examine 
securities with more than five percent foreign ownership. The ownership return can be 
constructed for higher frequencies than the quarterly changes in ownership by combining the 
previous quarter’s holdings weights with the updated weekly and monthly stock returns.10 
                                                 
10 It is interesting to think of the possible role played by measurement error. The returns not involving ownership in 
equation (3) simply involve weighted averages of global, country, and industry returns, and hence, are easily measured. 
The ownership return depends on knowing ownership, which is often incompletely measured or updated infrequently. 
Such effect will lead to more error in estimating foreign ownership returns, decreasing the power of our tests and biasing 
results against the significance of the ownership return. 
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2.2 Hypotheses for the Ownership Return 
The ownership return fits closely with a few different explanations in the literature. We consider 
if the ownership return is acting as a proxy for omitted country/industry variation, investor 
habitat, or wealth effects. 
1.2.1 Omitted country/industry variation 
As shown in equation (3), global, local, and industry factors are separately examined. 
Additionally, we will perform several checks to examine if an empirical regression like equation 
(3) is properly controlling for these effects. Most notably, institutions may purchase stocks with 
similar country and industry characteristics, and the ownership return could be a more precise 
proxy of these characteristics. We examine this hypothesis by creating a non-ownership return 
that has identical country, industry and size characteristics as the ownership return, but is based 
on stocks with no common ownership connection. Additionally, we perform robustness checks 
based upon different market and industry return definitions. 
2.2.2 Habitat investing 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) formalize a ‘habitat’ view of comovement where 
investors trade in a limited set of stocks. If investors in a habitat have certain views, they push 
the prices of stocks in their habitat up and down together.11 Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) show that overconfident investors misinterpret information about 
economic factors in a correlated fashion, which causes stock price fluctuations and mispricing.12 
Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) build on this intuition to show that a misvaluation factor generates 
comovement in returns beyond standard factors. This provides another motivation for why an 
                                                 
11 Stulz (1981b) proposes that investors may prefer home country assets because these assets could provide superior 
hedges against future state variables that affect investors’ intertemporal expected utility. It is possible that an investor’s 
habitat of stocks is determined by certain intertemporal hedging properties. 
12 Hence, variation due to common country and industry effects need not be due purely to rational pricing.  
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investor habitat can proxy for investors with either similar levels of overconfidence or who react 
to public signals in a manner that causes stock price comovement.  
In our setting, heterogeneous global investors with different market perceptions could 
influence stock prices as their holdings and preferences for stocks in particular investment 
locales oscillate in ways that cut across national borders and industries. For each stock, the 
ownership return could be thought of as the weighted average of the actions of the investors in 
all related stocks. If there truly exists a common investment locale or ‘habitat’ for groups of 
stocks, institutions should move capital into and out of these habitats in a similar fashion. We test 
this by examining if the changes in ownership for a stock i is related to the value-weighted 
holding changes in stocks held by the firm’s owners. Moreover, we also examine habitat by 
grouping stocks into those with low, medium, and high ownership linkages to stock i. We then 
identify whether the covariation of ownership changes as well as returns is strongest from those 
stocks with the highest cross-ownership. 
In a related vein, the category view [Barberis and Shleifer (2003)] hypothesizes that 
stocks move together because investors mentally lump them into categories (e.g. value vs. 
growth). To examine this category based view, we use detailed size, value, and momentum 
proxies both at the local and global level. 
2.2.3 Wealth effects 
A simple implication of portfolio rebalancing is that if stock prices increase in one group of 
securities, investors may want to diversify away from this group and increase their holdings in 
other securities. This basic aspect of portfolio rebalancing plays a role in many models.13 We 
will test this basic feature of portfolio rebalancing by examining if owners experiencing an 
                                                 
13 See for example equation 4 in Bohn and Tesar (1996), equation 6 in Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004), Figure 5 in 
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), and page 1412 in Kyle and Xiong (2001). 
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increase in wealth through high returns on other securities increase their holdings in a stock in 
the form of a wealth effect. 
Some of the portfolio rebalancing models are derived in the context of international 
contagion. For example, Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) propose that when an international 
investor’s domestic holdings decrease, she has lower wealth and is more likely to sell her foreign 
holdings. However, the investor is also more averse to the strategic risk that other international 
investors will be in a similar position and want to sell their international holdings. This generates 
international comovement in returns of assets that are held by the same investors, even without 
common fundamentals.14 Thus, in addition to basic portfolio rebalancing mechanisms, some of 
these models call for asymmetries surrounding negative returns and particularly in periods of 
crisis. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Our international institutional holdings are from FactSet/LionShares. Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
is the first academic paper to use the annual institutional filings from this data source. We follow 
many of their data cleaning procedures augmented with other standard checks for 13f filings as 
described in Supplemental Appendix A. Like Ferreira and Matos (2008), we obtain the historical 
LionShares database that is free from survivorship bias. FactSet/LionShares do not provide 
detailed disclosure of their sources, but they do use data from public filings obtained in various 
countries supplemented by companies’ annual reports. Their coverage appears to be lacking in 
                                                 
14 Calvo (1999) finds that leveraged losses in one market will cause forced liquidations in another, and Kyle and Xiong 
(2001) propose that when convergence traders suffer trading losses they have a reduced capacity for risk bearing and sell 
positions in both countries. Such effects are intensified when there is information asymmetry and herding by 
uninformed agents [Calvo (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), and Yuan (2005)]. Empirically, Choe, Kho, and Stulz 
(1999), Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), and Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006), among others, examine contagion. 
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capital originating outside of the United States. Wei (2011) finds that the United States and the 
United Kingdom account for slightly over 70 percent of LionShares’ non-domestic capital. 
LionShares contains two main databases: the aggregate institutional filings (similar to 13f 
in the United States), and the mutual fund database (similar to N-CSR mutual fund filings in the 
United States). LionShares provides the number of shares held by a fund or institution, as well as 
the total number of shares outstanding for each stock at a point in time. We aim to maximize data 
coverage. Hence, we use the institutional database as our primary database but add additional 
ownership information from the fund database if the parent institution’s holdings are not in the 
institutional ownership database. 
Appendix Table A2.1 details the frequency of coverage by database for the final sample 
and shows that 48 percent is annual, 32 percent biannual, and 14 percent quarterly. While most 
of the data in the United States is reported quarterly, in most other countries biannual and annual 
data is the norm. Appendix Table A2.2 details the number of institutions and mutual funds in the 
database through time and shows that the sample grows rapidly from 2001 to 2005.  
For returns and market value data, we use Thomson Financial’s Datastream total return 
indices and market values. In order to have a common currency to compute global returns, we 
download data in local currency and convert it into U.S. dollars using exchange rates from 
Datastream. We use filters for common equity as well as reversion and extreme return filters to 
smooth potential data errors as described with other details in Supplemental Appendix A. To 
ensure that our results are not driven by infrequent trading, we require stocks to exhibit trading 
for at least 30 percent in the previous year.15
                                                 
15 The percentage of zero returns is the main measure of liquidity used by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007). This 
measure is similar to Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)’s transactions costs measure, but is less subject to 
estimation problems. Higher trading filters of 50 and 75 percent yield similar results (as shown in Panel B of Table S2.4).  
15 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics  
The table shows summary statistics on the percent of firms in the sample with foreign institutional ownership, the number of firms with foreign institutional 
ownership, and the percentage of foreign institutional ownership. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. To be included in the sample, firms are required 
to have non-missing data on lagged foreign ownership and at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year. Panel A shows statistics for Developed 
Markets, while Panel B shows results for Emerging Markets (based on the MSCI classification as of June 2006). In each panel, results are broken down by 
country, region and size quintiles (small to large, using common U.S. breakpoints). Size is measured by market capitalization in U.S. Dollars as of December in 
the previous year. The first group of columns shows the percentage of firms in the sample that have data on foreign institutional ownership. The second group 
shows the number of firms with foreign ownership, and the third shows the average percentage of (free-float adjusted) foreign institutional ownership. Foreign 
Ownership is free-float adjusted by dividing it by one minus the percentage of closely held shares, where missing values of closely held shares are set to zero. 
Averages are first taken by year and subsequently across time. Ownership data is from LionShares, market capitalization data is from Datastream, and data on 
closely held shares is from Worldscope. 
(continued) 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel A: Developed Markets 
 % of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Number of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Foreign Institutional Ownership (%)
  
 Small 2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large 
Australia 33.2 74.9 86.3 91.3 91.7  126 99 67 52 47  3.3 4.9 5.8 7.8 12.2 
Austria 66.0 71.8 89.0 97.5 98.9  7 7 7 13 10  3.7 10.6 14.3 17.8 23.8 
Belgium 78.8 74.5 79.2 74.6 88.5  12 13 13 10 15  1.3 8.1 17.8 13.0 14.7 
Canada 35.6 79 85.5 90.0 94.0  390 144 87 70 67  3.5 7.3 14.2 17.3 26.3 
Denmark 54.5 71.3 81.2 72.8 90.8  12 22 18 12 14  3.7 2.3 4.2 9.3 16.2 
Finland 74.5 91.1 89.2 88.7 96.2  18 22 16 19 14  2.8 10.7 14.0 18.4 26.4 
France 54.3 72.2 89.0 89.6 94.8  102 73 75 60 79  3.4 6.7 10.7 16.1 18.4 
Germany 58.5 78.7 83.1 81.3 92.1  135 79 62 52 67  1.8 6.2 11.4 18.6 20.1 
Ireland 68.0 81.9 81.4 83.5 91.6  6 7 6 8 11  13.4 18.0 22.5 32.8 34.3 
Italy 61.4 75.1 79.0 84.0 82.5  13 32 38 34 46  1.8 4.5 8.4 10.9 15.5 
Japan 27.5 69.1 89.1 95.1 97.3  205 551 572 434 351  1.2 1.7 3.2 5.7 9.5 
Luxembourg 30.0 85.7 86.4 69.7 96.8  1 1 3 3 3  14.2 0.6 22.3 48.1 37.0 
Netherlands 35.5 59.2 69.7 69.7 84.2  7 12 14 18 23  3.2 12.5 24.3 24.2 31.0 
New Zealand 53.3 89.7 93.8 92.0 100  8 15 12 9 3  1.3 6.6 10.7 8.1 37.6 
Norway 66.0 81.4 93.7 96.8 95.1  17 21 23 20 11  2.0 4.5 12.7 19.3 28.1 
Portugal 47.0 74.0 75.9 57.6 94.5  5 6 7 4 10  2.3 4.2 7.4 23.0 11.8 
Spain 93.8 79.5 82.9 72.2 79.0  3 11 18 17 33  1.0 2.3 6.9 10.6 15.5 
Sweden 58.3 83 93 94 99.6  57 46 32 26 28  2.4 6.1 9.9 14.2 16.8 
Switzerland 68.5 74.5 75.8 66.9 69.2  11 23 30 27 11  3.6 5.2 13.0 19.8 16.5 
United Kingdom 73.0 88.4 88.2 82.9 85.0  144 155 151 124 135  1.8 3.4 5.3 8.4 11.6 
United States 96.9 99.5 99.0 96.9 99.1  741 871 873 881 944  0.7 1.2 2.1 2.6 4.8 
Developed  51.9 82.8 91.6 92.1 95.3  2,018 2,208 2,122 1,893 1,920  1.8 3.0 4.9 7.0 10.1 
Developed  ex US 40.9 74.7 87.1 88.3 91.8  1,277 1,337 1,249 1,012 977  2.6 4.1 6.8 10.6 15.0 
(continued) 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
 % of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Number of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Foreign Institutional Ownership (%)
  
 Small 2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large 
Argentina 53.9 75.4 94.2 93.2 90.4  5 5 7 8 5  1.1 1.8 3.4 9 19.5 
Bangladesh 6.3 16.1 13.6 14.3 0.0  2 2 2 1   2.5 0.8 0.6 2.4  
Bermuda 0.0 100 44.4 66.7 100   1 1 2 2   61.6 85.9 45.9 44.6 
Brazil 52.6 58.3 63.6 75.6 86.5  3 5 9 14 19  7.0 2.4 5.5 13.5 16.2 
Bulgaria 16.7 33.3 70.0 100   1 2 2 2   1.4 2.4 1.8 5.0  
Chile 38.1 57.1 61.8 77.6 88.1  2 4 7 13 13  2.8 2.6 1.7 12.1 20.2 
China 9.9 3.4 8.1 17.0 54.5  5 10 39 53 31  3.0 15.4 10.8 9.1 17.1 
Colombia 0.0 33.3 55.0 79.1 93.1   1 2 4 5   2.9 0.7 1.6 1.1 
Croatia 0.0 55.6 85.7 100 71.4   1 2 1 1   2.7 5.0 24.6 21.7 
Cyprus 5.8 14.5 26.1 45.0 69.2  3 4 2 2 2  1.5 0.0 0.1 6.7 4.5 
Czech Republic 7.1 0.0 57.1 100 100  1  1 2 3  0.0  11.5 43.9 41.4 
Egypt 8.2 24.1 57.4 71 100  2 3 6 6 5  1.0 1.0 1.6 7.5 15.9 
Estonia 57.5 84.6 100 100   5 1 3 3   15.2 42.0 48.0 24.1  
Greece 40.3 45.2 57.2 70.2 91.5  33 31 28 21 16  0.6 1.8 4.4 6.7 18.4 
Hong Kong 34.2 56.9 70.9 84.1 91.6  61 80 68 42 37  2.6 7.1 13.3 25.1 22.9 
Hungary 24.0 40.0 57.1 74 100  4 3 2 3 4  8.7 15.9 14.5 41.0 34.2 
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 60 67.0     3 4     5.8 0.2 
India 16.5 42.4 61.0 67.5 83.0  37 65 69 47 37  1.3 2.3 4.5 8.5 17.4 
Indonesia 27.3 39.2 42 70 72.7  15 13 9 10 8  7.2 10.0 11.1 20.4 35.6 
Israel 35.5 50.5 76.8 95.7 99.0  19 21 21 17 8  2.9 5.0 9.6 10.7 17.6 
Kenya 32.8 64.4 51.6 88.9 100  3 4 3 4 1  1.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.3 
Korea, Republic Of 21.0 52.7 83.2 93.5 98.4  100 137 86 55 40  1.9 4.4 8.1 13.5 19.4 
Latvia 50.9 90.9 86.7 66.7   4 3 2 1   9.8 10.7 8.5 0.3  
Lithuania 53.5 83.1 42.3 94.1 100  9 8 2 3 1  8.1 8.0 3.9 10.9 2.8 
Malaysia 32.6 57.0 84.5 96.3 100  73 74 60 40 20  2.2 2.1 6.7 7.7 14.6 
Malta  100 100 100    1 1 2    2.7 3.4 1.9  
Mauritius  80.0 87.5 100    2 4 1    0.3 1.5 6.3  
Mexico 23.8 54.5 69.0 80.4 98.0  1 2 4 8 11  0.5 6.2 8.1 11.9 15.4 
Morocco 2.2 4.1 29.5 60 70.8  1 1 3 5 3  0.1 0.0 0.7 0.7 3.2 
Pakistan 7.2 25.1 52.3 81.5 100  4 6 10 5 3  0.8 1.9 1.7 4.0 7.7 
Peru 22.0 27.3 55.6 65.2 81.3  1 2 3 5 2  5.6 9.5 0.5 3.1 25.8 
Philippines 38.6 73.0 78.0 83.3 86.0  8 9 8 7 5  22.2 19.9 24.8 63.2 93.2 
Poland 43.7 76.2 89.1 95.7 100  41 22 15 12 7  1.7 6.6 13.9 16.7 36.4 
Romania 46.8 81.8 90.0 100 100  10 5 2 2 2  6.4 10.5 4.5 2.1 2.5 
(continued) 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
 % of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Number of Firms with Foreign Ownership  Foreign Institutional Ownership (%)
  
 Smal
l 
2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large  Small 2 3 4 Large 
Singapore 34.3 63.1 72.8 85.5 84.4  45 54 32 20 14  1.9 4.3 11.6 17.3 39.9 
Slovakia 25.0 50.0 100 100 100  1 1 1 1 1  23.7 1.2 17.0 13.8 7.4 
Slovenia 66.7 54.5 45.0 81.8 100  10 5 4 3 3  2.3 0.0 0.4 1.8 2.5 
South Africa 30.7 59.9 66.9 61.6 78.4  13 20 26 24 22  0.5 1.7 4.3 9.8 21.1 
Sri Lanka 27.0 61.4 52.6 100   6 6 1 2   4.5 12.3 8.5 38.6  
Taiwan 20.8 45.3 65.8 87.1 97.4  53 108 109 72 42  1.0 2.4 3.8 7.2 13.2 
Thailand 27.5 55.6 75.9 93.3 100  25 29 25 18 12  5.3 7.2 12.6 14.9 24.9 
Turkey 27.9 72.0 80.2 93.4 99.0  22 37 29 20 12  2.2 5.3 9.4 21.4 27.1 
United Arab Em.   100 100 100    1 1 1    27.5 35.6 38.7 
Venezuela 77.3 90.0 62.5 66.7 100  3 2 2 2 2  4.4 0.3 1.3 21.2 91.8 
Emerging 26.8 45.0 53.6 59.5 86.3   572 760 678 545 384   2.6 4.2 7.3 12.2 20.1 
All countries 43.0 68.1 78.2 82.1 93.6  2,589 2,969 2,800 2,439 2,304  2.0 3.3 5.5 8.1 11.7 
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Table 2.1 shows the percent of firms with foreign ownership coverage, the number of 
firms with foreign ownership, and the fraction of market capitalization held by foreign 
institutions for those firms with coverage in the LionShares database over the January 1, 2000 to 
March 31, 2009 period. We use common U.S. breakpoints based on U.S. dollar market 
capitalization. Panel A is for developed markets and Panel B is for developing (emerging) 
markets. In terms of the number of firms with foreign ownership coverage, the sample is 
naturally more heavily tilted towards developed markets, where all size bins have more than 
1,000 firms as compared to 384 to 760 firms per bin in emerging markets. Overall, our sample 
includes a total of 13,101 firms, 8,790 of which are from outside of the U.S. 
Finally, for stocks with foreign ownership, we report the percent of foreign institutional 
ownership. Panel A shows that firms in developed countries outside of the United States have 
15.0 percent foreign ownership in the largest size quintile, and 2.6 percent in the smallest size 
quintile. For our regressions we will focus on non-U.S. firms since foreign ownership is small in 
the United States. Panel B shows similar coverage in emerging markets with 20.1 percent of 
shares held by foreigners in the largest quintile, and 2.6 percent in the smallest. Our main tests 
focus on stocks with more than five percent foreign ownership. Table 2.1 indicates that this 
sample is tilted toward large stocks but still captures many stocks in the bottom three size bins. 
4. Cross-sectional and Time-series Importance of Ownership Returns 
To examine the potential economic and statistical importance of the ownership return, we first 
evaluate the ownership returns with cross-sectional and time-series tests.
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Table 2.2: Cross-Sectional Regressions with Ownership Returns 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership 
Return), Ownership Return lagged by one period, the average of Ownership Return lagged by 2-4 periods, expected returns from a CAPM with local and world 
market index, and global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). Local Beta and World Beta are first estimated from rolling 
regressions using past two-year returns, where the returns of each stock is regressed on the returns on the value-weighted local country market returns, and the 
returns of the MSCI world market index:       , ,jt j L L t W M SCI t jtR R R . The Local Beta is then multiplied with the contemporaneous local market returns 
(Local Beta*Local Market), and the World Beta is multiplied with the contemporaneous MSCI world market returns (World Beta * World Market) to construct 
the CAPM expected returns. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the 
previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The table shows results for regressions with weekly, monthly, and quarterly returns, 
respectively. It reports the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West 
(1987) procedure with 3 lags. Ownership data is from LionShares, and return data for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from Datastream. 
 
  Weekly   Monthly   Quarterly 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Ownership Return 0.484 0.224 0.215 0.625 0.338 0.309 0.710 0.391 0.358 
  (21.4) (13.6) (12.6) (11.5) (9.52) (7.51) (7.11) (4.76) (3.71) 
Ownership Return (lagged) 0.097 0.060 -0.069 
  (5.64) (1.54) (-1.01) 
Ownership Return (lagged, avg. of 2, 3, 4) 0.080 -0.029 0.376 
  (2.54) (-0.47) (3.07) 
Local Beta*Local Market 0.784 0.782 0.789 0.788 0.768 0.746 
  (81.3) (82.2) (32.5) (33.1) (15.4) (15.3) 
World Beta*World Market 1.354 1.347 72.950 72.986 0.203 0.223 
  (2.33) (2.39) (1.02) (1.02) (0.40) (0.47) 
Industry 0.256 0.255 0.344 0.339 0.405 0.408 
  (25.4) (25.7) (13.8) (13.6) (9.78) (10.2) 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.105 0.108 0.012 0.120 0.123 0.015 0.132 0.138 
Average Number of Firms 2,117 1,997 1,990 2,118 2,002 1,969 2,088 1,607 1,441 
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4.1 Cross-sectional Regressions 
Table 2.2 reports results from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for all non-U.S. 
stocks with more than five percent foreign ownership for weekly, monthly, and quarterly 
frequencies. In the univariate specification, we find that a one percent increase in 
contemporaneous weekly ownership returns is associated with a 48.4 basis point increase in a 
stock’s return. In order to control for the expected local and global cost of capital changes due to 
both returns and betas, we use prior estimated betas times the contemporaneous local or global 
stock return movement.16 After controlling for the local and global cost of capital and the 
industry return, a one percent increase in the ownership return is associated with a 0.224 return 
increase. The comparable specification 2 shows a stronger ownership effect (0.338) at the 
monthly frequency, and an even stronger coefficient (0.391) at the quarterly frequency. 
Interestingly, these coefficients are nearly as large as those of the industry return at the weekly 
(0.256), monthly (0.344), and quarterly (0.405) frequencies. 
In specification 3 we include the lagged foreign ownership return. At the weekly frequency 
the lags are significant, especially in the prior week. These lag effects are potentially consistent 
with portfolio rebalancing, but the effects are small and dissipate rather quickly. We imagine that 
they would be difficult to trade on in real time. Lag effects show no significance at the monthly 
frequency and potentially some significance at the quarterly frequency over the entire prior year, 
though our ten-year time-series sample seems too short to make such prior-year inferences.17 
In supplemental results (Panel A of Table S2.2), for stocks with foreign ownership greater 
than five percent, we also estimate panel regressions with time fixed effects and standard errors 
                                                 
16 We later perform other risk adjustments as well. 
17 We also examine stocks with low (0-1 percent), medium (1-5 percent), and high (greater than 5 percent) foreign 
ownership in Panel A of Supplemental Table S2.1. The coefficients and t-statistics are increasing in the level of foreign 
ownership. 
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clustered by firm to account for firm and time effects. Given that our sample size increases over 
time, the panel regressions put more weight on recent periods, while Fama-MacBeth regressions 
treat each period equally. After controls for the local and world cost of capital and the industry 
return, the ownership return coefficient is 0.313 with a t-statistic of 5.35 for stocks with high 
foreign ownership.18  
4.2 Time-series Regression 
We now turn to examining the explanatory power of the ownership returns using the time-series 
approach of Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009), which is advantageous in that we can control 
for multiple forms of risk in the standard time-series regression framework. In order for the 
coefficient estimates to vary fully across stocks, we estimate regressions at the individual stock 
level and then aggregate up the coefficients. For stocks with more than five percent foreign 
ownership, Panels A-C of Table 2.3 shows the regressions estimates over three sub-periods with 
weekly data. 
We first examine the importance of the ownership return beyond the local market return. 
The average coefficient on the ownership return (specification 3) is 0.308 in the 2000 to 2002 
period (Panel A), 0.207 from 2003 to 2005 (Panel B), and 0.208 from 2006 to the first quarter of 
2009 (Panel C). A coefficient of 0.208 indicates that a weekly stock return increases by twenty 
basis points when the ownership return increases by 100 basis points, even after controlling for 
variation in the local market. This coefficient is similar in size to that of the world market return 
(0.361, 0.183, and 0.171 for the three sub-periods in specification 2) or global industry return 
                                                 
18 The ownership return factor will be inaccurate to the extent that institutions sell off their stocks over the quarter. 
In Supplemental Figure S1 we show weekly ownership return coefficients averaged over the course of quarters and 
find that the ownership return coefficients reduce only very slightly at the end of the quarter, and are generally quite 
stable. 
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Table 2.3: Time-Series Regressions with Ownership Returns 
 
The table shows the results of time-series regressions of weekly stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the local 
market index excluding own stock (Local Market), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), 
the world market index excluding the local market (World Market), global industry index returns excluding the 
industry in the local market (Industry), as well as local and global zero-investment portfolios based on market-to-
book (HML), market capitalization (SMB), and momentum (WML). The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. 
The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at 
least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The regression models are as follows: 
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The table reports the mean coefficients and adjusted R2 across firms, as well as the number of firms. Panels A, B, 
and C show results for the sub-periods 2000Q1-2002Q4, 2003Q1-2005Q4, and 2006Q1-2009Q1, respectively. Panel 
D shows the average Mean Squared Error (MSE) of correlations following Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009) for 
each of the models (1)-(9) as well as the difference in the MSE. Tests of significance of differences in MSE are 
based on bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 randomly drawn samples with replacement. Ownership data is 
from LionShares. Accounting data is from Worldscope, while return data for individual stocks, market indices, and 
industry indices is from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: First Quarter 2000 – Fourth Quarter 2002 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Return     0.308     0.298 0.150   0.213 
Local Market 0.808 0.603 0.599 0.566 0.609 0.594 0.603 0.631 0.628 
World Market   0.361     
-
0.128 0.028 
-
0.277 0.360 0.113 
Industry       0.409 0.444   0.428     
Local HML               
-
0.088 
-
0.075 
World HML               0.031 0.034 
Local SMB               0.036 0.040 
World SMB               0.129 0.126 
Local WML               
-
0.001 
-
0.001 
World WML               0.001 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.179 0.183 0.210 0.216 0.188 0.221 0.243 0.247 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
(continued) 
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Table 2.3: Time-Series Regressions of Ownership Returns (continued) 
 
Panel B: First Quarter 2003 – Fourth Quarter 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Return 0.207 0.299 0.264 0.417 
Local Market 0.892 0.815 0.779 0.761 0.780 0.775 0.744 0.815 0.766 
World Market 0.183 
-
0.082 
-
0.113 
-
0.333 0.258 
-
0.155 
Industry 0.247 0.286 0.279 
Local HML 
-
0.014 
-
0.013 
World HML 0.109 0.132 
Local SMB 0.086 0.119 
World SMB 0.174 0.160 
Local WML 
-
0.001 
-
0.001 
World WML 0.000 0.001 
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.227 0.229 0.236 0.241 0.232 0.245 0.250 0.255 
Number of Firms 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 
Panel C: First Quarter 2006 – First Quarter 2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Return 0.208 0.364 0.315 0.435 
Local Market 0.985 0.874 0.818 0.815 0.850 0.818 0.805 0.878 0.823 
World Market 0.171 
-
0.174 
-
0.186 
-
0.482 0.229 
-
0.182 
Industry 0.237 0.339 0.339 
Local HML 0.259 0.252 
World HML 
-
0.138 
-
0.178 
Local SMB 0.103 0.155 
World SMB 0.214 0.204 
Local WML 
-
0.002 
-
0.002 
World WML 0.001 0.001 
Adjusted R2 0.339 0.349 0.351 0.355 0.362 0.356 0.368 0.381 0.387 
Number of Firms 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 3,126 
(continued) 
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Table 2.3: Time-Series Regressions of Ownership Returns (continued) 
 
Panel D: MSE Tests of Model Comparison 
  Reg # MSE   Reg # MSE   Reg # MSE   Reg # MSE
Incremental Contribution of the Ownership 
Return           
Base Model (1) 0.038  (2) 0.025  (5) 0.021  (8) 0.013
Base Model with Ownership Return (3) 0.026  (6) 0.023  (7) 0.019  (9) 0.012
Difference  0.012   0.002   0.002   0.001
p-value  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001   <.0001
Incremental Contribution of the Industry 
Return           
Base Model (1) 0.038  (2) 0.025  (6) 0.023    
Base Model with Industry Return (4) 0.026  (5) 0.021  (7) 0.019    
Difference  0.012   0.004   0.004    
p-value  <.0001   <.0001   <.0001    
Incremental Contribution of the World 
Return           
Base Model (1) 0.038  (4) 0.026  (3) 0.026    
Base Model with World Return (2) 0.025  (5) 0.021  (6) 0.023    
Difference  0.013   0.005   0.003    
p-value   <.0001     <.0001     <.0001       
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 (0.409, 0.247, and 0.237 in specification 4).19 Comparing the incremental adjusted R2 in 
specifications 2-4 to specification 1 shows that the incremental explanatory power of the 
ownership return is higher than that of the world return, but not quite as large as that of the 
global industry return. Regressions (6) and (7) show similarly large coefficients and incremental 
explanatory power on the ownership return, over and above the local market, global market, and 
industry factors. This indicates that the importance of ownership is not attributable to 
fundamentals proxied for by global market or industry returns. 
We also wish to control for variation due to common styles such as value and growth. To 
do so, we construct the weekly regional and global value, size and momentum factors (i.e. HML, 
SMB and WML) following Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) and Fama and French (2012).20 
Regression (9) shows that the ownership return coefficients are still of large magnitude with 
these alternative controls, indicating that the ownership return effect is not simply due to the 
common movement of global style or factors. 
We now turn to a more formal evaluation of the various models. Bekaert, Hodrick, and 
Zhang (2009) convincingly argue that comparing models with the mean squared error of 
correlations is appropriate for examining which model best characterizes the covariance matrix 
of returns.21 We follow their procedures, except that we use individual stocks rather than 
portfolios.22 For specifications in Panel D, we follow Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009) and 
                                                 
19 Because the global market and the foreign ownership return are highly correlated, when both terms are included, the 
global market coefficients are often negative (specification 6). 
20 We include both local and global factors to give maximum chance to the factor model. Similar to Griffin (2002), Fama 
and French (2012) find that the local factors perform better in time-series tests. Karolyi and Wu (2012) show that global 
factors are more important with globally traded ADR/GDR assets.  
21 The approach involves determining which model provides the best fit for the sample covariance structure. If a 
factor model is true, the common factors should explain as much as possible of the sample covariance matrix and the 
residual covariance components should be small. To compare the performance of alternative models, one can use a 
mean squared error criterion, which is the time series mean of a weighted average of squared errors.  
22 In the context of standard asset pricing tests, Ang, Liu, and Schwartz (2010) propose that using individual stocks is 
more efficient than using portfolios. 
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estimate the regressions over six-month periods to allow for possible time-variation. 
Bootstrapped p-values are computed following their procedure where we bootstrap from the 
time-series of our MSEs to compute an empirical distribution. 
Panel D shows that the MSE with only the local market is 0.038, whereas it improves to 
0.026 when the ownership return is added. Interestingly, the improvement due to adding the 
global industry or world market return to the local market factor is extremely similar (MSEs of 
0.026 and 0.025). Other specifications examine the incremental improvement from adding the 
ownership return onto models without the factor and find that the ownership return leads to 
smaller MSEs than using a model with the global market, industry returns, or global style factors. 
5. Does the Ownership Return Simply Proxy for Missing Economic Characteristics? 
Here we examine possible explanations for whether the ownership return proxies for an omitted 
stock characteristic. 
5.1 A simulation experiment 
The ownership return may capture a common set of country and industry characteristics held by 
the institutional base in the stock. Institutional shareholders may specialize in country and 
industry characteristics beyond what our linear country and industry classifications can capture. 
Thus, we create a non-ownership return that has the exact same country, industry, and size 
composition as our ownership return, except that we sever the ownership link. For example, for 
Samsung’s largest shareholder, Capital World Investors, we look at each stock held by Capital 
World Investors and replace that stock with a stock in the same country, industry, and size bin 
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Table 2.4: Non-Ownership Returns and Adjusted Returns 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly stock returns on the foreign ownership return and various control variables. In particular, 
returns are regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), one of four alternative versions of a Non-
Ownership return, Local Market returns, global industry index returns (Industry), betas and expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index, 
and Fama and French (2011) factors and betas. The Non-Ownership Return variables are constructed by replacing each of the actual (foreign) holdings of a stock 
by an institution with stocks in the same country and industry not held by any owner of the stock in question. The four alternative versions of the Non-Ownership 
return are based on either using the average return of all stocks in the same country and industry (based on 48 Fama French classifications) that are not held by 
any other institution owning the stock (Non-Ownership Return (Average Stock)), or by using the average return of all stocks in the same country and industry 
(based on 2-digit SIC code classifications) that are not held by any other institution owning the stock (Non-Ownership Return (Average Stock) (2-digit SIC)), or 
by using the return of the largest stock in the same country and industry (based on 48 Fama French classifications) that are not held by any other institution 
owning the stock (Non-Ownership Return (Largest Stock)), or by using the return of the largest stock in the same country and industry (based on 2-digit SIC 
code classifications) that are not held by any other institution owning the stock (Non-Ownership Return (Largest Stock) (2-digit SIC)). Local Beta and World 
Beta are first estimated from rolling regressions using past two-year returns, where the returns of each stock is regressed on the returns on the value-weighted 
local country market returns, and on the returns of the MSCI world market index:       , ,jt j L L t W M SCI t jtR R R . Specification (8) includes Industry, local 
market, HML, SMB, and Momentum factors, as well as Local and Global Market Betas, Local and Global HML Betas, Local and Global SMB Betas, Local and 
Global Momentum Betas. We obtain Local market, Local HML, Local SMB, and Local momentum factors from Fama and French (2011). We estimate Local 
and Global Market Betas, Local and Global HML Betas, Local and Global SMB Betas, and Local and Global Momentum Betas from rolling regressions on the 
corresponding 8 Fama and French factors using past two-year returns. The estimated Fama and French betas are windsorized to 10 (-10) if they are above 10 
(below -10). Specifications (1)-(8) use the raw stock return as a dependent variable. Specification (9) subtracts the expected return from a CAPM with local and 
global market from the raw return, and uses this adjusted return as a dependent variable. The Local Beta is then multiplied with the contemporaneous local 
market returns (Local Beta*Local Market), and the World Beta is multiplied with the contemporaneous MSCI world market returns (World Beta * World 
Market) to construct the CAPM expected returns. Specification (10) subtracts the expected returns from an International Fama and French (2011) model from the 
raw return and uses this adjusted return as a dependent variable. The eight Fama and French Betas are multiplied with the contemporaneous factors to construct 
the Fama-French expected returns. They are insignificant and not reported. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks 
with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The table reports the average 
coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. 
Ownership data is from LionShares, and return data for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from Datastream. 
(continued) 
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Table 2.4: Non-Ownership Returns and Adjusted Returns (continued) 
 
  Returns   
Adj. Ret. 
(Intl. 
CAPM) 
Adj. 
Ret. 
(Intl. 
 FF) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Ownership Return   0.728 0.726 0.732 0.733 0.405 0.349 0.345   0.433 0.124 
    (7.20) (7.33) (7.63) (7.85) (5.78) (4.48) (4.16)   (3.89) (1.63) 
Non-Ownership Ret (Avg. Stock) 0.113 -0.100                   
  (1.47) (-1.08)                   
Non-Ownership Ret (Avg. Stock) (SIC2)     -0.090                 
      (-1.17)                 
Non-Ownership Ret (Largest Stock)       -0.081               
        (-1.09)               
Non-Ownership Ret (Largest Stock) 
(SIC2)         -0.083             
          (-1.15)             
Industry           0.537 0.418 0.480   0.457 0.354 
            (15.03) (10.68) (12.88)   (10.16) (4.84) 
Local Market           0.827 0.831       
            (18.99) (22.66)       
Local Beta             -0.004         
              (-0.37)         
Global Beta             -0.005         
              (-0.59)         
Local Market, Local HML, Local SMB, 
Local and Global Market Betas, Local and 
Global HML Betas, Local and Global 
SMB Betas, Local and Global Momentum 
Betas all included             Yes       
                        
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.113 0.141 0.122   0.030 0.010 
Average Number of Firms 2,086 2,086 2,086 2,086 2,086 2,086 1,607 1,569   1,607 1,569 
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that is not held by any of the owners of Samsung.23 The results reported in Table 2.4 show that 
the coefficient on the non-ownership return is close to zero. We repeat this process with two-
digit SIC industries that are potentially more precise. We also perform the analysis where we 
always pick the largest non-ownership stock within the country-industry bucket to make sure the 
non-ownership return is of similar or larger size composition. We also combine the industry and 
large stocks analysis. All of these coefficients in specifications 2-4 are close to zero, indicating 
that ownership returns are not simply proxying for stocks of similar country and industry 
characteristics. 
A potential concern of our non-ownership return is that it is just one realization. To 
further investigate the importance of the returns with the same country and industry structure, we 
slightly modify our approach and conduct a simulation based on non-ownership returns. In each 
draw, we do the following. For each stock (e.g. Samsung) held by the foreign investor (e.g. 
Capital World Investor), we randomly draw another stock from the same country, industry, and 
size bin that is not held by any of the stock’s shareholders. We then create a non-ownership 
return. This non-ownership return is added to an artificial data set that also includes the original 
ownership returns and other control variables. We create 200 such datasets based on alternative 
random draws of non-ownership returns. We then estimate univariate and multivariate 
regressions and generate regression coefficients for each of the datasets to obtain an empirical 
distribution of regression statistics. Our simulation regression coefficients have a mean of 0.0034 
and range from 0.0018 to 0.061 (Panel A of Table S2.3). In none of the 200 datasets is the 
                                                 
23 We take two approaches in sampling comparable stocks. First, we take the average of stocks in the same country, 
industry, and size bucket. Second, because stocks less likely to be held by foreign investors are typically smaller, we 
sample the largest stock in the same country and industry that is not owned by any existing shareholder. When there are 
fewer than five stocks in the country, industry, and size bucket not owned by any existing shareholder, which happens in 
44% of the cases, we pick stocks from the same country bucket. 
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coefficient of the non-ownership return anywhere close to that of the actual ownership return of 
0.710 shown for quarterly data frequency in Table 2.2. 
5.2 Alternative Factor and Industry Controls 
For robustness, rather than estimating expected returns (beta*market), we examine the 
components separately as controls.24 In specification 7 of Table 2.4, we show that controlling for 
prior betas has little effect on the ownership return inferences. Specification 8 shows that the 
inclusion of both local SMB, HML, and Momentum factors (constructed by Fama and French 
(2012)), as well as prior local and global on these factor betas, does not drive out the significance 
of the ownership return coefficient. 
It is also feasible to control for factor variation by first purging the left hand side returns 
from all factor variation as is commonly done with benchmark adjusted returns. We first 
construct the expected returns by using estimated local and global betas over the prior 36 months 
times the contemporaneous local and global market return in specifications 9 of Table 2.4. The 
adjusted return is the difference between the actual return and the expected return. In 
Specification 10, we use the same approach with the local and global Fama and French (2012) 
factors in the model. Using risk-adjusted returns implicitly assumes that all variation due to the 
factors is more fundamental, and that the approach rules out capturing variation due to the 
ownership return that is correlated with the factors. Nevertheless, specifications 9 and 10 in 
Table 2.4 show that ownership returns remain highly significant. 
The ownership return may simply be capturing the relation between changes in 
ownership and returns as found in the United States by Wermers (1999) and by Nofsinger and 
Sias (1999). Table 2.5 also shows that contemporaneous changes in foreign ownership are 
                                                 
24 Since the global market is constant at each point in time, it cannot be used in the cross-sectional regression, but the 
local market return varies across countries. Similarly, global style factors are also the same at each point in time.  
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Table 2.5: Ownership Change, Domestic Ownership, and Alternative Industry Controls 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly stock returns on the foreign ownership return 
and various control variables. In particular, stock returns are regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign 
institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), an institutional ownership return using only the local holdings of 
an institution (Domestic ownership Return), the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), the beta on the 
local market, expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index, global industry index returns 
excluding the industry in the local market using either the 48 Fama-French Industry classification (Industry (Fama 
French)) or 2-digit SIC code industry classifications (Industry (2-digit SIC)), and fund geographic style returns. 
Local Beta and World Beta are first estimated from rolling regressions using past two-year returns, where the returns 
of each stock is regressed on the returns on the value-weighted local country market returns, and on the returns of 
the MSCI world market index:       , ,jt j L L t W M SCI t jtR R R . The Local Beta is then multiplied with the 
contemporaneous local market returns (Local Beta*Local Market), and the World Beta is multiplied with the 
contemporaneous MSCI world market returns (World Beta * World Market) to construct the CAPM expected 
returns. Fund geographic style returns are the world, region, or country index return depending on the classification 
of the fund as country, region, or global fund. If the maximum average percentage of the holdings in a country over 
the previous 12 quarters is more than 80% of the funds' total holdings, the fund is classified as a country fund. 
Otherwise, if the maximum average percentage in a region is more than 80%, it is a region fund. Otherwise it is a 
global fund. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% 
non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The table 
shows results controlling for the change in ownership as well as using alternative industry controls. The table reports 
the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with 
the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Ownership data is from LionShares, and return data for individual 
stocks, market indices and industry indices is from Datastream. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Foreign Ownership Returns 0.391 0.395 0.350 0.265 0.239 0.389 0.324 
(4.76) (4.76) (4.15) (3.84) (3.25) (4.86) (3.62) 
Domestic ownership Return    0.764 0.664 0.643     
   (12.9) (11.0) (10.9)     
Ownership Change   0.455           
  (6.66)           
Local Market     0.219 0.300       
    (4.84) (6.80)       
Local Beta*Local Market 0.768 0.764     0.390 0.763 0.753 
(15.4) (15.3)     (5.27) (15.3) (16.41) 
World Beta*World Market 0.203 0.209     0.074 0.206 0.190 
(0.40) (0.42)     (0.16) (0.39) (0.37) 
Industry (Fama French) 0.405 0.399   0.490 0.396   0.397 
(9.78) (10.0)   (15.3) (11.3)   (10.9) 
Industry (2-digit SIC)           0.343  
          (8.02)  
Fund Geographic Style -0.039 
(-0.33) 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.137 0.101 0.128 0.154 0.130 0.137 
Average Number of Firms 1,607 1,607 2,085 2,085 1,606 1,607 1,535 
 33 
 
strongly related to a stock’s quarterly return, consistent with the U.S. evidence. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the foreign ownership return is not affected by the inclusion of quarterly 
ownership changes (in Specification 2) – the quarterly ownership return is doing much more than 
capturing changes in institutional ownership. 
Recall that for ease of interpretation, the ownership return is a foreign ownership return 
constructed as the sum of the returns coming from the holders of the security for all stocks 
outside of the country of origin of the stock. However, we can also examine, with more caution, 
the return coming from all owners of the security from all stocks in the same country as the 
respective security. We call this return the ‘domestic ownership return.’ Examining the domestic 
ownership return provides a holdout sample to examine the robustness of the foreign ownership 
return. The domestic ownership return has an average correlation of 0.786 with the local market 
return, which makes controlling for the local market return important. Even with the local market 
return and foreign market returns in the cross-sectional regression, Table 2.5 shows that a one 
percent increase in the domestic ownership return is associated with a 0.76 percent increase in a 
firm’s stock return. This coefficient is about twice as high as the foreign ownership return.  
Another potential concern regarding our results is that the industry portfolios based on 49 
Fama-French industries do not adequately capture all industrial variation. To control for this 
possibility, we create a finer industrial index which is based on 2-digit SIC codes.25 Table 2.5 
shows that the ownership return coefficient remains of similar magnitude and significance with 
the finer industry control. 
                                                 
25 In our dataset, firms are in 822 4-digit SIC codes, 353 3-digit SIC codes, and 72 2-digit SIC codes. 
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We also classify funds as world, region, or country funds based on their holdings, and use 
accordingly the world, region, or country index return as a geographic style control.26 
Specification 7 in Table 2.5 shows that the size of the coefficients on the ownership return and 
changes in ownership is unaffected, indicating that the ownership return is not emanating from 
simple country-style investing, while more explicit size, value, and momentum style variation 
was examined in Table 2.3 and 2.4. 
5.3 An ADR/GDR test and other tests 
To re-address many of the concerns in the prior two sub-sections as well as to examine if 
ownership is in fact causing the importance of the ownership return, we investigate whether the 
role of the ownership return is related to a change in ownership composition. The ownership 
composition of a stock often shifts around the listing of an ADR/GDR as shown by Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999). Therefore, we investigate the role of the ownership return for the subsample of 
firms that listed a new ADR/GDR during the sample period. If the explanatory power of the 
ownership return is driven by the ownership composition of a stock and not some omitted firm 
characteristic that ownership proxies for, then the stock return of these firms should become 
more correlated with the new ownership structure after the ADR/GDR listing. 
In order to keep the same comparison set of stock returns to form the ownership return, 
we use the same ownership return weights in forming the ownership return both pre- and post-
listing. The weights are the average ownership weights in the year after the listing. If the 
ownership composition shifts around the listing date, then the ownership return should be more 
strongly related to stock returns post-listing compared to pre-listing. We estimate pooled 
                                                 
26 We calculate for each fund in the quarter the percentage of holdings that are in a country and a region. If the 
maximum average percentage of the holdings in a country over the previous 12 quarters is more than 80% of the funds' 
total holdings, the fund is classified as a country fund. Otherwise, if the maximum average percentage in a region is more 
than 80% it is a region fund. Otherwise, it is a global fund. Depending on country, region, or global classification, the 
respective monthly country, region, or global index return is selected for a fund in the following quarter. 
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Table 2.6: ADR and GDR Listing and Ownership Returns 
 
The table shows the results of pooled regressions of weekly stock returns of companies that listed a depository receipt or other cross-listing on an intercept (not 
reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), the local market index excluding own stock (Local Market), and the U.S. market index. 
All regressors are interacted with a dummy variable (ADR/GDR-Dummy) that takes the value 1 after the effective date of the ADR/GDR listing, and 0 
otherwise. The sample period used is four quarters before and four quarters after the effective date, with the effective date between 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The 
sample is limited to non-U.S. stocks. The table reports the coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the adjusted R2. Results are shown separately for all 
firms, firms with an increase in foreign ownership, and firms with an increase in foreign ownership of at least 5%. The Ownership Return is calculated using 
average weights during the first year of the ADR/GDR listing. These fixed weights are used to calculate the Ownership Return before and after the listing. 
Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks and market indices is from Datastream. ADRs/GDRs are identified based on 
LionShares and Datastream information. Effective dates for ADRs/GDRs are identified through the Bank of New York website 
(http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp) as well as CRSP. We take the first listing date. 
 
  All Firms   
Firms with Increased Foreign 
Ownership   
Firms with Increased Foreign 
Ownership > 5% 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Ownership Return  0.083 0.117   0.093 0.164   0.086 0.138 
  (3.16) (2.88)   (2.88) (2.96)   (2.24) (1.92) 
Ownership Return * ADR/GDR-Dummy  0.042 0.069   0.101 0.159   0.108 0.255 
  (1.22) (1.30)   (2.41) (2.26)   (2.19) (2.81) 
Local Market 1.032 1.016 1.016  1.060 1.040 1.039  1.056 1.042 1.039 
 (61.1) (56.7) (56.7)  (51.4) (46.9) (46.8)  (46.7) (42.3) (41.9) 
Local Market * ADR/GDR-Dummy 0.025 0.000 -0.001  0.015 -0.018 -0.020  0.006 -0.032 -0.043 
 (1.11) (0.01) (-0.05)  (0.54) (-0.59) (-0.69)  (0.21) (-0.97) (-1.29) 
U.S. Market 0.043  -0.040  0.040  -0.076  0.046  -0.051 
 (1.8)  (-1.10)  (1.4)  (-1.57)  (1.4)  (-0.85) 
U.S. Market * ADR/GDR-Dummy 0.018  -0.043  0.056  -0.090  0.042  -0.184 
 (0.55)  (-0.84)  (1.41)  (-1.37)  (0.95)  (-2.25) 
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.252 0.252  0.275 0.276 0.276  0.277 0.278 0.278 
            
Number of Observations 35,430    22,576    18,356   
Number of Firms 358    232    191   
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regressions in a framework similar to Foerster and Karolyi (1999) except for the ownership 
return variable. 
Table 2.6 shows that the ownership return is significant both before and after the listing, 
but increases largely after the ADR listing. As one would expect, the increase in the ownership 
beta is stronger and more than doubles for stocks that experience an increase in the level of 
foreign ownership along with the ADR listing. The result is robust to controlling for local and 
U.S. market returns (specifications 2 and 3) and subsumes the increase in global betas 
documented by Foerster and Karolyi (1999). Shifts in ownership linkage betas in conjunction 
with the shift in ownership composition around the listing dates suggests that a firm’s foreign 
ownership drives the ownership return relation rather than just proxying for some omitted firm 
characteristic. 
We consider whether the explanatory power of ownership returns can be explained by 
foreign exchange movements, the extent of foreign sales, the home country where the capital is 
from, the most liquid stocks, the most active markets, and aspects of data coverage as detailed in 
Table S2.4. None of these issues are driving the findings, as we describe in more detail in 
Supplemental Appendix B. 
6. Investor Habitat or Wealth Effects 
Having dismissed many alternative/mechanical explanations for the importance of the ownership 
return, there are two main possible drivers for the ownership return: habitat investing and wealth 
effects. We use the behavior of institutional ownership to distinguish between them. With habitat 
or locale investing, the ownership return reflects value fluctuations due to changing viewpoints 
of the shareholder base. These changing viewpoints should be captured in correlated movements 
of capital as an investor habitat becomes attractive or undesirable to the group of investors that 
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trade these types of securities. Wealth effects, often known as portfolio rebalancing, predict that 
the returns of the actual institutions holding a stock cause price pressure that drives returns. 
Thus, both habitat and wealth effects provide separate predictions that center on changes in a 
stock’s ownership. 
6.1 Habitat 
A stock’s habitat or locale should capture the net change in investments into and out of other 
stocks that are linked to the stock. Intuitively, referring back to the Samsung example, if habitat 
is important, we expect to see investors purchasing Samsung at the same time as they purchase 
other stocks that have the same or similar owners. Note that the change of habitat holdings is not 
the change in the holdings of Samsung’s owners themselves, but the change of the other holdings 
of all institutions that are linked to Samsung in the manner captured through Samsung’s 
ownership composition. To directly test habitat, we construct a variable that captures the change 
of holdings to stocks in the same locale of stock i as follows: 
 , , , 1 , , 1 ,
1 1
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i t i n t k n t k t
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Change of Holdings in Habitat W V C 
 
   (6) 
where Wi,n,t-1 is the percentage of market capitalization of stock i held by institution n at the end 
of the previous quarter. Vk,n,t-1 is the percentage of market capitalization of stock k in the equity 
portfolio that institution n holds at the end of the previous quarter. Ck,t is the percentage change 
of equity holdings of each stock k in the current quarter, that is, 
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. Ek,n,t is the 
dollar equity holding of stock k by fund n at time t. ,k tM  is the dollar market value of stock k at 
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time t. We impose the same assumption on ownership return weights , , 1
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  as in equation (2). 
Table 2.7 investigates the importance of habitat in three ways. First, Specification 1 
shows that a one percent increase of ownership in a firm’s ownership habitat is associated with a 
0.241 percent increase in ownership. This cross-sectional effect is also significant with a t-
statistic of 3.24. This indicates that stock ownership changes with changes of ownership of other 
stocks in the firm’s habitat. 
Second, we decompose the habitat ownership variable into three components. Among the 
stocks that have common ownership with a particular stock, we separate them into three groups, 
according to whether the stocks have low, medium, or high levels of common foreign ownership. 
We then compute an aggregate change of holdings within each group. Specifications 3-7 in 
Table 2.5 show that the changes in ownership of the stock vary strongly with the stocks with the 
highest level of common ownership habitat, but not with stocks with medium or especially low 
levels of common ownership. 
Third, we can also divide the ownership return into components. The habitat hypothesis 
suggests that stocks co-move with others with high common ownership, but not with others with 
low levels of common ownership. One can think of this analysis as dividing the ownership return 
into three components in terms of their degree of common ownership. Here, one can see that 
when all three levels of ownership are added together, the stocks with the highest level of 
common ownership move together, while the others do not. Overall, the three tests in Table 2.7 
are consistent with habitat patterns in ownership and returns.
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Table 2.7: Investor Habitat 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of changes in quarterly holdings (specifications (1)-(7)) or quarterly stock returns (specifications (8)-
(9)) on various measures of investor habitat and control variables. In particular, the independent variables are the value-weighted change in the other holdings of 
a stock’s owner from the last quarter to the current quarter, using all stocks (Habitat), or, alternatively, just the stocks that are in the bottom, middle, and top 
tercile when ranking holdings by the number of common holders (labeled Change in Foreign Holdings of Foreign Stocks (Low Common Holders), (Medium 
Common Holders), and (High Common Holders), respectively). Regressions with returns use the value-weighted returns of foreign stocks with either low, 
medium, or high common ownership as regressors, considering stocks with no common ownership separately from those with low common ownership. Further 
controls are expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index, and global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market 
(Industry). Local Beta and World Beta are first estimated from rolling regressions using past two-year returns, where the returns of each stock is regressed on the 
returns on the value-weighted local country market returns, and on the returns of the MSCI world market index:       , ,jt j L L t W M SCI t jtR R R . The Local 
Beta is then multiplied with the contemporaneous local market returns (Local Beta*Local Market), and the World Beta is multiplied with the contemporaneous 
MSCI world market returns (World Beta * World Market) to construct the CAPM expected returns. Specifications (1)-(2) are based on new and existing holders 
of a stock, specifications (3)-(4) are based on existing holders of a stock, and specifications (5)-(6) are based on all holders of a stock. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged 
foreign institutional ownership. The table reports the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected 
with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Ownership data is from LionShares, and return data for individual stocks, market indices and industry 
indices is from Datastream. 
(continued) 
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Table 2.7: Investor Habitat (continued) 
 
 
  Change in Holdings   Returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) (9) 
Change of Holdings in Habitat 0.241 0.291                 
  (3.24) (2.72)                 
Change in Holdings of Foreign Stocks (High Common Holders)     0.236     0.233 0.273       
      (4.49)     (4.47) (4.05)       
Change in Holdings of Foreign Stocks (Medium Common 
Holders)       0.086   0.118 0.144       
        (1.00)   (1.35) (1.51)       
Change in Holdings of Foreign Stocks (Low Common Holders)         
-
0.109 -0.084 -0.215       
          
(-
1.43) (-1.23) (-2.74)       
Returns of Foreign Stocks (High Common Holders)                 0.741 0.338 
                  (6.75) (6.48) 
Returns of Foreign Stocks (Medium Common Holders)                 -0.410 -0.036 
                  (-1.86) (-0.17) 
Returns of Foreign Stocks (Low Common Holders)                 -0.230 -0.319 
                  (-2.87) (-3.23) 
Returns of Foreign Stocks (No Common Holders)                 -1.701 -0.550 
                  (-8.73) (-2.71) 
Local Beta*Local Market   0.005         0.005     0.728 
    (1.75)         (1.81)     (15.21) 
World Beta*World Market   -0.004         -0.011     0.165 
    (-0.40)         (-0.91)     (0.34) 
Industry   0.006         0.006     0.410 
    (1.27)         (1.28)     (9.67) 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.010   0.040 0.143 
Number of Firms 1,991 1,582 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,991 1,582   2,053 1,598 
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Table 2.8: Wealth Effect at the Stock-Fund Level 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-McBeth regressions of quarterly changes in holdings at the stock-fund level. 
The dependent variable is the change of holdings from the previous quarter to the current quarter of a stock by a 
fund. The regressors include an intercept (not reported), the fund’s return (Owner Fund Return), the fund’s return in 
the previous quarter (i.e. lagged), the fund’s return on foreign holdings (Owner Fund Foreign Return), the fund’s 
return on foreign holdings in the previous quarter (i.e. lagged), the percentage change in holdings (i.e. the dependent 
variable) lagged by one quarter, and last quarter’s fund holding of the stock as a percentage of fund’s total assets 
minus the last quarter's average percentage holdings of the fund across stocks in the fund (Stock Holdings (lagged) – 
Average Stock Holdings (lagged)). All variables are standardized. Specifications (1)-(3) are based on new and 
existing holders of a stock, while specifications (4)-(6) are based on existing holders only. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample is limited to non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the 
previous year. The table reports the coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. 
Ownership data is from LionShares. Returns data for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices are from 
Datastream. 
 
 
  New and Existing Holders   Existing Holders 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Owner Fund Foreign Return 0.050 0.062 
  (0.64) (0.72) 
Owner Fund Foreign Return (lagged) 0.136 0.141 
  (1.50) (1.39) 
Owner Fund Return 
-
0.005 -0.027 0.000 
-
0.024 
  
(-
0.06) (-0.28) (0.00) 
(-
0.24) 
Owner Fund Return (lagged) 0.080 0.054 0.081 0.065 
  (0.80) (0.51) (0.73) (0.58) 
Percentage Change in Holdings (lagged) 0.035 0.036 
  (6.89) (6.99) 
Stock Holdings (lagged) - Average Stock Holdings 
(lagged) 0.024 
  (2.50) 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.006 
Average Number of Firm-Fund per Quarter 2,150 2,184 2,150 2,150 2,184 2,184
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Figure 2.1: Foreign Ownership Regression Coefficients over Time 
 
The figure shows the average coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The sample consists of 
non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign 
institutional ownership. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. A cross sectional regression is run over all 
firms in the sample for each week. We then take the rolling average of these coefficients in the regressions over the 
past 26 weeks. The figure shows the moving average. Shaded areas are NBER recession periods. Stock returns are 
regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), global 
industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry) and world market index returns (World). 
Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices 
is from Datastream. Data on recession periods is from the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html). 
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6.2 Wealth Effects 
We now investigate wealth effects through a direct institution-level analysis. Suppose two of 
Samsung’s shareholders, Capital World Investors and New York Retirement Funds (in Appendix 
A), have very different fund returns. Capital World Investors experiences high returns on its 
holdings, and New York Retirement has low returns. A wealth effect implies that Capital World 
Investors will increase their holdings in Samsung, whereas New York Retirement will hold their 
position constant or sell. We test this proposition directly by testing whether quarterly changes in 
each institution’s holdings of each stock depend on the institution’s past returns. In particular, we 
estimate cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is the quarterly ownership 
change for each existing institutional holding of each firm. 
Table 2.8 presents the regression results and shows that the contemporaneous institutional 
returns are statistically and economically unrelated to the institution’s change in holdings. In 
other words, institutions that experience the largest stock returns are not increasing their 
institutional holdings in the stocks they already hold.27 
Since wealth effect theories are often related to contagion and point to the effects of 
ownership mattering more in periods of extreme stress, we examine weekly Fama-MacBeth 
cross-sectional regressions and sum the coefficients over rolling 26-week periods. Figure 2.1 
plots the coefficients over the January 2000 to March 2009 period. Industry and ownership 
coefficients are of similar magnitude and are relatively stable. The coefficients are never below 
zero and range between 0.10 and slightly over 0.60.28 Hence, our results are consistent with 
                                                 
27 We also sort each stock/quarter into four ownership groups according to the owner’s common ownership return. In 
contrast to a wealth effect explanation, in Table S5 we find no net differences in the relative changes of ownership of the 
groups depending on the institution’s past stock return. 
28 Figure S2 Panel A shows coefficients from regressions that also include the local market index and Panels B and C of 
Supplemental Figure S2 look at quarterly regressions. None show elevated levels in times of economic crisis. 
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Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2012) as they find little economic evidence of excess 
comovement during the financial crisis. 
The contagion literature postulates that when investors face imminent financial constraints, 
they will sell off their other holdings. This story implies a higher correlation among stocks 
owned by these investors. In Panel A of Supplemental Table S2.6, we examine asymmetries by 
looking alternatively at the extreme bottom twenty percent and five percent of ownership returns. 
We find no evidence that the effect of the ownership return is stronger. Furthermore, we find that 
stocks experiencing large outflows do not experience a stronger ownership return.29 Overall, our 
findings indicate that changes in institutional holdings are affected by changes in a stock’s 
habitat and not wealth effects. 
7. Ownership Decomposition and Habitat Channels 
7.1 Decomposition 
In a world with heterogeneous investors, an investor habitat captures the common investment 
locale in which a certain group of investors may allocate capital across the stock market. It can 
be decomposed into several channels. First, an investment locale may cause prices to co-move if 
a firm’s existing holders receive correlated flows, and those investors allocate the flows to 
securities they already own. Second, habitat could link the returns of stocks in manners that 
cannot be directly traced to quarterly changes in ownership. This might be because of correlated 
buying of other investors who are not in our database, or prices moving due to changes in 
viewpoints of stocks that are commonly held together. This may be due to domestic or foreign 
returns. Third, the change in holdings of a habitat reflects capital moving into or out of an 
                                                 
29 As explained later in equation (9), we track investors’ outflows by institution and compute an aggregate measure of 
outflows across all institutions who invest in a given stock. We then create a dummy variable for whether a stock’s 
investors are in the bottom 5 and 20 percentiles in terms of aggregate outflows and create a dummy variable interaction 
term with the ownership return. 
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investment habitat in a correlated fashion. For example, if investors become optimistic on global 
economic conditions, capital may be allocated towards large international companies with 
investors who hold bullish views or a mandate to purchase such securities. 
To this end, the stock-level change of holdings can be decomposed into three main 
components: fund flows, returns to stocks in the same habitat, and change of holdings of stocks 
in the habitat. We decompose the change in equity holdings of stock i by fund n as follows: 
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 (7) 
where  is the total net asset value of fund n in quarter t,  is the fraction of the funds’s 
total net asset value invested in equities in quarter t, is the portion of the equity holdings of 
fund n that is invested in stock i in quarter t, and  is the market value of stock i in quarter t. 
Fund flows in equation (7) are defined following the standard approach in the literature, i.e. 
quarterly fund flows are inferred as the difference between total net assets and what assets would 
have been if they had simply grown passively:
,n tTNA ,n tZ
, ,i n tq
,i tM
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Table 2.9: Decomposition of Funds’ Change in Holdings 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly stock returns (specifications (1)-(5)) or changes in holdings (specifications (6)-(10)) on an 
intercept (not reported), fund flows, the returns of foreign stocks in habitat, the change in holdings for foreign stocks in habitat, the returns of domestic stocks in 
habitat, the change of holdings for domestic stocks in habitat, expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta* Local Market and 
World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). Fund flows, returns, and changes of holdings 
for stocks in the domestic and foreign habitat are all scaled by lagged market capitalization and are standardized. The table reports the average coefficients, 
associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. The sample consists 
of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The sample period 
is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from 
Datastream. 
 
  Returns   Change of Holdings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Flows 0.000     -0.001 -0.001   0.002     0.001 0.001 
  
(-
0.18)     (-0.62) 
(-
0.28)   
(2.46
)     (2.34) (1.01) 
Returns of Foreign Stocks in Habitat   0.016   0.018 0.009     0.001   0.001 0.000 
    (4.96)   (6.10) (4.13)     (1.29)   (0.89) (-0.10) 
Change of Holdings for Foreign Stocks in Habitat     0.029 0.025 0.004       0.004 0.003 0.002 
      (2.67) (2.39) (0.45)       (5.51) (4.75) (2.73) 
Returns of Domestic Stocks in Habitat         0.016           0.001 
          (5.76)           (1.52) 
Change of Holdings for Domestic Stocks in Habitat         -0.003           0.002 
          
(-
1.01)           (4.77) 
Local Beta*Local Market         0.721           0.004 
          
(14.36
)           (1.20) 
World Beta*World Market         0.144           0.015 
          (0.30)           (0.94) 
Industry         0.373           0.004 
          (9.94)           (0.86) 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.141   0.014 0.011 0.003 0.027 0.048 
Average Number of Firms per Quarter 2,262 2,262 2,009 2,009 1,536   1,991 1,991 1,916 1,916 1,512 
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  , , , 1 ,1n t n t n t n tFund Flow TNA TNA R    (8) 
where Rn,t is the return of fund n during quarter t, and TNAn,t is the total net asset value at the end 
of quarter t.30  
We subsequently aggregate these components across institutional holders for a stock on a 
value-weighted basis according to the market capitalizations of their positions in the stock to 
obtain a stock-level measure in three components as follows:  
                
, , ,
, ,
Change of Holdings Fund Flow Returns in Habitat
Change of Holdings in Habitat Error
i t i t i t
i t i t
 
   (9) 
The returns in habitat component can be further split into returns from domestic stocks in the 
habitat (the country where stock i is located but excluding stock i itself), and returns from foreign 
stocks in the habitat.31 
7.2 Decomposition Results 
Table 2.9 presents cross-sectional regression results for the decomposition of stocks with high 
foreign ownership (> 5 percent) at the aggregate LionShares institutional level. It shows the 
various components of the decompositions, first for returns and then for their effect on changes 
in ownership. The first three specifications start off with each component of the decomposition 
individually and then all the components together in the fourth specification. The change of 
holdings in the habitat and the returns of stocks in the habitat are both linked to returns. The flow 
                                                 
30 Our definition of the flow represents the dollar growth of a fund that is due to new investments at the end of the 
quarter. When we turn to the LionShares data where we do not have TNA, we approximate this with the total equity 
positions. We apply Fund Flown,t for fund n proportionally to fund n’s stock holdings i using the previous quarter’s 
weights to obtain Fund Flowi,n,t. We then aggregate the components across funds to create changes in the position in stock 
i due to fund flow and returns in habitat. 
31 The return from foreign stocks in the habitat is similar to our ownership return, except for weighting. The ownership 
return constrains the holding weights of all foreign owners to sum to one, while the weights in the returns from foreign 
stocks in habitat term sum to the actual amount of dollars invested by the funds in that particular stock. For example, if 
the foreign holding is just 0.5 percent of the funds’ portfolios, the ownership return weights are normalized to one, while 
the weight of the returns from foreign stocks in habitat is 0.5 percent. 
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measure is insignificant and close to zero. In Specification 5 we add the change of holdings of 
domestic stocks in the habitat, as well as returns from domestic stocks in the habitat along with 
the standard local market, world market, and industry controls. With controls, the change of 
holdings for stocks in the domestic and foreign habitat is insignificantly related to returns. The 
return of stocks in the domestic habitat and the returns of stocks in the foreign habitat are both 
highly significant. A firm’s stock price increases when the related stocks held by both domestic 
and foreign institutions experience increase in value. 
In the second half of the table, we cross-sectionally regress stocks’ changes in holdings 
on the elements of the decomposition. The change of holdings in both the domestic and foreign 
habitat is strongly related to the change in ownership. Interestingly, flow is significant in the 
earlier specifications, but becomes insignificant with more extensive controls for the local and 
global market and industry in specification 10. The other terms are largely unrelated to changes 
in holdings. 
Overall, in terms of the relation between stock returns and cross-sectional ownership 
changes, Table 2.9 indicates that the patterns of stocks moving together in an investment locale 
are primarily due to institutions investing in stocks within the same habitat. Such patterns are not 
primarily driven by, and are largely distinct from, those of fund flows. 
8. Diversification Implications 
While most of our results are focused on linking the ownership return to stock returns, we will 
explore in this section the diversification implications for ownership linkages. A simple but 
useful practical diagnostic is to compare the return covariance of firms within a population 
relative to the return variance of a representative firm. Solnik (1974) uses this to compare the 
power of portfolio diversification in the United States and internationally. Panel A of Table 2.10 
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Table 2.10: Ownership Level, Ownership Beta and Portfolio Diversification 
 
The sample consists of all non-U.S. stocks with data between 01/01/2000 and 03/31/2009 with at least 30% non-
zero trading days in the previous year. Firms are also required to have at least 30 non-missing observations over the 
sample period. In Panels B and C firms are also required to have at least 30 non-missing observations in a rolling 
two-year window. Panel A shows the effect of global portfolio diversification for alternative levels of foreign 
institutional ownership (FO) (0%, 0%-1%, 1%-5%, >5%) measured at the beginning of a three year period. To 
ensure an equal number of firms across bins, for each country, year, and institutional ownership group, we restrict 
the number of firms to the smallest number of firms across institutional ownership groups. We compute the average 
stock return covariance and correlation between all pairs of stocks in the bin for each year and subsequently the 
average across years. Panels B and C are computed based on random draws of 1,000 of our 6,698 funds. Panel B 
shows the effect of alternative levels of foreign institutional ownership return betas estimated over rolling two year 
windows over the years 2003-2009 for firms with at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. For each fund 
the universe of stocks is restricted to those not held by a fund. Over rolling two-year windows (always shifted by 
one year) we regress the foreign ownership return of each stock (not held by the institution) on the return of each 
LionShares institution: 
, ,O w nership t O w nership B eta F und t tR R     .  Subsequently, we sort the observations for each year 
into four groups based on the estimated ownership betas (<0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-1, >1) and calculate the average beta 
of the stock return with the fund return (Fund Beta) in the next year: 
, ,i t Fund Beta Fund t tR R     . To compute 
averages which compare observations within the fund level, we first average by fund, country, year, and ownership 
beta bucket. Subsequently, we average across funds by country, year, and ownership beta bucket. We then average 
across countries by year and ownership beta bucket. Finally, we average across years by ownership beta bucket. The 
t-statistics are computed from this last cross-country average. The panel shows the average ownership beta and fund 
beta of stocks in each of the four ownership beta bins, as well as those of a high-low portfolio based on ownership 
betas, along with corresponding t-statistics. Panel C follows the procedure in Panel B except that it breaks out the 
results by both the lagged level of foreign institutional ownership (FO) and lagged ownership beta. It also shows 
averages across different groups, as well as values for high-low portfolios (based alternatively on FO betas or FO 
levels) and corresponding t-statistics. 
 
Panel A FO=0% 0%<FO<1% 1%<FO<5% 5%<FO  
Average Covariance  0.00058 0.00053 0.00062 0.00077  
Average Correlation 0.103 0.128 0.162 0.210  
 
Panel B  Ownership Beta bin     
 <0.5 (Low) 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 >1 (High) High-Low t-stat 
Average Ownership Beta 0.380 0.648 0.867 1.080 0.699  
Average Fund Beta 0.471 0.635 0.765 0.864 0.394 5.4 
  Panel C Ownership Beta bins     High – Low 
Own Beta Bin 
  
FO Level <0.5 (Low) 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 >1 (High)   Average t-stat 
Fund Betas   
0% 0.34 0.45 0.53 0.58  0.48 0.24 4.1 
0%-1% 0.39 0.51 0.57 0.61  0.52 0.22 4.4 
1%-5% 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.75  0.60 0.30 4.4 
5%-15% 0.46 0.58 0.70 0.81  0.64 0.35 6.0 
>15% 0.47 0.67 0.83 0.98  0.74 0.50 5.4 
         
Average 0.42 0.56 0.66 0.74   0.31 9.9 
High - Low FO 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.34  0.23   
t-stat 9.75 6.26 14.2 6.87   11.3     
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Figure 2.2: Ownership Level and Portfolio Diversification 
 
The figure shows the effect of global, country, and industry portfolio diversification for alternative levels of foreign 
institutional ownership (0%, 0%-1%, 1%-5%, >5%) measured at the beginning of a three year period. The sample 
consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Firms are required to have at least 30 non-missing return observations. For each country, 
year, and institutional ownership groups, the number of firms is restricted to the smallest number of firms across 
institutional ownership groups that have the same number of stocks in each institutional ownership group. For each 
year the average variance and covariance is calculated for alternatively global, pure industry, or pure country 
diversification, as in Griffin and Karolyi (1998), and, subsequently, the average across years is calculated. 
Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks is from Datastream. 
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shows that for stocks with no foreign ownership the average correlation is 0.103, but for stocks 
with more than five percent foreign ownership the average correlation is 0.21.32 In Figure 2.2, we 
graph the covariances as a fraction of the average variance. For stocks with no foreign 
ownership, the global limit of diversification is 7.1 percent of individual stock variance, whereas 
for stocks with more than five percent foreign ownership the limit is 18.8 percent. These findings 
show the importance of the level of foreign ownership, a finding recently confirmed by Faias, 
Ferreira, Matos, and Santa-Clara (2011). 
To gauge similar implications for ownership linkages captured by the ownership return, 
we take the perspective of a fund manager looking to diversify into non-U.S. stocks that he does 
not already hold in his portfolio. In order to focus on the set of stocks that fund managers 
typically select, we require the level of foreign ownership in these stocks to exceed five percent. 
For each of the stocks meeting these requirements, we regress its foreign ownership return on the 
return of each fund, using weekly returns over the prior two-year rolling window. We call the 
estimated slope coefficient of this regression the ownership beta of a stock with respect to the 
fund. The ownership beta is a measure of how closely the return of a fund covaries with the 
return on the foreign holdings of other funds that hold a particular security. 
For the year subsequent to the estimation period of the ownership betas, we regress the 
stock return on the fund return separately for each stock and fund. We call the estimated slope 
coefficient of this regression the ‘fund beta’ of a stock with respect to the fund. It is a measure of 
how strongly a stock covaries with a given fund’s portfolio, or its diversification potential for the 
fund. 
                                                 
32 Panels A and B of Supplemental Figure S3 break the global diversification limit down into the country and industry 
component following Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994). Supplemental Tables S7 and S8 and Supplemental Figures S4 
and S5 show that global market betas are largely increasing in the level of foreign ownership. 
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With the ownership betas and fund betas in hand, we sort all stocks into four groups each 
year according to their ownership betas (<0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-1, >1) and calculate the average 
fund beta of each group. To preserve proper weighting on a fund and country level, we first 
average the fund betas across stocks by fund, country, year, and ownership beta bin. 
Subsequently, we average across funds, across countries, and then across years for each 
ownership beta bin. Fund betas are related to prior estimated ownership betas and are of large 
size. Panel B of Table 2.10 shows that the average fund beta is 0.471, 0.635, 0.765, and 0.864 as 
one moves from low to high ownership betas.33 If a fund manager adds a security with a high 
ownership beta to his fund, the average fund beta is 1.83 times (0.864/0.471) what the average 
fund beta is for a stock with a low ownership linkage. 
A remaining issue is that it seems probable that the level of foreign ownership is related 
to the strength of the ownership linkage, i.e. the ownership beta. To address this issue we sort 
stocks into bins both according to the level of foreign ownership as well as their ownership betas. 
In particular, we define five levels of foreign ownership (0, 0-1, 1-5, 5-15, and >15 percent) and 
sort stocks within each group into bins based on their ownership beta (<0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-1, 
>1). Panel C of Table 2.10 shows the average fund beta according to both its level of foreign 
ownership as well as the stock’s ownership beta. For stocks with zero foreign ownership, the 
average fund beta is 0.48, but for stocks with more than 15 percent foreign ownership the 
average fund beta is 0.74 or 1.54 times (0.74/0.48). For stocks with low ownership linkage to a 
fund the average fund beta is 0.42, whereas for stocks with high ownership linkage the fund beta 
averages 0.74, or 1.77 times as much (0.74/0.42). This indicates that a stock with high ownership 
                                                 
33 Because of computational considerations, we randomly draw one thousand of our 6,698 institutions to consider in the 
analysis in Panel B and C of Table 10. The analysis is computationally intensive because of the high dimensionality of the 
combined analysis of all permutations of the time-series data of these 6,698 institutions with the time-series stock return 
and ownership return data of 9,095 Non-U.S. stocks. 
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linkages will have considerably less diversification benefits for portfolio managers, even after 
controlling for the level of foreign ownership. Our findings indicate that both ownership linkages 
and the level of foreign ownership are economically important factors to consider in international 
diversification. 
9. Conclusion 
The traditional view of international stock market co-movement suggests that firms move 
together to the extent that their economic drivers are similar. In the international finance 
literature, this debate has been cast in terms of two components of economic fundamentals, 
namely industry and country factors. Although Froot and Dabora (1999), Chan, Hameed, and 
Lau (2003), and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show in different contexts that covariation is related 
to a firm’s location, we extend this intuition by developing a new measure of ownership linkages 
and documenting its pervasiveness and importance. Fama and French (2012) find that local 
factors are relatively more important than global ones, but Karolyi and Wu (2012) show that the 
degree to which a stock is global depends on the cross-listed trading venue. In a broadly 
consistent manner, we find that a more explicit measure of ownership linkages can explain return 
variation beyond factors. 
We construct a return that is the value-weighted average of all foreign stocks held by 
common shareholders. We find that this very specific ownership composition measure is similar 
in economic importance as a stock’s industry variation, both in the cross-section and in the time-
series. We examine a variety of different ownership related explanations and conclude that the 
ownership return is proxying for a stock’s related-firm habitat. More specifically, heterogeneous 
investors with different market perceptions influence stock prices as their holdings and 
preferences for stocks in an investment locale oscillate in ways that transcend borders. 
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Our results have important practical implications to investors: Stocks with an ownership 
return similar to a portfolio manager’s existing portfolio provide considerably less diversification 
potential as compared to stocks with an unrelated ownership return. Thus, international fund 
managers should pay close attention both to the level of foreign ownership and to whether the 
stock is held by unrelated or competing shareholders. We believe these findings have broad 
academic and practical relevance for a variety of domestic and international portfolio and risk 
management applications.  
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Appendix 1: Example of Ownership Linkage 
As an example of the foreign ownership return, consider the Korean stock Samsung, 
where Capital World Investor is the largest foreign shareholder. We calculate the value-weighted 
return each peri-od to Capital World Investor due to all of its positions outside of Korea. Capital 
World Investor’s foreign return is then weighted by the proportion of its position in Samsung 
relative to all other foreign holders. Since Capital World Investor is the largest foreign holder of 
Samsung, it will take the largest weight in Samsung’s ownership return. After performing the 
same calculation for all other foreign investors in Samsung and aggregating across investors, we 
obtain Samsung’s foreign ownership return, Ri,F, which captures the return on the portfolio 
holdings of institutional shareholders of Samsung outside of Korea. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a hypothetical example of a stock (Samsung) which is held by two 
shareholders (Capital World Investors and New York Retirement Fund). The drawing 
demonstrates how Samsung is linked to other securities through the common shareholders. 
 
Figure 2.3 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A2.1: Summary Statistics on Update Frequency of Ownership Data 
 
The table shows the percentage of institutions by country and data source in LionShares, i.e. institutional level data 
(13F in the US and its equivalent in other countries), the mutual funds database (MF), and the merged dataset 
(13F+MF). Results are split by updating frequency, i.e. annual, biannual, triannual, and quarterly frequency. The last 
column shows the total percentage of institutions across the years 2000-2009. The total percentage can add up to 
above 100 if an institution appears in both 13F and MF. Ownership data is from LionShares. 
 
  Annual   Biannual  Triannual  Quarterly  Total 
  13F MF 13F+MF   13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF
Australia 7 62 63  2 28 27  1 4 5  2 3 6  12 98
Austria 2 22 22  8 58 59  1 4 4  2 15 15  13 99
Belgium 3 20 19  8 58 60  0 4 4  0 17 17  11 100
Canada 10 25 26  17 50 49  2 6 6  13 11 19  42 91
Denmark 3 35 36  3 46 45  1 9 9  3 8 10  10 99
Finland 1 37 37  7 54 56  0 3 3  0 3 3  9 98
France 4 54 55  2 16 16  1 14 14  6 12 15  13 95
Germany 2 22 22  2 39 40  0 7 7  2 31 31  7 99
Ireland 8 24 23  21 61 65  1 4 4  3 6 8  33 95
Italy 10 83 85  0 13 13  0 2 2  0 1 1  10 98
Japan 12 46 48  3 15 14  2 2 3  33 1 35  50 64
Luxembourg 4 20 20  9 62 63  1 5 6  2 10 11  17 98
Netherlands 7 30 30  4 50 46  2 2 4  14 6 20  26 88
New Zealand 0 89 89  0 11 11  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Norway 1 40 37  4 44 44  1 11 12  2 4 6  9 100
Portugal 3 27 28  2 26 26  0 6 6  5 38 41  9 97
Spain 1 12 12  0 13 13  0 14 14  1 60 60  2 99
Sweden 3 30 29  4 41 42  1 11 11  3 15 17  12 97
Switzerland 4 23 25  5 51 53  1 4 4  9 11 18  19 89
United Kingdom 9 23 26  9 38 38  1 6 7  17 19 29  36 86
United States 17 6 18  2 9 6  4 3 5  67 12 71  89 31
Developed  5 35 36  5 37 37  1 6 6  9 14 21  20 91
Developed  ex US 5 36 37   6 39 39  1 6 6  6 14 18  17 94
(continued) 
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics on Update Frequency of Ownership Data (continued) 
 
  Annual   Biannual  Triannual  Quarterly  Total 
  13F MF 13F+MF   13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF 13F+MF  13F MF
Andorra 0 67 67  0 33 33  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Argentina 0 0 0  0 33 33  0 33 33  0 33 33  0 100
Bahamas 22 28 50  0 0 0  0 0 0  50 0 50  72 28
Bahrain 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Barbados 50 0 50  0 0 0  0 0 0  50 0 50  100 0 
Bermuda 9 34 38  0 24 23  0 6 4  32 2 34  41 67
Brazil 75 0 75  0 0 0  25 0 25  0 0 0  100 0 
British Virgin Islands 26 50 58  4 39 41  0 1 1  0 0 0  30 91
Cayman Islands 3 49 49  4 47 47  0 2 2  0 2 2  7 100
Chile 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
China 0 25 25  0 74 74  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 100
Cook Islands 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Croatia 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Cyprus 25 0 25  25 0 25  0 0 0  50 0 50  100 0 
Czech Republic 0 38 38  0 62 62  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Estonia 0 35 35  0 53 53  0 12 12  0 0 0  0 100
Gibraltar 0 0 0  0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Greece 0 32 32  0 68 68  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Hong Kong 13 13 26  4 46 46  0 0 0  27 0 27  45 59
Hungary 0 32 32  0 68 68  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Iceland 33 67 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  33 67
India 0 45 45  0 37 37  0 4 4  0 15 15  0 100
Latvia 0 67 67  0 33 33  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Liechtenstein 1 32 32  2 67 67  0 0 0  0 1 1  3 100
Lithuania 0 83 83  0 17 17  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Malaysia 0 27 27  0 31 31  0 14 14  0 28 28  0 100
Malta 0 0 0  0 33 33  0 67 67  0 0 0  0 100
Mauritius 0 43 43  0 57 57  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Monaco 60 0 60  0 0 0  0 0 0  40 0 40  100 0 
Namibia 0 47 47  0 33 33  0 20 20  0 0 0  0 100
Netherlands Antilles 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Pakistan 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Philippines 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Poland 0 36 35  4 64 65  0 0 0  0 0 0  4 100
Romania 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Saudi Arabia 0 100 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Singapore 6 18 23  6 71 65  0 1 1  10 2 12  22 91
Slovakia 0 25 25  0 75 75  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Slovenia 0 52 52  0 47 47  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 100
South Africa 2 43 43  2 40 40  0 15 15  0 2 2  4 100
South Korea 100 0 100  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  100 0 
Taiwan 31 38 69  0 0 0  0 0 0  31 0 31  62 38
Thailand 0 38 38  0 27 27  0 10 10  0 25 25  0 100
Turkey 0 50 50  0 50 50  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 100
Virgin Islands 13 0 13  0 0 0  6 0 6  81 0 81  100 0 
Emerging  10 45 54  1 30 30  1 4 5  8 2 11  21 81
All countries 9 42 48   2 32 32  1 5 5  8 6 14  20 84
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Table A2.2: Number of Institutions and Mutual Funds by Year and Country 
 
The table shows the number of institutions and mutual funds that come from a particular country by year and 
country in LionShares. Results are split by data source, i.e. institutional level data (13F in the US and its equivalent 
in other countries) and the mutual funds database (MF). Coverage is from 2001 to 2009. In order to keep the table 
brief we report the coverage in three years: 2001, 2005, and 2008. The last column (Total) shows the total number of 
fund-years. Ownership data is from LionShares. 
 
  2001   2005   2008   
Total Fund Years (01-
09) 
  13F MF   13F MF   13F MF   13F MF 
Australia 1 10 1 55 4 83 17 380 
Austria 29 43 55 379 
Belgium 22 31 1 31 3 244 
Canada 20 146 44 164 69 173 428 1,365 
Denmark 18 1 33 2 35 10 232 
Finland 18 32 31 248 
France 4 53 13 159 14 135 88 1,152 
Germany 2 107 4 144 5 205 36 1,349 
Ireland 3 9 2 13 5 17 36 118 
Italy 35 58 1 59 3 454 
Japan 8 37 12 70 12 76 109 607 
Luxembourg 34 1 64 3 58 9 452 
Netherlands 3 11 9 28 11 27 77 225 
New Zealand 4 3 18 
Norway 1 18 1 25 1 24 9 192 
Portugal 3 24 28 215 
Spain 1 100 1 123 2 127 14 964 
Sweden 1 20 1 58 1 74 11 429 
Switzerland 4 56 13 163 14 205 92 1,218 
United Kingdom 36 168 71 268 108 299 693 2,293 
United States 1,924 845 2,424 845 2,892 899 25,060 8,796 
Developed  2,008 1,739 2,598 2,404 3,145 2,644 26,695 21,330 
Developed  ex US 84 894 174 1,559 253 1,745 1,635 12,534 
(continued)
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  2001   2005   2008   Fund Years (01-09) 
  13F MF   13F MF   13F MF   13F MF 
Andorra 3 3 17 
Argentina 1 3 3 17 
Bahamas 1 2 2 3 4 1 24 25 
Bahrain 1 2 
Barbados 1 1 1 6 2 
Bermuda 4 1 4 6 5 6 43 43 
Brazil 4 4 3 8 7 44 
British Virgin Islands 1 1 2 4 
Cayman Islands 1 1 10 
Chile 1 1 11 
China 1 1 54 64 
Cook Islands 
Croatia 5 12 
Cyprus 1 1 4 3 
Czech Republic 1 7 8 41 
Estonia 1 3 7 31 
Gibraltar 1 5 
Greece 4 16 109 
Hong Kong 2 35 5 41 5 51 39 387 
Hungary 8 5 36 
Iceland 2 2 1 13 
India 3 28 38 221 
Latvia 3 6 
Liechtenstein 1 13 19 102 
Lithuania 3 6 
Malaysia 14 21 97 
Malta 
Mauritius 1 3 
Monaco 1 1 5 
Namibia 1 2 8 
Netherlands Antilles 2 
Pakistan 16 30 
Philippines 1 6 
Poland 16 29 139 
Romania 6 19 49 
Saudi Arabia 5 8 
Singapore 38 2 43 3 44 15 393 
Slovakia 6 6 34 
Slovenia 13 13 66 
South Africa 3 30 69 1 353 
South Korea 2 4 1 4 2 29 
Taiwan 1 1 1 2 3 8 15 
Thailand 1 8 19 92 
Turkey 3 4 19 
Virgin Islands 1 2 2 17 
Emerging 8 95 18 278 29 490 174 2,554 
All countries 2,016 1,834 2,616 2,682 3,174 3,134 26,869 23,884 
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Table A2.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics on the percentage of local institutional ownership and market capitalization of 
firms in the sample. To be included in the sample firms are required to have non-missing data on lagged foreign 
ownership and at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year. Panel A shows statistics for Developed 
Markets, while Panel B shows results for Emerging Markets (based on the MSCI classification as of June 2006). In 
each panel results are broken down by country, region, and by size quintiles (small to large, using common U.S. 
breakpoints), where size is measured by market capitalization in U.S. Dollars. The first column shows the average 
percentage of (free-float adjusted) local institutional ownership. Ownership is free-float adjusted by dividing it by 1 
minus the percentage of closely held shares, where missing values of closely held shares are set to zero. The second 
column shows the average market capitalization (in millions of U.S. Dollars). Averages are first taken by year and 
are subsequently taken across time. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Ownership data is from 
LionShares, market capitalization data is from Datastream, and data on closely held shares is from Worldscope. 
 
Panel A: Developed Markets 
  Local Institutional Ownership (%)   Market Capitalization (USD) 
Small 2 3 4 Large Small 2 3 4 Large 
Australia 2.0 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 34 110 294 911 8,879 
Austria 1.5 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.1 29 95 499 879 5,650 
Belgium 2.3 5.5 11.7 9.5 6.3 34 98 263 895 10,565 
Canada 6.0 13.3 18.9 25.3 27.8 28 108 291 884 8,982 
Denmark 12.4 16.8 16.7 15.1 13.0 35 108 275 1,008 6,324 
Finland 7.1 15.5 10.4 11.6 9.2 30 106 281 903 12,514 
France 4.5 8.0 8.6 10.4 9.9 27 98 275 829 16,294 
Germany 4.1 7.3 8.5 8.9 10.7 23 94 295 884 14,319 
Ireland 0.7 1.6 1.9 2.0 0.8 42 75 242 900 6,884 
Italy 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.2 42 99 280 849 11,257 
Japan 0.7 0.9 1.7 2.2 1.5 37 100 263 814 7,568 
Luxembourg 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.8 2.0 43 95 374 1,275 14,614 
Netherlands 7.9 13.3 15.2 5.0 1.8 29 108 302 907 16,538 
New Zealand 0.3 1.3 2.7 1.3 2.3 33 98 260 966 3,318 
Norway 5.3 12.7 24.2 25.2 14.2 42 108 339 792 9,055 
Portugal 5.6 13.4 16.3 11.6 3.0 20 112 254 1,030 5,353 
Spain 2.7 6.0 10.1 7.6 5.2 46 128 305 994 14,049 
Sweden 6.1 18.3 26.1 28.9 25.3 28 95 254 822 8,768 
Switzerland 12.6 11.5 12.1 9.1 4.6 42 114 287 896 7,444 
United Kingdom 17.2 25.4 26.2 23.0 11.2 27 97 258 795 13,913 
United States 27.8 49.4 79.7 99.7 92.3 29 98 269 831 12,763 
Developed  14.4 23.9 37.4 51.0 49.1 30 100 270 835 11,584 
Developed  ex US 5.7 7.6 8.7 9.0 7.5 30 101 271 839 10,439 
(continued) 
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Panel B: Emerging Markets 
  Local Institutional Ownership (%)   Market Capitalization (USD) 
Small 2 3 4 Large Small 2 3 4 Large 
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 24 128 288 814 5,239 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43 147 512 484 
Bermuda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 236 579 1,074 2,329 
Brazil 2.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 42 164 373 1,043 7,531 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62 37 501 138 
Chile 0.0 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.8 93 117 332 922 3,922 
China 0.0 0.6 2.0 2.2 5.1 68 181 463 1,278 7,669 
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 306 279 1,131 2,616 
Croatia 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 167 292 1,347 1,705 
Cyprus 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 24 193 357 1,110 3,613 
Czech Republic 0.4 0.9 2.8 1.1 56 325 1,184 7,195 
Egypt 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 69 171 348 1,166 4,352 
Estonia 0.4 1.4 0.4 0.9 88 1,033 124 402 
Greece 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 30 107 277 777 5,262 
Hong Kong 0.9 3.7 5.2 6.5 6.1 39 100 271 836 10,364 
Hungary 3.1 2.6 1.2 1.2 0.4 52 96 258 661 5,061 
Iceland 0.0 0.0 250 1,609 
India 3.7 4.8 6.0 5.1 3.3 40 130 325 1,116 6,230 
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41 100 313 947 4,300 
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34 91 261 900 5,485 
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92 140 430 848 877 
Korea, Republic Of 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 44 105 309 979 7,483 
Latvia 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 45 111 353 536 
Lithuania 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 37 104 466 772 2,742 
Malaysia 1.1 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.7 36 103 265 844 4,509 
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 149 247 869 
Mauritius 0.0 0.0 0.0 97 238 133 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 36 124 362 973 4,703 
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52 831 499 1,038 5,037 
Pakistan 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 42 91 304 784 2,621 
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63 151 338 723 3,242 
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 32 138 311 686 2,914 
Poland 11.2 25.7 19.9 15.7 13.6 36 111 309 969 5,142 
Romania 1.8 1.1 2.2 0.5 1.3 33 205 433 954 5,919 
Singapore 0.7 1.7 4.1 3.8 6.7 36 88 262 885 7,206 
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 95 95 504 1,443 1,699 
Slovenia 12.0 11.1 6.5 4.5 5.3 435 86 267 717 1,400 
South Africa 5.1 21.4 10.9 6.5 4.7 43 102 299 962 5,791 
Sri Lanka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17 85 261 739 
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 49 107 259 786 5,440 
Thailand 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.4 33 96 287 861 3,912 
Turkey 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 40 103 279 843 3,878 
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.1 0.0 602 1,866 1,155 
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 282 628 425 834 931 
Emerging 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.1 42 107 289 909 6,103 
All countries 12.1 18.8 29.0 40.5 41.9 33 103 276 852 10,698 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Supplemental Appendix A: Data sample cleaning 
For the main part of the analysis we use two datasets: a) LionShares holdings data and b) returns 
and market values data from CRSP and Datastream. Holdings data is from LionShares and 
structured using three identifiers describing who owns what and when. There are two unadjusted 
datasets within LionShares, namely FUND and 13F. FUND is fund level holding data where 
holders are identified as funds. 13F is institution level data. We use the merged data of the two. 
Stocks in LionShares data are identified by CUSIP, ISIN and SEDOL. CUSIP is the main 
identifier for assets that funds and institutions hold. Other identifiers, such as ISIN and SEDOL 
are also available for each CUSIP. ISIN is later used to link DSCD to CUSIP.34 LionShares 
records how many shares a fund or an institution holds. From this number we construct the 
percentage of ownership by dividing by the number of shares outstanding. The number of shares 
is provided in a separate dataset offered by LionShares. When the number of shares outstanding 
is missing or zero, we use the number of shares outstanding on the closest future date (provided 
that the stock price has not changed substantially). ADR and GDRs and their parent firms are 
identified using classifiers obtained from both Datastream and LionShares. For ADRs and GDRs 
we calculate the ownership in a stock as the combined ownership of the ADR/GDR and the 
home country stock, and use the returns from the parent firm. 
U.S. stock returns and market values are from CRSP. International stock returns and 
market values are from Datastream. We use exchange rates downloaded from Datastream to 
                                                 
34 In most countries, LionShares covers companies with a market capitalization of more than $50 million and account 
for all positions equal to or larger than 0.1 percent of the issued shares. The coverage threshold for Latin American and 
some Asian (Indian, Chinese, South Korean, Philippines and Indonesian) companies are between $100 and $200 million. 
There is no coverage threshold for U.K., U.S., and Japan companies. 
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convert the local currency stock returns into U.S. dollar terms. U.S. stocks are identified by 
CRSP’s PERMNO, while International stocks are identified by Datastream codes (DSCD). 
For U.S. stocks, we use CRSP’s event table to map CUSIP to PERMNO. For non-U.S. 
stocks, we use the aforementioned ISIN to get DSCD for each firm. Datastream provides a 
mapping between DSCD and ISIN. In case of depository receipts, Datastream also provides a 
mapping between DSCD of the underlying home listing and the ISIN. Using the two datasets 
above, we map each firm in LionShares to CRSP for U.S. stocks and to DSCD for non-U.S. 
stocks. In case of depository receipts, we use the DSCD for its underlying stock. 
LionShares provides institution-level data as well as fund-level data. To utilize all of the 
holding data available, we make the two datasets institutional-level by aggregating the fund-level 
data at the institution level. We then merge these two datasets.35 When there is overlap of the 
holding information, we prefer 13F data to FUND data. 
There is a mismatch of reporting frequency and dates of the two datasets. The reporting 
frequency and dates of institution-level data (13F) are usually fixed and quite regular; reports are 
made at the end of each quarter and are in quarterly frequency. Fund level data does not have a 
fixed frequency, and it is not necessarily reported at the end of each quarter. For example, a fund 
could be reporting semi-annually at the end of April and October. When there is a mismatch of 
reporting frequency and dates of the two datasets, we interpolate missing holding information in 
the fund level data before aggregating the fund level data to the institutional level. We merge the 
                                                 
35 If we only have institutional holding data on a stock in a quarter but no holding data by any of its funds on that stock, 
we use the institution data. Similarly, if we only have fund holding data on a stock in a quarter but not the fund’s 
institution holding data, we take the fund data. When we have both institution and fund holding data on the stock in a 
quarter, we use the institution level observation. Ferreira and Matos (2008) also make the same assumptions in preferring 
institutional holding records to fund holdings. In the case that a stock holding only appears in the fund holding but not 
in the institutional holding record, we retain that stock holding record by the fund. To illustrate, if Fidelity (e.g. Magellan, 
International Discovery, etc.) held stocks X and Y in the fund dataset and Fidelity held stocks X and Y in the institution 
dataset, we would use Fidelity’s holdings of X and Y. However, if the fund record showed various Fidelity funds owning 
stocks X and Y, and the institutional record showed Fidelity owning stock X only, then we would use Fidelity’s holding 
of stock X and sum up various Fidelity funds’ holding of stock Y. 
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institution level holdings data and mutual fund holdings in the last month of each quarter. If the 
holdings data is missing, we fill in the holding data in the mutual fund dataset using the latest 
holding information. We carry the holdings information forward to the next available report date 
for up to three quarters.36 
We use two data screens for returns on stocks. First, to screen for common equities, we 
use the filters from Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) which eliminate preferred stocks, 
warrants, unit trusts, investment trusts, duplicates, and other non-common equities. Second, we 
use filters following Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010) with some modification to account for 
varying data frequencies. The screen for quarterly data is as follows. If returns are greater than 
1000 percent, we exclude returns from -1 to +1 quarter around the extreme event. We exclude 
returns <-98 percent if the extreme return event occurs more than 30 days from the end of the 
time series available. If one quarter’s return is greater than 500 percent but the cumulative return 
in the current and next quarter is less than 20 percent, we assume a data error and delete the 
return in both quarters. The screen for weekly data is as follows. If returns are greater than 500 
percent, we exclude returns from -12 to +12 weeks around the extreme event. We take out 
returns <-98 percent if the extreme return event occurs more than 30 days from the end of the 
time series available. If one week's return is greater than 300 percent, but the cumulative return 
over the current and next week is less than 50 percent, i.e. Rt or lag1(Rt)> 3.00 and (1+Rt)*(1+ 
lag1(Rt))<1.5, then we assume a data error and delete the return in both weeks. The exception is 
in the United States, where the data is from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and where we restrict our sample to common equities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. 
                                                 
36 For the last holding report, we carry the holdings information over by the same number of months as there are 
between the last two holdings observations. We use holdings data for the last month within a quarter. 
  70
Third, we apply a liquidity filter. We require a stock to have more than 30 percent trading 
days of non-zero return in the previous year for cross-sectional regressions. For time-series 
regressions, we use three years of holding data and further require the stock to have at least 100 
weeks of observations within the three year regression window.  
The percentage of closely held shares and the percentage of foreign sales are from the 
Worldscope database, and missing observations of both variables are set to zero. The 
classification of emerging countries/markets is based on the Morgan Stanley Capital Index 
(MSCI) classification in 2006. For the global return we use the MSCI world index. In order to 
exclude own stock returns in the construction of local country returns, we build the value-
weighted local returns using the Datastream sample. 
In terms of coverage, Panel A of Table 2.1 shows that developed countries outside of the 
United States have, on average, foreign ownership coverage in LionShares for 40.9 percent of 
firms in the smallest market capitalization quintile. From the second quintile to the largest 
quintile, the average percentages of firms with foreign ownership coverage are 74.7, 87.1, 88.3, 
and 91.8 percent. Across countries, in the largest size quintile, the LionShares foreign ownership 
coverage is above 80 percent in all countries except Spain and Switzerland. In the emerging 
markets in Panel B, the percentage of firms with some foreign ownership coverage ranges from 
26.8, 45.0, 53.6, 59.5, and 86.0 percent as one moves from the smallest to the largest quintile. In 
the largest quintile, coverage is above 80 percent in all countries except China, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Morocco, and South Africa. 
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Supplemental Appendix B: Alternative Explanations of the Ownership Linkage 
The ownership return may simply be capturing the relation between changes in ownership and 
returns as found in the U.S. by Wermers (1999) and by Nofsinger and Sias (1999).  Table 2.5 
also shows that contemporaneous changes in foreign ownership are strongly related to a stock’s 
quarterly return consistent with the U.S. evidence. Interestingly, the coefficient on the foreign 
ownership return is not affected by the inclusion of quarterly ownership changes – the quarterly 
ownership return is doing much more than capturing changes in institutional ownership. 
Liquidity 
We also investigate whether our results can be explained by illiquidity when focusing only on 
the most liquid stocks. In Panel B of Table S2.4, we compare our main findings (with the 30 
percent trading filter) to a more stringent 50 and 75 percent filter. For stocks that trade 50 percent 
of the time the results are similar, and they strengthen slightly with the filter that they trade 75 
percent or more of the time. We also consider other possible explanations such as whether the 
explanatory power of ownership returns can be explained by foreign exchange movements, the 
extent of foreign sales, or the home country where the capital is from. In Table S2.4 we find no 
support for these explanations. 
To address the issue that data coverage may increase over time for some countries but not 
others, we limit our data sample to a subset of countries where data coverage is better.  In 
particular, we limit our data sample to those from countries where there are more than 500 firm-
quarters so that we are not focusing on countries with only a small number of firms. This limits 
our sample to the top 36 countries with the highest foreign ownership level. In another test we 
further limit our analysis to the top 20 countries with the highest country-aggregate foreign 
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ownership level. The result, as shown in Table S2.4 Panel B, shows that foreign ownership 
returns remain significant. 
Institutional Ownership 
Since the impact of ownership should be larger when foreigners hold a greater fraction of the 
security, we expect the impact of ownership returns and changes in ownership to increase with 
the level of foreign ownership. For stocks with low foreign ownership (0-1 percent), a one 
percent increase in the ownership return is associated with a 21.7 basis point increase in the 
stock’s return (Table S2.1). If the ownership return enters by capturing returns in other stocks, it 
may proxy for how the investors in a stock will change their ownership. Hence, we include the 
change in foreign ownership in the cross-sectional regressions. The second specification shows 
that contemporaneous changes in foreign ownership are strongly related to a stock’s quarterly 
return, similar to U.S. findings of a strong contemporaneous relation between quarterly 
institutional ownership and returns by Wermers (1999) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999). 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the foreign ownership return is not affected by the inclusion of 
quarterly ownership changes, indicating that the quarterly ownership return is doing much more 
than capturing changes in institutional ownership. 
After controlling for returns on local and global costs of capital as well as industry indices, 
the coefficient on the ownership return is only 0.090. However, as expected, for stocks with one 
to five percent foreign ownership the size of this coefficient strengthens to 0.223 and then to 
0.395 for stocks with over five percent foreign ownership. For changes in foreign ownership, the 
t-statistic strengthens substantially for the higher institutional ownership bins, yet the coefficient 
itself falls. One possible explanation for this effect is that a one percent increase in foreign 
ownership impacts the stock more if one moves from zero to one percent foreign ownership than 
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it does from 20 to 21 percent foreign ownership. We will later examine the importance of the 
components of the change in ownership in more detail, but we now turn to further examination 
of the relation between ownership returns and stock returns. 
Sorts 
As another gauge of the economic importance of a stock’s ownership return, we sort all stocks 
over a given quarter into those with ownership returns above (below) a given threshold. We start 
by examining all stocks with more than five percent foreign ownership and with ownership 
returns above 2.5 percent as compared to those with returns below -2.5 percent in a quarter. 
Supplemental Table S2.9 shows that stocks with high ownership returns exhibit an excess return 
of 3.3 percent on average versus -2.1 percent for stocks with low ownership returns. 
Interestingly, the effect is rather symmetric. Despite only 17 quarters, the differences are highly 
significant. 
Style 
The category-based view of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggests that comovement is driven 
because investors classify stocks into bins, such as value and growth. LionShares has seven style 
types: Aggressive, Deep Value, GARP, Growth, Index, Value, and Yield. We compute style 
returns as a value-weighted average of all the funds in a particular style. We then use the owners 
of each stock to construct its stock-specific style return. For example, if a stock is 40 percent 
owned by a value fund and 60 percent owned by a growth fund, we construct the style return to 
be: 0.4*global average value fund return + 0.6*global average growth fund return. Specifications 
(5), (6) and (12) in Panel A of Table S2.4 show that style returns are important for explaining 
cross-sectional return variation. However, the size of the coefficients on the ownership return 
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and changes in ownership is largely unaffected, indicating that the importance of the ownership 
return is not from simple style investing. 
We now turn to our list of possible explanations as to why ownership is important. 
Country of Origin 
We first ask which part of the ownership return matters. Does the ownership return matter 
because of the specific composition of the stocks that the manager holds, or does it matter due to 
the fact that a shareholder is domiciled in a particular country? If a U.S. institutional investor is 
influenced by its views of the world from U.S. news and market conditions, then the manager 
may be pushing or pulling capital abroad based on U.S. market returns. Similar to our ownership 
return, we compute an owner’s home market return that is based not on the holdings, but rather 
the country where the institution is domiciled (not where the capital is deployed). The home 
market returns are calculated as the weighted sum of index returns of the home country where 
the funds are incorporated; the weights are based on the relative size of the funds’ holdings in the 
stock. 
Results of cross-sectional regressions are shown in Panel A of Table S2.4 for all stocks 
with more than five percent foreign ownership. The owners’ home market return has some 
ability to explain returns with no controls (specification (1)), but has no explanatory power in the 
presence of the ownership return (specification (2)) and other important variables (specification 
(12)). More importantly, specification (2) shows that the coefficients on the ownership return and 
changes in ownership are unaffected by the owners’ home market return. 
Foreign Exchange Returns and Foreign Sales 
Since the foreign ownership return may capture variation related to foreign exchange or 
operations, in specification (3) and (4) of Panel A in Table S2.4 we include the return on a trade-
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weighted currency index for the country in which the stock is incorporated. The currency index 
is in terms of local currency relative to a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies computed 
by J.P. Morgan. Specifications (3) and (4) show that changes in trade-weighted currency indices 
are largely unimportant and unrelated to the ownership return. 
It is also possible that the level of foreign ownership is simply a proxy for the extent to 
which a stock has operations abroad, and this could be why the importance of the ownership 
return increases with the level of foreign ownership. To investigate this possibility, we interact 
the level of foreign sales with the ownership return. Since firms with high foreign ownership 
may have varying degrees of foreign sales, it allows us to see if foreign operations are important 
beyond ownership levels. Specifications (5) and (6) show that foreign operations are not driving 
the importance of the ownership return. 
Emerging and Developed Markets, Size, and Liquidity 
Table S2.10 first examines our quarterly cross-sectional regression results (for stocks with more 
than 5 percent foreign ownership) separately for emerging and developed markets (except for the 
United States). Interestingly, the ownership return coefficient is highly significant in developed 
markets but not in emerging markets. The lack of statistical significance in emerging markets 
could simply be due to lack of power with the smaller sample, but the coefficient is much smaller 
as well. This result is opposite to theories such as Kodres and Pritsker (2002) which call for the 
effect to concentrate in emerging markets. 
We also examine if the effect is greater for smaller stocks, or for those with less liquidity. 
Like most other tables, we require a minimum of trading on 30 percent of the days in the 
previous year. Surprisingly, the effect is greater in larger stocks. Similarly, when we sort our 
sample into those stocks with trading on more than 50 percent of the days in the previous year 
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(and those with 30-50 percent of days traded), we find that our results are much more 
pronounced among more liquid stocks. This finding suggests that ownership returns are an 
important facet of international portfolio diversification for most investors. 
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Table S2.1: Cross-Sectional Regressions with Ownership Returns and Ownership Change 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership 
Return), the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta*Local Market and 
World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). The table shows results for stocks with 
alternative levels of foreign institutional ownership of 0%-1%, 1%-5%, and >5% (in Panel A) and foreign institutional ownership above 10% and 20% (in Panel 
B) using quarterly returns. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample is limited to non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the 
previous year. The table reports the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-
West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Ownership data is from LionShares, and return data for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from 
Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Alternative Levels of Foreign Institutional Ownership 
  0-1%   1%-5%   >=5% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ownership Return 0.217 0.217 0.132 0.203 0.197 0.090  0.259 0.257 0.272 0.361 0.376 0.223  0.710 0.705 0.553 0.653 0.591 0.395
 
(5.40
) 
(5.39
) 
(2.94
) (4.27) (5.28) (2.43)  
(6.29
) (6.23)
(4.60
) (5.06)
(5.26
) (3.54)  
(7.11
) 
(7.15
) 
(5.14
) (6.17) 
(6.83
) 
(4.76
) 
Ownership Change  1.781 2.316 2.371 1.762 2.150   1.315 1.140 1.279 1.124 1.028   0.451 0.500 0.515 0.427 0.455
  
(5.35
) 
(2.77
) (2.79) (5.69) (2.65)   (6.77)
(4.52
) (5.69)
(6.50
) (4.45)   
(9.78
) 
(6.82
) (6.81) 
(9.68
) 
(6.66
) 
Local Beta*Local Market   0.726   0.795    0.763   0.792    0.731   0.764
   
(9.81
)   (10.1)    
(11.0
)   (11.0)    
(14.6
)   
(15.3
) 
World Beta*World Market    
-
0.108  0.181     -0.408  
-
0.153     0.000  0.209
    
(-
0.23)  (0.40)     (-0.75)  
(-
0.35)     (-0.00)  
(0.42
) 
Industry     0.325 0.235      0.303 0.270      0.505 0.399
     (6.52) (4.98)      
(5.81
) (8.23)      
(13.0
) 
(10.0
) 
Average Adjusted R2 0.006 0.009 0.067 0.020 0.024 0.091  0.006 0.009 0.098 0.029 0.037 0.126  0.015 0.020 0.094 0.039 0.052 0.137
Average Number of Firms per 
Quarter 2,020 2,020 1,091 1,091 2,015 1,091  3,627 3,627 1,226 1,226 1,606 1,226  1,981 1,981 1,524 1,524 1,979 1,524
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Panel B: Foreign Institutional Ownership above 10% and 20%  >=10%   >=20% 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Ownership Return 0.758 0.529   0.706 0.526 
  (8.94) (6.46)   (7.2) (4.40) 
Local Beta*Local Market   0.681     0.644 
    (12.8)     (8.83) 
World Beta*World Market   0.16     0.124 
    (0.28)     (0.20) 
Industry   0.435     0.449 
    (9.97)     (8.54) 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.131   0.013 0.132 
Average Number of Firms 1,221 928   550 381 
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Table S2.2: Panel Regressions 
 
Panel A shows the results of panel regressions, with standard errors clustered by firm and with quarter fixed effects, of stock returns on an intercept (not 
reported), the contemporaneous and lagged foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), 
expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta*Local Market and World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns 
excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). Panel B shows the results of panel estimations with firm and quarter fixed effects. The sample consists of 
non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The table reports the coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the adjusted R2 and the number of observations. Ownership data is 
from LionShares, and return data for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Panel Regressions with Clustered Standard Errors and Quarter Fixed Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat
Ownership Return 0.801 (15.3)  0.559 (10.6)  0.353 (5.96)  0.732 (10.7)  0.705 (8.33)  0.768 (14.8)  0.313 (5.35)
Ownership Return (lagged)          -0.021 (-0.52)  -0.241 (-5.11)      
Ownership Return (lagged, avg. of 2, 3, 
4)          0.236 (3.61)  0.249 (2.74)      
Ownership Change                0.409 (7.36)  0.455 (6.53)
Local Beta*Local Market       0.529 (20.0)     0.565 (21.6)    0.524 (19.9)
World Beta*World Market       0.035 (0.82)     0.044 (0.96)    0.029 (0.66)
Industry    0.542 (21.9)  0.489 (19.0)          0.483 (18.8)
Adjusted R2 0.27  0.30  0.35  0.28  0.33  0.28  0.35 
Observations 37,154 37,154  30,120  36,479  29,939  37,154  30,120 
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Panel B: Panel Regressions with Firm and Quarter Fixed Effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
 Coef t-stat   Coef t-stat   Coef t-stat   Coef t-stat   Coef t-stat  Coef t-stat   Coef t-stat
Ownership Return 0.815 (17.3)  0.662 (14.2)  0.677 (12.6)  0.813 (17.0)  0.803 (14.8)  0.811 (17.3)  0.670 (12.6)
Ownership Return (lagged)          0.127 (2.68)  0.012 (0.23)      
Ownership Return (lagged, avg. of 2, 
3, 4)          0.363 (6.07)  0.459 (6.06)      
Ownership Change                0.395 (11.6)  0.484 (12.4)
Local Beta*Local Market       0.555 (39.2)     0.581 (40.4)    0.550 (38.9)
World Beta*World Market       0.042 (1.88)     0.016 (0.69)    0.040 (1.77)
Industry    0.533 (32.1)  0.493 (27.6)          0.490 (27.5)
Adjusted R2 0.30  0.32  0.38  0.30  0.36  0.30  0.38 
Observations 37,154 37,154  30,120  36,479  29,939  37,154  30,120 
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Table S2.3: Ownership Return and Non-Ownership Return with Simulation 
 
The table shows results from the following simulation exercises. In simulation exercise 1 (Panel A), for each stock 
held by a foreign investor, we randomly draw another stock from the same country, industry, and size bin that is not 
held by any of the stock’s shareholders. We then create a non-ownership return. This non-ownership return is added 
to an artificial data set that also includes the original ownership returns and other control variables. We create 200 
such datasets based on alternative random draws of non-ownership returns. We then estimate the following 
univariate regression: R_i = a + b*R_nonown_i + c*R_own_i + e_i.  We generate regression coefficients for each of 
the datasets to obtain an empirical distribution of regression statistics. Size groups are defined using cut off points 
among U.S. stocks. Non-ownership linked firms must have market cap greater than 100 million. In simulation 
exercise 2 (Panel B), we conduct a bootstrap. For each stock, we have the Ownership Return (R_own_i) and the 
Non-Ownership Return (R_nonown_i) based on the value-weighted mean returns of the largest non-owned stock in 
the same industry and country as the linked stocks. For each quarter we run a cross-sectional regression of the stock 
return (R_i) on the Ownership Return and the Non-Ownership Return: (1) R_i = a + b*R_nonown_i + c*R_own_i + 
e_i. We keep the parameter estimates for a, b, and c, as well as the residuals. We take the time-series average of a, b, 
and c to get the Fama-MacBeth estimates and associated standard errors (corrected with Newey West (1987)). Under 
the null hypothesis, the ownership linkage is not a driver of stock returns.  Therefore, we set the coefficient c 
estimated in (1) to zero, i.e. c=0. Subsequently, we perform the following steps 1,000 times: For each firm in each 
quarter, we take a random draw (with replacement) from the residuals for that quarter. We impose the null 
hypothesis and create returns for each firm and quarter by multiplying the estimated coefficients (b and c, with c set 
to zero) with the Non-Ownership Return and the Ownership Return and adding the intercept, a, as well as the 
residual (from the prior step). Using these constructed return series instead of the actual returns, we estimate 
regression (1) for each quarter. We take the time-series average of a, b, and c to get the Fama-MacBeth estimates 
and associated standard errors (corrected with Newey West (1987)). From each of the 1,000 iterations we obtain a 
time-series average of a, b ,and c, as well as associated t-statistics/standard errors, which yield an empirical 
distribution. We calculate p-values as the proportion of t-statistics that are greater than the t-statistic from the 
original Fama-MacBeth regression. 
 
 
Panel A: Simulation exercise 1 
Mean Coef. Min Coef. Min Coef. Iterations 
Non-Ownership Return 0.003 0.0018 0.061 200 
 
Panel B: Simulation exercise 2 
Coef. p-value Iterations 
Ownership Return 0.850 0.00 1,000 
Non-Ownership Return -0.086 0.40 1,000 
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Table S2.4: Alternative Explanations 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly stock returns on various ownership variables and control variables. It shows results with an 
intercept (not reported), the owners’ home market return (Owners’ Home Market Return), returns on the multilateral exchange rate index of the country of 
incorporation (Foreign Exchange Return), the interaction between the percentage of foreign sales and the ownership return (Foreign Sales*Ownership Return), 
investment style returns (Style Return), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), 
expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta*Local Market and World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns 
excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). The owners’ home market return is a weighted average of the home market index returns where the owners 
are incorporated; the weights are based on the relative size of the funds’ holdings of the stock. Foreign exchange returns are the returns on a trade-weighted 
currency index for the country in which the stock is incorporated. The currency index is in terms of the local currency relative to a trade-weighted basket of 
foreign currencies. In the LionShares database each fund is classified as one of the following styles: Aggressive, Deep Value, GARP, Growth, Index, Value, or 
Yield. To construct style returns, we first create fund style returns in each quarter by computing the value weighted return of its holdings. We then construct style 
index returns as the value-weighted average return of all funds in each style. Then, for each stock, we construct its stock specific style return as the holdings-
weighted average of the returns of the styles into which its owners are classified. In Panel A the sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero 
trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. Panel B shows subsample results around liquidity and coverage. In 
Panel B the sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with more than 30%, more than 50%, or more than 75% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at 
least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. Columns 1 to 6 show the results for weekly regressions, while columns 7 to 15 show the results for quarterly 
regressions.  Columns 13 and 14 of Panel B shows results for non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year, at least 5% lagged 
foreign institutional ownership, and from countries where there are more than 500 firm-quarters or the top 20 countries with the highest country-aggregate 
foreign ownership level. Column 15 shows results for a sample where we only include institutions that report their holdings on a quarterly basis. The sample 
period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The table reports the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are 
corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with three lags. 
(continued) 
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Table S2.4: Alternative Explanations (continued) 
 
Panel A: Additional Control Variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Owners’ Home Market Return 0.319 0.039 0.039 
(3.40) (0.51) (0.55) 
Foreign Exchange Return 0.026 0.015 -0.083 
(0.24) (0.31) (-1.15) 
Style Return 2.474 0.826 0.997 
(6.14) (3.12) (2.96) 
Foreign Sales*Ownership Return 0.571 0.177 0.179 
(4.34) (1.84) (2.08) 
Ownership Return 0.372 0.409 0.373 0.382 0.395 0.323 
(4.54) (4.73) (5.04) (4.17) (4.76) (3.18) 
Ownership Change 0.460 0.459 0.458 0.624 0.455 0.636 
(6.76) (6.80) (7.01) (6.35) (6.66) (6.82) 
Local Beta*Local Market 0.763 0.751 0.759 0.748 0.802 0.785 0.764 0.717 
(15.72) (15.42) (16.05) (13.04) (15.93) (14.96) (15.30) (11.97) 
World Beta*World Market 0.190 0.206 0.205 0.142 0.160 0.179 0.209 0.117 
(0.38) (0.42) (0.40) (0.31) (0.23) (0.35) (0.42) (0.25) 
Industry 0.397 0.407 0.389 0.380 0.411 0.399 0.385 
(10.28) (10.39) (9.97) (10.74) (9.55) (10.00) (11.34) 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.138 0.010 0.139 0.011 0.139 0.013 0.146 0.109 0.126 0.137 0.152 
Average Number of Firms per Quarter 2,072 1,607 2,056 1,595 2,066 1,606 1,420 1,136 1,611 1,611 1,607 1,131 
(continued) 
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Table S2.4: Alternative Explanations (continued) 
 
Panel B: Liquidity and Coverage 
 
 
  Weekly Regression 
   Percent of Trading Days 
  >30% >30% > 50% >50% >75% >75% 
Ownership Ret 0.224 0.215 0.241 0.231 0.259 0.248 
  (13.56) (12.63) (13.38) (12.25) (14.00) (12.41) 
Ownership Ret  0.097 0.096 0.097 
  (lag) (5.64) (5.28) (4.92) 
Ownership Ret  0.080 0.084 0.078 
  (lag avg. of 2, 3, 4) (2.54) (2.45) (2.09) 
Loc Beta*Loc Mkt 0.784 0.782 0.788 0.786 0.801 0.798 
  (81.32) (82.22) (83.57) (84.10) (86.51) (87.45) 
Wld Beta*Wld Mkt 1.354 1.347 1.363 1.337 1.374 1.341 
  (2.33) (2.39) (2.18) (2.23) (2.15) (2.20) 
Industry 0.256 0.255 0.257 0.255 0.264 0.264 
  (25.39) (25.68) (25.81) (25.81) (27.65) (27.59) 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.108 0.110 0.113 0.122 0.124 
Avg. No. of Firms 2,159 2,150 2,090 2,083 1,882 1,877 
(continued) 
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Quarterly Regression 
Percent of Trading Days 
No Obs > 500 Top 20 cty Qtr obs only   >30% > 50% >50% >75% >75% 
Ownership Ret 0.358 0.395 0.352 0.464 0.366 0.227 0.290 0.407 
  (3.71) (4.76) (3.51) (5.83) (3.70) (3.56) (2.99) (5.14) 
Ownership Ret  -0.069 -0.065 -0.029   
  (lag) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-0.59)   
Ownership Ret  0.376 0.418 0.412   
  (lag avg. of 2, 3, 4) (3.07) (3.51) (3.01)   
Loc Beta*Loc Mkt 0.746 0.768 0.748 0.770 0.749 0.790 0.636 0.770 
  (15.27) (15.56) (15.38) (15.59) (15.67) (9.87) (8.72) (15.51) 
Wld Beta*Wld Mkt 0.223 0.204 0.223 0.133 0.161 -0.149 -0.374 0.185 
  (0.47) (0.42) (0.48) (0.27) (0.34) (-0.33) (-0.74) (0.37) 
Industry 0.408 0.399 0.406 0.390 0.399 0.278 0.332 0.402 
  (10.21) (9.72) (10.40) (8.84) (9.71) (8.07) (5.46) (9.64) 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.134 0.141 0.145 0.150 0.120 0.095 0.133 
Avg. No. of Firms 1,441 1,580 1,420 1,470 1,331 1,279 343 1,588 
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Table S2.5: Sorting Results for Wealth Effect 
 
The table shows sorting results for the wealth effect. For each stock, we sort each stock’s institutional owners into 
five quintiles according to the institutions’ average holding returns. In each quintile we report the average change of 
holdings of the stock by the institutions in the current and over the next four quarters. Panel A shows results for the 
average change of holdings by the institutions.  Panel B shows results for the relative average change of holdings by 
the institutions as a percentage of the average level of holdings of stocks held by institutions within the quintile. The 
sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading 
days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. Ownership data is from 
LionShares, and return data for individual stocks is from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Change of Holdings 
    Average   Change of holdings 
Return at t at t+1 at t+2 at t+3 at t+4 
  (x100) (x10000) (x10000) (x10000) (x10000) (x10000) 
1 (Low) -3.952 23.917 -24.571 -20.942 -16.484 -13.086 
(4.060) (-3.847) (-3.881) (-3.104) (-2.846) 
2 -1.465 19.699 -23.286 -18.488 -16.020 -12.875 
(3.344) (-3.645) (-3.427) (-3.017) (-2.800) 
3 -0.276 16.538 -22.809 -18.770 -17.653 -14.061 
(2.808) (-3.571) (-3.479) (-3.324) (-3.058) 
4 1.083 18.649 -24.400 -18.566 -17.433 -14.545 
(3.166) (-3.820) (-3.441) (-3.283) (-3.163) 
5 (High) 4.033 26.981 -24.099 -16.675 -13.349 -15.299 
  (4.581) (-3.773) (-3.091) (-2.514) (-3.327) 
High-Low 3.064 0.472 4.267 3.135 -2.213 
      (0.520) (0.074) (0.791) (0.590) (-0.481) 
 
Panel B: Change of Holdings Relative to Average Level of Holdings within Quintile 
    Average   Relative Change of Holdings 
Return at t at t+1 at t+2 at t+3 at t+4 
  (x100)           
1 (Low) -3.952 0.924 -0.199 -0.110 -0.151 -0.103 
(3.185) (-5.963) (-2.621) (-4.169) (-2.234) 
2 -1.465 0.106 -0.192 -0.178 -0.163 -0.162 
(0.365) (-5.749) (-4.242) (-4.504) (-3.498) 
3 -0.276 0.123 -0.202 -0.182 -0.174 -0.154 
(0.423) (-6.053) (-4.328) (-4.811) (-3.324) 
4 1.083 0.091 -0.189 -0.179 -0.172 -0.140 
(0.312) (-5.661) (-4.259) (-4.745) (-3.030) 
5 (High) 4.033 0.477 -0.160 -0.145 -0.146 -0.128 
  (1.643) (-4.787) (-3.456) (-4.027) (-2.769) 
High-Low -0.447 0.039 -0.035 0.005 -0.025 
      (-1.542) (1.176) (-0.835) (0.142) (-0.535) 
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Table S2.6: Asymmetries in Ownership Returns 
 
Panel A of the table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership 
return (Ownership Return), dummy variables for the stocks with the lowest 20% (or alternatively 5%) Ownership Returns, dummy variables for the stocks with 
the lowest 20% (or alternatively 5%) outflows interacted with the Ownership Return as explained below, the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), 
expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta*Local Market and World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns 
excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). To construct firm-level outflows, we track investors’ outflows by institution and compute an aggregate 
measure of outflows across all institutional investors in a given stock. We then create a dummy variable for whether a stock’s institutional investors are in the 
bottom 20% (or alternatively 5%) percentile aggregate outflows and create a dummy variable interaction term with the ownership return. The sample consists of 
non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The table reports the average coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with 
the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Panel B table shows the results of time-series regressions of stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the local 
market index excluding own stock (Local Market), negative observations of the local market index excluding own stock (Local Market (negative)), the foreign 
institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), and negative observations of the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership Return (negative)). The 
sample is limited to non-U.S. stocks with foreign ownership above 5% in the beginning of 3 year periods. Results are shown for the subperiods 01/01/2001-
12/31/2002, 01/01/2003-12/31/2005 and 01/01/2006-03/31/2009. The regression models are as follows: 
, ,
, , ,
, , ,
(1)
(2)
(3)
jt j j LocalMarket t j Ownership t jt
jt j j LocalMarket t j Ownership t j OwnershipNegative t jt
jt j j LocalMarket t j LocalMarketNegative t j Ownership t j OwnershipNegative
R R R
R R R R
R R R R R
   
    
    
   
    
     ,t jt
 
The table reports the mean and median coefficients and adjusted R2s, as well as the number of firms. The panel also shows the average Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) following Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) for models (1) and (2), as well as the difference in the MSE. Tests of significance of differences in MSE 
are based on bootstrapped standard errors using 1,000 randomly drawn samples with replacement. Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for 
individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from Datastream. 
(continued) 
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Table S2.6: Asymmetries in Ownership Returns (continued) 
 
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership Return 0.694 0.372 0.765 0.410 0.691 0.352 0.690 0.388 
 (7.22) (4.39) (7.21) (5.06) (6.09) (3.72) (6.63) (4.56) 
Lowest 20% Ownership Return -0.154 -0.066       
 (-1.42) (-0.52)       
Lowest 5% Ownership Return   -0.144 0.870     
   (-0.60) (1.75)     
Lowest 20% flows * Ownership Return     0.014 0.108   
     (0.18) (1.43)   
Lowest 5% flows * Ownership Return       0.061 0.080 
       (0.94) (1.22) 
Ownership Change  0.453  0.458  0.452  0.457 
  (6.52)  (6.68)  (6.42)  (6.48) 
Local Beta*Local Market  0.762  0.763  0.763  0.765 
  (15.28)  (15.25)  (15.20)  (15.30) 
World Beta*World Market  0.220  0.213  0.212  0.204 
  (0.43)  (0.42)  (0.42)  (0.41) 
Industry  0.399  0.400  0.399  0.400 
  (10.00)  (10.06)  (10.00)  (9.98) 
Average Adjusted R2 0.017 0.137 0.016 0.137 0.017 0.138 0.016 0.137 
Average Number of Firms per Quarter 2,088 1,607 2,088 1,607 2,088 1,607 2,088 1,607 
(continued) 
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Table S2.6: Asymmetries in Ownership Returns (continued) 
 
Panel B: Time-series Regressions 
 
    2001Q1-2002Q4   2003Q1-2005Q4   2006Q1-2009Q1 
    (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Local Market Mean 0.60 0.60 0.61  0.78 0.77 0.72  0.82 0.82 0.82 
 Median 0.56 0.55 0.56  0.76 0.76 0.70  0.80 0.80 0.80 
Local Market (negative) Mean   -0.03    0.13    -0.01 
 Median   0.00    0.08    0.01 
Ownership Return Mean 0.31 0.21 0.20  0.21 0.17 0.19  0.21 0.21 0.20 
 Median 0.21 0.15 0.14  0.13 0.12 0.14  0.14 0.14 0.11 
Ownership Return (negative) Mean  0.20 0.22   0.11 0.04   -0.003 0.02 
 Median  0.18 0.19   0.09 0.03   0.003 0.01 
Adjusted R2 Mean 0.18 0.18 0.19  0.35 0.23 0.23  0.35 0.35 0.36 
 Median 0.14 0.14 0.14  0.35 0.20 0.21  0.35 0.36 0.36 
Number of Firms   233 233 233  3,126 1,408 1,408  3,126 3,126 2,316 
 
  Regression # MSE 
Incremental Contribution of Negative Ownership Return  
Base Model (1) 0.026 
Base Model with Negative Ownership Return (2) 0.025 
Difference  0.002 
p-value   <.0001 
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Table S2.7: Equally-Weighted World Market Betas and Explanatory Power of Ownership 
Portfolios 
 
The table shows regression results using portfolios of stocks with different degree of foreign institutional ownership. 
In particular, stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year are sorted into 4 portfolios, 
depending on whether lagged foreign institutional ownership is equal to 0%, between 0% and 1%, between 1% and 
5%, or larger than 5%. Equally-weighted portfolios of weekly USD returns are formed by foreign institutional 
ownership, country, and date, requiring at least 10 stocks per country and ownership group on a given date. 
Moreover, for a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months, non-missing observations in each 
of the four ownership groups are required for each day and country, each country/ownership portfolio has to have at 
least 30 weekly observations, and there have to be non-missing observations for each ownership group for at least 5 
countries. We also form a High-Low ownership portfolio as the difference between the returns of the high foreign 
ownership portfolio and the low foreign ownership portfolio for each country. For a given window of weekly 
observations within rolling 24 months, the returns of these portfolios are regressed on an intercept (not reported) and 
the USD returns of the MSCI world market index: ,jt j j W orldM arket t jtR R     . Results across countries are 
aggregated using equal weights. The table shows the average world market beta estimates and R2s for the respective 
portfolio, as well as the t-statistics of tests that the average world market beta and R2, respectively, of the high minus 
low ownership portfolio is different from zero. T-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Panel A shows results for Developed Countries, while Panel B 
shows results for Emerging Markets (based on the MSCI classification as of June 2006). The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks and the 
world market index is from Datastream. 
Panel A: Developed Countries 
  World Market Beta   R2 
 0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5%
High-
Low t-stat  0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5% 
High-
Low t-stat
Australia 0.75 0.80 0.88 1.06 0.31 7.3  0.26 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.12 5.32
Canada 0.84 0.94 1.01 1.11 0.27 11.1  0.24 0.34 0.38 0.47 0.11 8.90
Denmark 0.59 0.69 0.97 1.31 0.72 14.1  0.29 0.34 0.44 0.68 0.41 19.7
France 0.46 0.57 0.77 1.03 0.57 20.7  0.20 0.29 0.38 0.58 0.46 13.5
Germany 0.57 0.63 0.95 1.16 0.59 19.5  0.24 0.33 0.43 0.59 0.34 9.48
Hong Kong 0.66 0.73 0.83 0.98 0.32 13.9  0.21 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.12 6.02
Italy 0.68 0.47 0.64 0.61 -0.07 -3.28  0.09 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.00 2.70
Japan 0.42 0.54 0.63 0.73 0.31 20.7  0.10 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.18 6.99
Norway 0.82 0.87 0.97 1.17 0.35 6.62  0.23 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.14 4.18
Singapore 1.13 0.95 0.93 1.02 -0.11 -2.06  0.31 0.32 0.36 0.45 0.02 3.99
Sweden 0.95 0.98 1.19 1.22 0.27 19.9  0.39 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.08 11.5
Switzerland 0.39 0.44 0.63 0.85 0.46 10.4  0.08 0.17 0.21 0.36 0.17 6.80
United Kingdom 0.50 0.56 0.71 0.93 0.43 19.0  0.21 0.30 0.39 0.55 0.28 9.33
United States 0.63 1.03 1.22 1.20 0.58 31.4  0.48 0.72 0.79 0.78 0.39 18.4
Developed  0.64 0.73 0.89 1.04 0.40 49.5  0.25 0.33 0.40 0.51 0.23 14.9
Developed  ex US 0.64 0.70 0.86 1.02 0.38 40.9   0.22 0.29 0.36 0.48 0.21 12.8
(continued) 
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Table S2.7: Equally-Weighted World Market Betas and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
  World Market Beta   R2 
 0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5%
High-
Low t-stat  0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5% 
High-
Low t-stat
China 0.26 0.44 0.55 1.01 0.75 24.7  0.01 0.04 0.08 0.35 0.16 7.97
India 1.38 1.31 1.40 1.33 -0.05 -1.02  0.24 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.02 4.15
Korea 0.88 0.96 1.07 1.11 0.23 7.30  0.22 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.11 4.88
Malaysia 0.52 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.13 7.92  0.17 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.06 3.82
Poland 1.26 1.08 1.18 1.20 -0.06 -1.35  0.32 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.03 4.75
South Africa 0.62 0.71 0.94 1.11 0.49 12.5  0.21 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.15 6.23
Thailand 0.55 0.53 0.61 0.73 0.18 12.9  0.36 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.11 7.11
Emerging  0.74 0.76 0.90 0.95 0.21 13.0  0.18 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.07 6.66
All countries 0.67 0.74 0.89 1.02 0.35 36.7   0.23 0.29 0.35 0.45 0.18 15.2
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Table S2.8: Value-Weighted World Market Betas and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios 
 
The table shows rolling regression results using portfolios of stocks with different degree of institutional ownership. 
In particular, stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year are sorted into 4 portfolios, 
depending on whether lagged foreign institutional ownership is equal to 0%, between 0% and 1%, between 1% and 
5%, or larger than 5%. Value-weighted portfolios of weekly USD returns are formed by foreign institutional 
ownership, country, and date, requiring at least 10 stocks per country and ownership group on a given date. 
Moreover, for a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months, non-missing observations in each 
of the four ownership groups are required for each day and country, each country/ownership portfolio has to have at 
least 30 weekly observations, and there have to be non-missing observations for each ownership group for at least 5 
countries. We also form a High-Low ownership portfolio as the difference between the returns of the high foreign 
ownership portfolio and the low foreign ownership portfolio for each country. For a given window of weekly 
observations within rolling 24 months, the returns of these portfolios are regressed on an intercept (not reported) and 
the USD returns of the MSCI world market index: ,jt j j W orldM arket t jtR R     . Results across countries are 
aggregated using lagged USD country market capitalization as weights. The table shows the world average market 
beta estimates and R2s for the respective portfolio, as well as the t-statistics of tests that the average world market 
beta and R2, respectively, of the high minus low ownership portfolio is different from zero. T-statistics are corrected 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Panel A shows results 
for Developed Countries, while Panel B shows results for Emerging Markets (based on the MSCI classification as of 
June 2006). The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns 
for individual stocks and the world market index is from Datastream. 
Panel A: Developed Markets 
  World Market Beta   R2 
 0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5%
High-
Low t-stat  0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5% 
High-
Low t-stat
Australia 0.72 0.67 0.84 0.99 0.27 11.5  0.24 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.08 4.21
Canada 0.86 0.76 0.81 1.00 0.14 7.94  0.32 0.45 0.45 0.59 0.04 4.27
Denmark 0.56 0.93 1.03 1.31 0.75 10.6  0.27 0.35 0.53 0.64 0.34 17.5
France 0.41 0.54 1.03 1.17 0.76 19.9  0.16 0.31 0.46 0.67 0.38 10.7
Germany 0.22 0.50 1.09 1.37 1.15 17.6  0.12 0.29 0.50 0.71 0.55 18.2
Hong Kong 0.62 0.85 0.84 1.19 0.57 12.4  0.19 0.25 0.45 0.58 0.18 10.1
Italy 0.66 0.51 0.71 0.66 0.00 -0.03  0.13 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.01 2.48
Japan 0.42 0.54 0.71 0.87 0.45 22.8  0.11 0.17 0.28 0.39 0.22 6.96
Norway 0.72 0.81 1.09 1.13 0.41 5.83  0.21 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.13 4.50
Singapore 1.12 0.83 1.01 0.97 -0.15 -3.82  0.29 0.30 0.34 0.45 0.01 4.04
Sweden 0.96 1.00 1.22 1.44 0.48 7.94  0.40 0.45 0.51 0.64 0.23 6.80
Switzerland 0.24 0.37 0.89 1.48 1.24 13.9  0.05 0.11 0.27 0.49 0.41 12.1
United Kingdom 0.51 0.73 0.95 1.01 0.49 14.1  0.24 0.42 0.57 0.64 0.26 8.06
United States 0.62 1.07 1.00 1.00 0.39 15.2  0.57 0.76 0.85 0.82 0.25 9.11
Developed  0.56 0.86 0.95 1.03 0.47 23.0  0.39 0.55 0.65 0.69 0.26 10.9
Developed  ex US 0.49 0.62 0.89 1.06 0.57 31.7   0.18 0.30 0.42 0.54 0.27 12.4
(continued) 
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Table S2.8: Value-Weighted World Market Betas and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
  World Market Beta   R2 
 0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5%
High-
Low t-stat  0% 0%-1% 1%-5% >5% 
High-
Low t-stat
China 0.24 0.43 0.67 0.54 0.30 10.0  0.01 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.03 5.13
India 1.38 1.40 1.42 1.37 -0.01 -0.32  0.25 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.01 4.57
Korea 0.93 1.13 1.14 1.18 0.25 4.32  0.24 0.24 0.30 0.40 0.05 5.43
Malaysia 0.56 0.49 0.59 0.63 0.07 3.71  0.18 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.03 3.17
Poland 1.21 0.95 1.16 1.42 0.21 2.51  0.25 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.06 3.08
South Africa 0.63 0.78 0.99 1.15 0.52 9.13  0.21 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.16 6.18
Thailand 0.56 0.58 0.71 0.96 0.40 26.8  0.34 0.26 0.30 0.41 0.19 15.2
Emerging  0.80 0.87 0.94 1.00 0.20 8.38  0.19 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.05 7.86
All countries 0.57 0.86 0.96 1.04 0.46 23.0   0.38 0.54 0.64 0.68 0.25 10.9
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Table S2.9: Portfolio Sorts 
 
The table shows the stock return performance and change in ownership of stocks as a function of their ownership 
return. Stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign 
institutional ownership are sorted into high and low ownership return groups depending on whether their foreign 
ownership return in the period is above 2.5% (5%, 7.5%) (“High”) or below -2.5% (-5%, -7.5%) (“Low”). For 
stocks in each group, we calculate the average change in ownership (ownership at end of quarter minus ownership at 
beginning of quarter), the average USD return, and the average USD return in excess of the local market index 
excluding the respective stock. Each ownership return portfolio is required to have at least 10 stocks on a given date. 
We also form a High-Low portfolio as the difference between the values for the high foreign ownership return 
portfolio and the low foreign ownership return portfolio (requiring at least 10 observations in each portfolio). The 
table reports the time-series average (Mean), corresponding t-statistic (t-stat), and number of observations (N) of the 
USD returns and change in foreign ownership. T-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. Results for the USD returns of the high and the low foreign 
ownership return portfolios are based on USD returns in excess of the local market index excluding the respective 
stock, while results for the High-Low foreign ownership return portfolio are based on raw USD returns. The sample 
period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks 
and market indices is from Datastream. 
 
      Returns (USD)   Change in Foreign Ownership 
  Ownership Return Mean t-stat N   Mean t-stat N 
 >2.5% High 0.033 (2.10) 23  -0.0027 (-1.57) 23 
 <-2.5% Low -0.021 (-1.58) 22  -0.0054 (-3.14) 22 
  High-Low 0.059 (2.55) 17  0.0025 (1.17) 17 
          
 >5% High 0.030 (1.37) 17  -0.0008 (-0.59) 17 
 <-5% Low -0.029 (-1.75) 18  -0.0065 (-3.60) 18 
  High-Low 0.069 (1.43) 10  0.0079 (2.79) 10 
          
 >7.5% High 0.031 (1.00) 12  -0.0028 (-2.91) 12 
 <-7.5% Low -0.021 (-0.97) 16  -0.0101 (-5.92) 16 
    High-Low 0.120 (1.85) 6   0.0083 (2.31) 6 
  95
Table S2.10: Illiquid and Emerging Market Stocks 
 
The table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (Ownership 
Return), the change in foreign ownership (Ownership Change), expected returns from a CAPM with local and world market index (Local Beta*Local Market and 
World Beta*World Market), and global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry). The table shows results for the full sample 
(All), as well as results broken down by degree of market development (Emerging, Developed), market capitalization size (Small, Medium, Large), and trading 
activity (High, Medium, Low). Stocks are classified into emerging and developed markets based on the MSCI classification as of June 2006. Stocks are classified 
into market capitalization buckets on the basis of lagged market capitalization in U.S. dollars, where small is the bottom 40%, medium is the next 30%, and large 
is the top 40%. Stocks are classified according to trading activity on the basis of the number of trading days in the prior year as liquid (stocks with more trading 
days, i.e. top half) or illiquid (stocks with few trading days, i.e. bottom half). The sample consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in 
the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign institutional ownership. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The table reports the average 
coefficients, associated t-statistics, as well as the average adjusted R2. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure with 3 lags. 
Ownership data and information on investment styles is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks, market indices, and industry indices is from 
Datastream. 
 
      Market Development   Market Capitalization   Trading 
 All    Emerging Developed   Small Medium Large  Illiquid Liquid 
Ownership Return 0.395  0.150 0.436  0.115 0.334 0.413  0.184 0.629 
 (4.76)  (1.26) (4.44)  (0.66) (3.38) (4.24)  (2.19) (6.78) 
Ownership Change 0.455  0.457 0.463  0.579 0.504 0.536  0.325 0.588 
 (6.66)  (4.21) (5.96)  (2.45) (4.73) (5.28)  (4.04) (5.80) 
Local Beta*Local Market 0.764  0.813 0.676  0.761 0.779 0.783  0.693 0.785 
 (15.3)  (21.3) (8.32)  (5.94) (14.2) (20.6)  (10.5) (15.5) 
World Beta*World Market 0.209  -0.634 0.245  0.270 0.160 0.168  0.397 -0.009 
 (0.42)  (-1.56) (0.47)  (0.53) (0.30) (0.31)  (0.71) (-0.02) 
Industry 0.399  0.471 0.398  0.658 0.285 0.394  0.442 0.386 
 (10.0)  (5.88) (9.92)  (5.13) (5.47) (8.75)  (8.16) (10.06) 
Average Adjusted R2 0.137  0.221 0.113  0.081 0.130 0.188  0.098 0.172 
Average Number of Firms per Quarter 1,607  272 1,335  192 427 988  706 901 
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Figure S2.1: Ownership Returns Coefficient over the Quarter 
 
This figure documents the ownership returns coefficient over the quarter. A cross-sectional regression is run where 
weekly stock returns are regressed on foreign ownership returns. The regression is rerun every week at the 
beginning of each week and then subsequent weeks over the quarter. We average such coefficients from the weekly 
regressions across the weeks that arethe same number of weeks away from previous quarter end. The x-axis shows 
the number of weeks from the previous quarter end (from 1 to 14). The y-axis shows the ownership return 
coefficients over the 14 weeks within each quarter. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. The sample 
consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% 
lagged foreign institutional ownership. 
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Figure S2.2:  Foreign Ownership Regression Coefficients over Time 
 
The figure shows the average coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The sample consists of 
non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year as well as at least 5% lagged foreign 
institutional ownership. The sample period is 01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Each week (Panel A) or quarter (Panels B and 
C), a cross sectional regression is run over all firms in the sample. We then take the rolling average of these 
coefficients in the regressions over the past 26 weeks (7 quarters). The figure shows the moving average. Shaded 
areas are NBER recession periods. In Panel A stock returns are regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign 
institutional ownership return (Ownership Return), global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local 
market (Industry), local market index returns (Local Market) and world market index returns (World). In Panel B 
stock returns are regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (RtO_F), and 
global industry index returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry ex loc). In Panel C stock returns 
are regressed on an intercept (not reported), the foreign institutional ownership return (RtO_F), global industry index 
returns excluding the industry in the local market (Industry ex loc) and local market index returns (Local). 
Ownership data is from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks, market indices and industry indices 
is from Datastream. Data on recession periods is from the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html). 
 
 
Panel A: Model with Weekly Data and Local Market 
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Figure S2.2: Foreign Ownership Regression Coefficients over Time (continued) 
 
Panel B: Model with Quarterly Data without Local Market Index 
 
 
 
Panel C: Model with Quarterly Data and Local Market Index 
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Figure S2.3: Ownership Level and Portfolio Diversification 
 
The figure shows the effect of country and industry portfolio diversification for alternative levels of foreign 
institutional ownership (0%, 0%-1%, 1%-5%, >5%) measured at the beginning of a three year period. The sample 
consists of non-U.S. stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year. The sample period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009. Firms are required to have at least 30 non-missing return observations. For each country, 
year, and institutional ownership groups, the number of firms is restricted to the smallest number of firms across 
institutional ownership groups to have the same number of stocks in each institutional ownership group. For each 
year, the average variance and covariance is calculated for alternatively pure country or pure industry 
diversification, as in Griffin and Karolyi (1998), and subsequently the average across years is calculated. Panel A 
shows country portfolio diversification, and Panel B shows industry portfolio diversification. Ownership data is 
from LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks is from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Country Portfolio Diversification 
  
(continued) 
  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Number of Stocks
Po
rtf
ol
io
 v
ar
ar
ia
nc
e 
as
 a
 %
 o
f t
he
 a
ve
ra
ge
 st
oc
k 
va
ria
nc
FO=0% 0%<FO<1%
1%<FO<5% 5%<FO
  100
Figure S2.3: Ownership Level and Portfolio Diversification (continued) 
 
Panel B: Industry Portfolio Diversification 
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Figure S2.4: Equally-Weighted Market Sensitivity and Explanatory Power of Ownership 
Portfolios 
 
The figure shows rolling regression results using portfolios of stocks with different degrees of institutional 
ownership. In particular, stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year are sorted into 4 
portfolios, depending on whether lagged foreign institutional ownership is equal to 0%, between 0% and 1%, 
between 1% and 5%, or larger than 5%. Equally-weighted portfolios of weekly USD returns are formed by foreign 
institutional ownership, country, and date, requiring at least 10 stocks per country and ownership group on a given 
date. Moreover, for a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months, non-missing observations in 
each of the four ownership groups are required for each day and country, each country/ownership portfolio has to 
have at least 30 weekly observations, and there have to be non-missing observations for each ownership group for at 
least 5 countries. For a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months over the period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009, the returns of these portfolios are regressed on an intercept and the USD returns of the 
MSCI world market index: ,jt j j W orldM arket t jtR R      Results across countries are aggregated using equal 
weights. Panel A shows the time-series of the average world market betas, while Panel B shows the time-series of 
the average R2 for the four ownership portfolios. Figure C shows rolling regression results using iShares. For a given 
window of daily observations within rolling 24 months over the period 1/1996-6/2009, the returns of all iShares on 
CRSP are regressed on the value-weighted U.S. market index. Results across iShares are aggregated using equal 
weights. The figure shows the time-series of the average of market betas and R2. Ownership data is from 
LionShares, while data on returns for individual stocks and the world market index is from Datastream. Data on 
iShares is from CRSP. 
 
Panel A: Equally-Weighted World Market Betas 
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Figure S2.4: Equally-Weighted Market Sensitivity and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Equally-Weighted R2 
 
 
Panel C: U.S. Market Sensitivity and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios of iShares 
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Figure S2.5: Value-Weighted Market Sensitivity and Explanatory Power of Ownership 
Portfolios 
 
The figure shows rolling regression results using portfolios of stocks with different degree of institutional 
ownership. In particular, stocks with at least 30% non-zero trading days in the previous year are sorted into 4 
portfolios, depending on whether lagged foreign institutional ownership is equal to 0%, between 0% and 1%, 
between 1% and 5%, or larger than 5%. Value-weighted portfolios of weekly USD returns are formed by foreign 
institutional ownership, country, and date, requiring at least 10 stocks per country and ownership group on a given 
date. Moreover, for a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months, non-missing observations in 
each of the four ownership groups are required for each day and country, each country/ownership portfolio has to 
have at least 30 weekly observations, and there have to be non-missing observations for each ownership group for at 
least 5 countries. For a given window of weekly observations within rolling 24 months over the period is 
01/01/2000-03/31/2009, the returns of these portfolios are regressed on an intercept and the USD returns of the 
MSCI world market index: ,jt j j W orldM arket t jtR R      Results across countries are aggregated using lagged USD 
country market capitalization as weights. Panel A shows the time-series of the average world market betas, while 
Panel B shows the time-series of the average R2 for the four ownership portfolios. Ownership data is from 
LionShares, while data on returns and market capitalization for individual stocks, as well as data on the world 
market index, is from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Value-weighted World Market Betas 
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Figure S2.5: Value-Weighted Market Sensitivity and Explanatory Power of Ownership Portfolios (continued) 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted R2 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRADE LINKAGE AND CROSS-COUNTRY STOCK RETURN PREDICTABILITY 
1. Introduction 
International trade volume and shares of exports in the GDP of many countries have been 
growing steadily over the past few decades37. This increase in trade activity has served to 
strengthen economic linkages between industries and countries.  In this environment, it is 
possible that information originating with trade partners within an industry can predict future 
returns of that industry. In this paper, I am going to test whether future returns of industry 
portfolios can be predicted using past information from trading partners. Moreover, I am going to 
characterize cross-predictability and explore possible explanations for it utilizing trading partner 
relationships between industries. 
 Researchers have documented some evidence of cross-industry predictability in the 
United States.  Menzly and Ozbas (2010) show that stock returns of economically related 
industries can cross-predict each other’s returns in US stock markets. Similarly, Cohen and 
Frazzini (2008) investigate whether firm level public information on customer and supplier 
relationships can be used to obtain abnormal returns. So far, such evidence has focused almost 
exclusively on the domestic US market.  However, as inter-industry relationships extend beyond 
national borders, international interdependence of industries warrants further investigation of this 
issue in a more global setting.38  In this paper, I will bring in a new data source, the GTAP 
(Global Trade Analysis Project), to address this issue. 
                                                 
37 The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/): Export volume index, Exports of goods and services(% of 
GDP) 
38 A recent paper by Rizova (2011) examines the interdependence of country-level trade relationships and 
country-level equity market performance. 
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 The GTAP provides data on cost spent on imported and exported goods by industries 
around the world.  This data, widely used in international trade literature but never in finance 
literature, enables us to look not only at the breakdown of exported and imported goods and 
services, but also dependences of industries on particular imported goods.  For example, the data 
describes quantities of iron and steel products imported from Japan to Korea. Moreover, the data 
reports amounts of this iron and steel consumed by Korean industries. The rich structure of the 
data helps us understand relationships among industries across countries. More importantly, such 
a broad cross section of economically linked industries enables us to relate sources of cross-
predictability to their customers and suppliers.  
 To quantify degrees of international linkages between industries, I consider international 
trade flows and imported goods usage by industries. Based on such linkages, I can quantify how 
an industry in a country is related to other industries around the world.  I construct related 
industry portfolios and examine whether industry portfolio returns can be predicted by past 
returns of internationally related industries. Also, bilateral relationships between related 
industries allow for new possibilities for testing existing theories.  In particular, we have access 
to a cross section of related industries with varying levels of international trade relationships, 
which can be used along with other relationships between two industries, such as institutional co-
ownership and analyst co-coverage.  This data structure enables us to break down the predictor 
variable into several pieces and analyze whether there is varying level of predictability along 
certain criteria, such as co-ownership or co-coverage, on top of the international trade link.  
 Overall, I find strong evidence for cross-border stock return predictability among trade-
linked industries. A trading strategy of buying industry portfolios whose trade-linked industries 
had high returns, and shorting industry portfolios whose trade-linked industries had low returns, 
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yields annualized returns of 12%. Such returns cannot be explained by known risk factors, and 
are different from industry momentum. I find some evidence against the leading explanation that 
posits information segmentation as the only reason for this cross-predictability, and find support 
for illiquidity as a new channel of explanation. 
My paper makes the following three contributions to the literature. First, I uncover effects 
on returns of industry-level trade linkages across the world. Second, I test whether relative 
information is efficiently priced across countries and industries and decouple effects of within-
country predictability and across-country predictability. Third, by selecting an international 
setting in which there is natural information segmentation across countries and great variability 
of liquidity, I obtain a better testing ground for these theories.  
I find the following four empirical results. First, as noted above, I find that self-financing 
trading strategies based on past information from economically related industries yield 
significant premiums.   
Second, I analyze the characteristics of past returns that are most powerful in predicting 
an industry’s return. If information segmentation is the main explanation of cross-predictability, 
then returns from obscure or ignored stocks are more likely to carry more weight in predicting 
related industry returns in foreign countries. In contrast, I find that the strongest predictive power 
comes from past returns of economically linked industries that (1) share greater degrees of 
institutional ownership, and that (2) share more analyst coverage. Such industries are likely more 
well-known and familiar among investors.  This suggests that information segmentation does not 
fully explain cross-predictability.  
Third, I test whether liquidity can explain the observed cross-predictability and compare 
this with the information explanation. If equities of certain industries are highly illiquid, this will 
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result in slow price adjustments. Utilizing double-sort results, I find evidence in favor of the 
illiquidity explanation, which, unlike information segmentation, can explain cross-predictability 
among economically linked industries. 
 Finally, I find that institutional investors increase their holdings quickly in response to 
positive news, but do not decrease their holdings quickly after negative return news. This is in 
line with the fact that most excess return gains from cross-predictability come from the long side 
of the long-short portfolio.  Moreover, the responsiveness of portfolio rebalancing in light of 
positive news increases as liquidity of stocks increases, while responsiveness to negative return 
news is about the same across different liquidity levels.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes data used, Section 3 
present empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
Data used in this paper comes from a number of sources.  Bilateral trade data of disaggregated 
commodities and services and use of imported goods and services by disaggregated industries 
comes from the GTAP.  This data provides bilateral trade of various goods and services and cost 
structures of industries for each country as snapshots of the world economy. In this paper, GTAP 
versions 5 and 6 were used, representing 1997 and 2001, respectively. Only with disaggregated 
trade data and interdependence of industries within countries may we establish industry 
relationships between countries. Description of reorganized GTAP industries can be found in the 
Appendix, Table A3.1. 
I merge these GTAP industries with corresponding industry classifications provided by Professor 
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Ken French. 39  Correspondences between the GTAP and French's industrial classifications are 
also described in the Appendix, Table A3.1. 
Menzly and Ozbas (2010) identify customer and supplier relationships of US industries 
using Benchmark Input-Output Surveys of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).40 The BEA 
surveys document amounts of goods from an industry used across all industries. One potential 
downside of GTAP data, compared to the BEA Use table, is that it comprises only 56 industries, 
whereas the BEA tables include more than 400 industries, though exact numbers vary depending 
on publication year. Moreover, many GTAP industries are related to agriculture; thus, if we 
group them into one industry, the total number of industries is reduced further to 23. Since 
customer-supplier relationships may weaken following aggregation, this higher level of 
aggregation likely biases against finding any cross-sectional predictability, given such a small 
number of industries. Despite such limitations, I still find a strong level of cross-sectional 
predictability across countries. 
Returns of international stocks are from Datastream. I use the same data filter as Griffin, 
Kelly, and Nadari (2009), which involves screening non-common equity. The data error 
                                                 
39 Industry classification is obtained from Ken French’s data library, at his web site 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
40 Cohen and Frazzini (2008) utilize public information of major customers, which firms are required to report 
under Regulation SFAS No. 131, as obtained from Compustat.  But this approach means that results are mostly 
driven by relatively small stocks whose customers are concentrated and not diversified. In contrast, input-output 
relationships across industries are relatively free of small stock problems. In the input-output table, supplier and 
customer industries are well identified and there is no asymmetry of identifying suppliers, as is seen in the 
Compustat data. 
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screening of Ince and Porter (2006) is also applied to the returns data. Numbers of firms and 
average market capitalization of firms in each country-industry group are reported in Table A3.2 
and Table A3.3, respectively. The sample period for the returns data is from 1990 to 2009.  I 
only include countries in the Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) World Index or MSCI 
Emerging Markets Index as of 2010, and countries available in the GTAP database. 41 
Institutional ownership data for international stocks is from the Lionshares database. The 
sample period for the ownership data is from March 1999 to March 2009. The ownership data is, 
at most, quarterly and contains holdings reports of institutions comparable to those of 13F in the 
US.  Detailed data description of Lionshares can be found in Ferreira and Matos (2008) and 
Bartram, Griffin, and Ng (2012).  
 
3. Empirical results 
In order to test the hypothesis of slow diffusion of information or slow reaction of prices from 
economically linked industries, I construct a portfolio of economically linked industries for each 
industry in question. Economic links considered in this study are customer and supplier 
relationships across countries and industries. Under the null hypothesis of immediate information 
diffusion of economically relevant information and price adjustments, the portfolio returns of 
linked industries should not lead returns of the industry. In contrast, when there is slow diffusion 
of information or sluggish price adjustments, we should be able to predict an industry’s returns 
from returns of economically linked industries, where the returns are used as proxies for news 
from linked industries. The next section describes the construction of the customer and supplier 
                                                 
41 I drop Russia due to low data coverage in Datastream. 
 111 
 
industry portfolios.  
3.1 Portfolio returns of international customer and supplier industries 
I follow procedure similar to that of Menzly and Ozbas (2010) and Cohen and Frazzini (2008), in 
that I use lagged returns of economically related industries to predict a particular industry’s 
returns. What is different from their approach is that I am focusing on international linkages of 
industries across the world, rather than industry interdependence within one country. For this 
purpose, I construct two portfolios for each country-industry, namely international customer and 
supplier portfolios. These portfolios consist of foreign industries that are customers or suppliers 
of the industry in the country.  
The customer portfolio is first weighted by trade flows between countries and, secondly, 
by intra-country dependences of industries. In particular, return of customer portfolio of industry 
i  in country c is constructed as 
 , ,
d
customer
ic t ic d ijd jd
d C j J
R w v R
 
  
 (1)
 
where ,ic dw  is proportion of exported good i  to country d  from country c  to all of exported 
good i  from country c , and ijdv is proportion of cost spent by industry j  in country d on 
imported good i  to cost spent on imported good i  by all industries in country d , and jdR  is 
value-weighted portfolio return of stocks industry j  in country d . For example, Chinese 
electronic equipment is exported to multiple countries; 35% of these exports go to the US, 15% 
to Japan, 50% to other countries across the world. Imported electronic equipment is used in 
many industries in each country. In the US, for instance, 50% of imported electronic equipment 
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is used in the electronic equipment industry, 14% in the fabricated products and machinery 
industry, 12% in the service industry, and 24% in other industries. Weight ,ic dw  describes how 
important country d  is to industry i  of country c  as a customer country, and ijdv  describes how 
important industry j of country d  is as a customer industry of imported goods produced by 
industry i .  
The supplier portfolio for industry i  of country c is constructed similarly as 
 , , ,' '
d
supplier
ic t jic jd c jd t
j J d C
R v w R
 
  
 (2)
 
where ' jicv is proportion of cost spent on imported good j  by industry i of country c  to costs 
spent on all imported goods by industry i of country c , and ,'ic dw  is proportion of imported good
j  from country d to country c . In the electronic equipment industry in the US, for example, out 
of all costs of imported goods used in the industry, 86% was spent on imported electronic 
equipment, 5% on imported fabricated products and machinery, and the rest on imported goods 
and services. There are many imported goods used in the electronic equipment industry in the US 
and these come from different countries: 22% from Japan, 10% from Singapore, 10% from 
Taiwan, and 58% from the rest of the world. Weight ' jicv  describes how important imported 
good j  is to industry i  in country c , and ,' jd cw  describes how important country d  is as a 
supplier country of good j  in country c .  
3.2 Abnormal returns of portfolios sorting on lagged customer and supplier industry returns 
For a first piece of evidence for cross-predictability of returns, I investigate whether abnormal 
returns could be obtained from a trading strategy utilizing available information of economically 
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linked industries. At the beginning of every month, value-weighted industry portfolios are sorted 
on the basis of the returns of a portfolio of its international customers and suppliers at the end of 
the previous month. These sorted industry portfolios are assigned to one of five quintile 
portfolios. These quintile portfolios are equal-weighted. Reported in Table 3.1 are quintile 
portfolio returns sorted according to previous month customer and supplier industry returns. 
Portfolio returns of long top quintile and short bottom quintile sorting on customer and supplier 
returns are also considered. See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for long-short portfolio return sorting on 
customer and supplier industry returns. Excess returns of portfolios are calculated by subtracting 
risk free rates for the US, value-weighted returns for our sample firms are used as world market 
returns in calculating world CAPM alphas, and global size, value, momentum factors used in 
Fama and French (2012) are used to obtain global Fama-French 4 factor alpha.  
The long-short portfolio gives monthly excess returns of 1.09% when sorted on customer 
industry returns, and 1.06% when sorted on supplier industry returns. The fact that the excess 
returns of the top quintile portfolio turn out to be the most significant suggests two interesting 
points. First, profit from the trading strategy doesn’t depend crucially on short positions. Hence, 
the trading strategy may have less difficulty in real world applications due to restrictions on short 
sales. Second, it suggests that good news tends to travel more slowly or is priced more slowly 
than bad news. 
To test and to further investigate whether industry-level returns are cross-predictable based on 
past returns of supplier and customer industries, I conduct the following regression using Fama-
MacBeth (1973) methodology: 
 , 1, , 1 2, , 2: 12 , 1 ,
related related related related
ci t t t ci t t ci t t t ci t ci tr r r Z e           (3)
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Table 3.1: Portfolio returns sorted based on lagged customer or supplier industry return 
 
This table reports excess returns and abnormal returns of five portfolios and a long-short portfolio of the top and 
bottom portfolios. At the beginning of every month, each country-industry portfolio is sorted into five quintile 
groups based on its customer/supplier industry portfolio returns at the end of the previous month. Quintile portfolios 
are formed by putting equal weight on country-industry portfolios within the quintile group, and these are 
rebalanced every month. Average excess returns of portfolios are reported in the first column. World CAPM alpha is 
the intercept on a regression on world market returns constructed from value-weighted returns in our sample. Third 
column reports estimated intercept using world market returns, and global size, value, momentum factors used in 
Fama and French (2012). All returns are monthly returns in percentage. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Statistically significant estimates at the 5% significance level are bold faced. 
 
Panel A: sample period from 1990 to 2009
Excess return
World CAPM 
alpha
Global FF4 
factor alpha
Excess return
World CAPM 
alpha
Global FF4 
factor alpha
Low 1 0.004 -0.147 -0.189 -0.069 -0.219 -0.225
(0.01) (-0.69) (-0.92) (-0.20) (-0.99) (-1.05)
2 0.288 0.147 0.055 0.338 0.208 0.125
(0.95) (0.85) (0.35) (1.10) (1.15) (0.76)
3 0.573 0.438 0.322 0.581 0.446 0.329
(1.88) (2.60) (2.10) (1.94) (2.65) (2.15)
4 0.628 0.489 0.407 0.748 0.608 0.481
(2.03) (2.83) (2.45) (2.41) (3.44) (2.87)
High 5 1.099 0.950 0.780 0.993 0.834 0.662
(3.41) (4.96) (4.25) (2.95) (4.20) (3.39)
High-Low 1.095 1.097 0.969 1.062 1.054 0.887
(6.03) (6.04) (5.03) (4.84) (4.79) (3.79)
Panel B: sample period from 1997 to 2009
Low 1 -0.174 -0.216 -0.269 -0.305 -0.346 -0.382
(-0.36) (-0.79) (-1.03) (-0.63) (-1.21) (-1.39)
2 0.227 0.188 0.086 0.238 0.198 0.100
(0.54) (0.87) (0.46) (0.55) (0.88) (0.49)
3 0.583 0.544 0.375 0.668 0.629 0.486
(1.37) (2.64) (2.13) (1.61) (3.18) (2.90)
4 0.737 0.696 0.567 0.813 0.774 0.598
(1.72) (3.45) (3.07) (1.90) (3.63) (3.10)
High 5 1.316 1.274 1.103 1.273 1.230 1.057
(2.90) (5.41) (5.04) (2.68) (4.96) (4.48)
High-Low 1.489 1.490 1.372 1.578 1.576 1.439
(6.16) (6.14) (5.39) (5.38) (5.36) (4.64)
Sorting on customer return Sorting on supplier industry return
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Table 3.2: Fama-MacBeth regressions (Robustness checks and different markets) 
 
Dependent variables are industry returns. Explanatory variables are past returns of own industry returns, customer 
industry returns, and supplier industry returns. Regressions are run using all samples (ALL), excluding the bottom 
20% in market cap size (EX20), emerging markets (EMR), and advanced economies (ADV). Explanatory variables 
are lagged returns of customer (CR) and supplier (SR) portfolio returns and lagged returns of own industry returns 
(RI). Sample periods are from Jan 1990 to Mar 2009 for results in Panel A, and from Jan 1997 to Mar 2009 for 
Panel B. Statistically significant estimates at the 5% significance level are bold faced. 
 
Panel A: sample period from 1990 to 2009
Variable ALL ALL EX20 EMR ADV ALL ALL EX20 EMR ADV
Intercept 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003
(2.80) (1.88) (1.50) (2.04) (1.08) (2.68) (1.58) (1.01) (1.57) (0.99)
CR (t-1) 0.160 0.132 0.117 0.121 0.139
(6.26) (5.89) (5.18) (3.25) (5.29)
CR (t-2:t-12) 0.149 0.159 0.051 0.136
(2.48) (2.57) (0.52) (1.95)
SR (t-1) 0.141 0.101 0.107 0.107 0.107
(4.57) (3.70) (3.99) (1.73) (3.98)
SR (t-2:t-12) 0.149 0.162 0.108 0.065
(2.13) (2.40) (0.85) (0.84)
IR (t-1) 0.028 0.026 0.031 0.031 0.026 0.025 0.032 0.031
(2.68) (2.27) (2.19) (2.74) (2.58) (2.14) (2.26) (2.74)
IR (t-2:t-12) 0.084 0.080 0.039 0.156 0.087 0.082 0.038 0.160
(3.31) (2.69) (1.06) (5.84) (3.50) (2.78) (1.07) (6.04)
Adjusted R squared 0.0063 0.0474 0.0624 0.0682 0.0646 0.0086 0.0502 0.0664 0.0733 0.0675
NOB 168776 164090 132682 64426 99664 168776 164090 132682 64426 99664
Avg NOB 730.6 710.3 574.4 278.9 431.4 730.6 710.3 574.4 278.9 431.4
Panel B: sample period from 1997 to 2009
Variable ALL ALL EX20 EMR ADV ALL ALL EX20 EMR ADV
Intercept 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003
(1.86) (1.18) (0.77) (1.01) (0.75) (1.78) (0.86) (0.35) (0.51) (0.72)
CR (t-1) 0.225 0.182 0.155 0.181 0.174
(7.11) (7.25) (5.84) (5.10) (5.35)
CR (t-2:t-12) 0.152 0.165 0.164 0.067
(2.09) (2.07) (1.76) (0.73)
SR (t-1) 0.218 0.160 0.155 0.199 0.125
(6.10) (5.52) (5.21) (4.99) (3.72)
SR (t-2:t-12) 0.201 0.195 0.276 0.067
(2.30) (2.36) (2.22) (0.69)
IR (t-1) 0.035 0.035 0.031 0.041 0.034 0.033 0.030 0.042
(2.90) (2.67) (2.03) (3.16) (2.82) (2.54) (1.95) (3.26)
IR (t-2:t-12) 0.098 0.096 0.029 0.165 0.102 0.099 0.031 0.164
(2.96) (2.35) (0.61) (4.50) (3.14) (2.44) (0.68) (4.51)
Adjusted R squared 0.0080 0.0506 0.0681 0.0626 0.0729 0.0104 0.0535 0.0711 0.0658 0.0770
NOB 116273 115049 92611 49954 65095 116273 115049 92611 49954 65095
Avg NOB 791.0 782.6 630.0 339.8 442.8 791.0 782.6 630.0 339.8 442.8  
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where ,ci tr  is the return of the value-weighted portfolio of stocks in industry i  of country c  in 
month t  and , 1ci tZ   is a vector of lagged control variables known to predict country-industry 
portfolio return. , 1
related
ci tr   is either customer or supplier country-industry portfolio return as 
described above. Table 3.2 reports regression results. Coefficients on lagged customer industry 
portfolio returns are significant and robust across different subsamples. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is many times greater than the coefficient on lagged industry portfolio returns, which 
are known factors to predict industry returns, as in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). 
 To check whether cross-predictability is not driven by the smallest and most neglected 
stocks, I conduct the same regression for different subsamples. I get robust results in the 
following samples: excluding industries in the bottom 20 percentile in market capitalization, 
industries from emerging economies, and industries from advanced economies. 
 Since the economic relationships used in this paper are coming from two snapshots of the 
world economy, one taken in 1997 and the other in 2001, it would be interesting to see the 
performance of the predictor using samples after the snapshots.  Panel B of Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2 report excess returns from the long-short portfolio, and regression results from samples after 
1997. We find greater predictability both in terms of magnitude of excess returns and Fama-
MacBeth coefficient size. Using later data samples, the long-short portfolio yields an even 
greater excess return. The excess return is close to a monthly return of 1.5% or annualized return 
of 18%. Coefficients of Fama-MacBeth regressions also show increased magnitude when the 
later sample is used.  It is interesting to see that the predictability of past supplier industry returns 
improved when we used the later sample.  
In an unreported table, where only one GTAP snapshot is used to determine customers 
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and suppliers, the excess return and the coefficients were smaller compared to results where we 
utilize two snapshots. From the results we have seen so far, we can deduce that a more accurate 
description of the world economy relationship would allow us to predict future industry returns 
with greater precision.  
3.3 Can cross-predictability better explained by liquidity than information coverage? 
Information segmentation and investor inattentiveness are the dominant explanations of the 
cross-predictability of economically linked stocks [Cohen and Frazzini (2008); Menzly and 
Ozbas (2010)].  In the literature, information coverage and institutional ownership are generally 
used as proxies for information coverage and the level of investor attention stocks receive.  
However, the same variable could be a proxy for liquidity, because illiquid stocks generally get 
less analyst coverage and are owned less by institutional investors. Because of this close 
correlation, it is often difficult to discern the two effects from the proxies.  
Analyst coverage and institutional ownerships were used as proxies for information 
coverage in previous literature. However, in this exercise, I am going to use only analyst 
coverage as a proxy for information coverage because it is direct measure of the information 
coverage an industry gets, and indirect measures, such as institutional ownership levels, can 
contain mixed information about preferences of institutional investors. For each month, I counted 
the number of analyst forecasts for each firm in an industry during past 6 months and took value 
weighted average of this number to proxy information coverage. Since I am aggregating all firms 
in an industry to get this measure, there sporadic analyst coverage is less of an issue. 
As for the liquidity measure, I use the percentage of observed zero daily returns in the 
previous month and aggregate this number for all firms in each industry. The liquidity measure 
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was first proposed in Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) and is widely used in international 
finance [Lesmond (2005), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007), and Bartram, Griffin, and Ng 
(2010)].  
In this section, I try to compare the information and liquidity explanations of cross-
predictability among economically linked stocks. First, I try to characterize excess returns from 
long-short portfolios. If level of predictability has anything to do with information coverage or 
liquidity, we should see meaningful differences in excess returns along different levels of 
information coverage or liquidity. I investigate returns of long-short portfolios formed from 
subsets of the industry portfolio pool where subsets are divided according to liquidity and 
information coverage measures. First, I separately analyze the effects of liquidity and 
information coverage on cross-predictability. Industries are sorted according to information 
coverage or liquidity measures and grouped into three subgroups. Within each subgroup, I form a 
long-short portfolio and report average returns from each. Second, I do a double sort as a 
preliminary comparison between the information and liquidity explanations.  
Returns from each subgroup and each double sort group are reported in Table 3.3. Panel 
A divides industries according to the information coverage measure, and finds very little 
difference between returns of portfolios formed from the least coverage group and the most 
analyst coverage group. If information coverage mostly explains cross-predictability, we should 
see greater returns from a portfolio formed from industries with less analyst coverage. However, 
the results in Panel A provides only very weak evidence. Panel B reports analogous results where 
industries are sorted according to liquidity levels. The difference is significant at the 
conventional 5% significant level and the magnitude of the difference is larger than we saw in 
Panel A. 
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Table 3.3: Long-short portfolio returns from subgroups of industries 
 
Reported in this table are average returns of the long-short portfolio formed from subgroups of industries. Long 
short portfolios are formed using industry portfolios in each subgroup. In Panel A, subgroups are divided by analyst 
coverage level measured by the number of analysts covering an industry. In Panel B, the liquidity of an industry is 
used to form subgroups. Liquidity of an industry is measured using a value-weighted average of the number of non-
zero return days in the previous month. In Panel C, pools of industries are sorted independently according to analyst 
coverage and liquidity. Reported returns are in monthly percentage. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Estimates 
with 5% statistical significance are in bold face.  
 
Panel A:
Least 
coverage
Moderate 
coverage
Most 
coverage
Difference
0.012 0.009 0.012 0.000
(4.81) (4.09) (5.41) (0.06)
Panel B: Least liquid
Moderately 
liquid
Most liquid Difference
0.015 0.011 0.009 0.006
(6.57) (4.40) (3.99) (2.32)
Panel C: Least liquid
Moderately 
liquid
Most liquid Difference
Least analyst coverage 0.018 0.005 0.002 0.015
(5.73) (1.25) (0.47) (2.95)
moderate  analyst coverage 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.004
(3.82) (2.94) (2.24) (1.21)
Most analyst coverage 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.003
(4.06) (4.79) (4.25) (0.98)
Difference 0.004 -0.009 -0.008
(0.89) (-2.04) (-1.79)  
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Table 3.4: Fama-MacBeth regresisons (subgroup of industries) 
 
Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients on corresponding interaction terms are reported in this table. The dependent 
variable is industry returns. The product of two dummy variables and customer industry portfolio returns are used to 
form interaction terms. The interaction terms and industry returns of previous months are included in the regression; 
however only coefficients to the interaction terms are reported. In Panel A and B, the following Fama-MacBeth 
regression was estimated: 
3
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where ,i tr is industry return, , 1
k
i tA   is dummy variable for analyst coverage in Panel A and for liquidity in Panel B, 
and , 1i tZ   is a vector of industry’s own past return. Only averages of 
k
t are reported 
In Panel C, the following Fama-MacBeth regression was estimated, and only averages of jkt are reported: 
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where , 1
j
i tA   and , 1
k
i tA   are respectively dummy variables for liquidity and analyst coverage. t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. Estimates with 5% statistical significance are in bold face.  
 
Panel A: Least coverage
Moderate 
coverage
Most coverage
0.154 0.112 0.096
(4.79) (3.94) (3.13)
Panel B: Least liquid Moderately liquid Most liquid
0.180 0.115 0.079
(5.73) (4.07) (2.62)
Panel C: Least liquid Moderately liquid Most liquid
Least analyst coverage 0.200 0.088 0.107
(5.14) (1.76) (1.73)
Moderate  analyst coverage 0.152 0.090 0.074
(3.90) (2.54) (1.67)
Most analyst coverage 0.144 0.159 0.051
(2.58) (4.31) (1.50)  
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Further dissecting the industries using finer subgroups, we see more interesting results. 
Panel C reports average returns from long-short portfolios in each double-sort industry group and 
differences in returns between top and bottom tertiles. Among the industries with least analyst 
coverage, we see significant differences between returns from most liquid and most illiquid 
industries. On the other hand, return differences among the analyst coverage portfolios are either 
non-existent or show signs that are the opposite of the difference expected from the information 
theory.  
In support of the double sort analysis, I conducted additional regression analysis 
controlling for known factors of cross-predictability. Results are reported in Table 3.4. The 
additional regression analysis confirms what we found in the double sort analysis.  The least 
liquid industries show predictability in all groups while most liquid industries show little 
predictability.  It is interesting to see that Fama-MacBeth regression results in Panel A are in line 
with the results in existing literature. However, I interpret this result a little differently that 
analyst coverage alone could be picking up variations in liquidity levels of industries. Once we 
considered liquidity as well as analyst coverage, I see in Panel C that most of the variation in 
predictability can be explained with the different levels of liquidity.  
3.4 What type of information is most useful in cross-predictability? 
Previous literature focused on characteristics of industries whose returns were to be predicted. 
Such characteristics are useful in exploring the underlying reason for the cross-predictability, but 
only shed lights on one side of a two sided problem. If one industry’s returns can be predicted, 
analysis of the information that enables the cross-prediction would complete the picture. Up to 
this point, I have established that economically linked industries’ past returns cross-predict an 
 122 
 
industry’s returns, and that certain industries are more predictable than others, but haven’t said 
anything about which economically linked industry provides the most valuable information on 
future returns.  
To answer this question, I dissect the customer industry returns into several parts in a 
meaningful way. As a first step, I separate the economically linked industries into five groups 
according to their economic dependence. Since the customer returns are basically an economic 
link weighted average of customer industry returns and a successful predictor of future return, it 
is expected and confirmed that we see the most useful information from industries with greater 
linkages.  
Now, we take the analysis a step further, in a more meaningful way, by looking at 
characteristics within the group of industries with the most significant economic linkages. In this 
analysis, we look at two aspects, namely analyst co-coverage and institutional co-ownership. 
This type of analysis is not possible with the major customer data of Cohen and Frazzini (2008) 
because there is not large enough number of customers to conduct such analysis. BEA’s Use 
table used in Menzly and Ozbas (2010) was more suitable for this type of analysis, but such was 
never carried out in their paper. The advantage of this data is that there are large numbers of 
linked industries across different countries with varying levels of interesting characteristics. 
By dissecting and sorting the past information, we should be able to answer more 
questions about how and why we see cross-predictability, because we will be able to distinguish 
information that is useful from that which is not if there is meaningful variation among the 
measures used. 
Table 3.5 reports Fama-MacBeth regression results where analyst co-coverage is used to 
group economically linked industries. In the first column of Table 3.5, we see that most of the 
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Table 3.5: Source of cross-predictability and analyst co-coverage 
 
Dependent variables are industry returns. Explanatory variables are decomposed international customer portfolio 
returns in the previous month. Explanatory variables are constructed using past month stock returns of trade-linked 
industries similar to the construction of the customer return, however the linked industries are now decomposed into 
several groups and explanatory variables are created for each group of linked industries. In regression specifications 
(1), (2), and (3), international customers are divided into ten groups: five groups by trade links, with each trade link 
group divided into two groups, one with common analyst house coverage and the other without. In specification (4), 
I further divide the high trade linked customer industry group into five sub groups according to number of co-
covering analyst houses. Previous month industry stock returns of each subgroup of customer industries are 
averaged and are used as explanatory variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.024 0.020 0.011 0.039
(3.89) (3.39) (2.73) (3.54)
CR Q1 Low trade link, w/o common coverage -0.271 -0.489 -0.310
(-2.97) (-4.41) (-2.94)
CR Q2 trade link, w/o common coverage -0.015 -0.012 -0.027
(-1.11) (-0.77) (-1.68)
CR Q3 trade link, w/o common coverage 0.004 -0.009 0.005
(0.28) (-0.64) (0.33)
CR Q4 trade link, w/o common coverage -0.004 -0.002 -0.011
(-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.75)
CR Q5 High trade link, w/o common coverage 0.027 0.041
(2.08) (2.91)
CR Q1 Low trade link, w/ common coverage -0.029 -0.028 -0.161
(-0.92) (-0.92) (-2.07)
CR Q2 trade link, w/ common coverage 0.022 0.030 0.011
(1.33) (1.71) (0.38)
CR Q3 trade link, w/ common coverage -0.025 -0.020 -0.014
(-1.48) (-1.19) (-0.45)
CR Q4 trade link, w/ common coverage 0.015 0.027 0.047
(0.89) (1.51) (1.53)
CR Q5 High trade link, w/ common coverage 0.113 0.135
(4.55) (5.07)
CR Q5 High trade link, Low common coverage 0.019
(1.12)
CR Q5 High trade link, 2 common coverage 0.028
(2.48)
CR Q5 High trade link, 3 common coverage 0.031
(1.87)
CR Q5 High trade link, 4 common coverage 0.045
(2.16)
CR Q5 High trade link, High common coverage 0.048
(2.06)
Avg adj R2 0.0333 0.0143 0.0201 0.0525
Number of obs 115826 168230 115900 70090
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Table 3.6: Source of cross-predictability and co-ownership 
 
Dependent variables are industry returns. Explanatory variables are decomposed international customer portfolio 
returns in the previous month. Explanatory variables are constructed using past month stock returns of trade-linked 
industries similar to the construction of the customer return, however the linked industries are now decomposed into 
several groups and explanatory variables are created for each group of linked industries. In regression specifications 
(1), (2), and (3), international customers are divided into ten groups: five groups by trade links, with each trade link 
group divided into two groups, one with common institutional ownership and the other without. In specification (4), 
I further divide the high trade linked customer industry group into five sub groups according to number of common 
institutional ownership measures. Previous month industry stock returns of each subgroup of customer industries are 
averaged and are used as explanatory variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.040 0.023 0.030 0.048
(3.52) (3.26) (3.25) (2.92)
CR Q1 Low trade link, w/o common ownership -0.136 -0.296 -0.135
(-1.54) (-2.48) (-1.46)
CR Q2 trade link, w/o common ownership -0.014 -0.014 -0.020
(-1.02) (-0.87) (-1.25)
CR Q3 trade link, w/o common ownership -0.012 -0.027 0.003
(-0.84) (-1.83) (0.21)
CR Q4 trade link, w/o common ownership -0.019 0.002 -0.013
(-1.39) (0.13) (-0.99)
CR Q5 High trade link, w/o common ownership 0.001 0.038
(0.04) (2.07)
CR Q1 Low trade link, w/ common ownership -0.093 -0.143 -0.196
(-0.70) (-1.10) (-1.00)
CR Q2 trade link, w/ common ownership 0.055 0.045 0.044
(1.65) (1.39) (1.12)
CR Q3 trade link, w/ common ownership 0.034 0.025 0.011
(0.94) (0.74) (0.25)
CR Q4 trade link, w/ common ownership 0.008 0.017 0.037
(0.24) (0.52) (0.93)
CR Q5 High trade link, w/ common ownership 0.195 0.195
(4.67) (4.51)
CR Q5 High trade link, Low common ownership -0.007
(-0.36)
CR Q5 High trade link, 2 common ownership 0.015
(1.02)
CR Q5 High trade link, 3 common ownership 0.055
(2.85)
CR Q5 High trade link, 4 common ownership 0.051
(2.14)
CR Q5 High trade link, High common ownership 0.086
(2.82)
Avg adj R2 0.0249 0.0100 0.0172 0.0350
Number of obs 73315 95616 74901 67340
Avg NOB 632.0 783.7 645.7 580.5  
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predictions are coming from industries with high trade links, whether the industries are co-
covered by analyst houses or not. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient to the past return 
of industries that are commonly covered by at least one analyst house is greater than that of the 
coefficient to industries that are not covered. The second and third columns demonstrate again 
that high trade link industries are the most important predictor. The fourth and fifth columns use 
a group of industry returns sorted according to the co-coverage measure, which is the number of 
analyst houses covering both the predicted industry and the linked industries. In line with what 
we find in the first column, we see monotone increasing importance of past returns of linked 
industries as levels of co-coverage increase. This result, however, is not in line with the existing 
information explanation of cross-predictability, because information for the connected industries 
is likely to be known by investors since it is covered by the same analyst houses. 
I do a similar analysis on the level of institutional co-ownership and report results in 
Table 3.6. For pairs of industries, institutional co-ownership is measured as the sum of the 
product of portfolio weights of the first industry and second industries in an institution’s equity 
portfolio. The sum is taken for all of the institutions that hold both industries. This measure is 
designed to reflect connectedness via institutional ownership and is greater as more institutions 
hold both industries in their portfolios, and as the industries’ weights are larger in their portfolio. 
Varying levels of predictability across the co-ownership measure may also serve as a proxy for 
the level of informational barriers between industries. Institutional investors pay attention to and 
act upon what is happening in parts of their portfolios; hence there would be much less of an 
informational barrier between industries in their portfolios.  
The results in Table 3.6 are in line with what we found using co-coverage of industries by 
analysts. Past return information for industries with the largest economic linkages, and that are 
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commonly owned by institutional investors, is the most relevant information in predicting future 
returns of industries. These results lend themselves to the following interpretations. First, the 
most useful predictors are known by investors. Second, institutional investors are slow to react to 
useful information at hand.  
Under the slow diffusion of information theory, the most useful predictor would be 
information from industries that are most economically dependent, yet not likely followed by 
investors. However, regression results in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 suggest otherwise. These 
results open a new possible explanation involving institutional investors, which we are going to 
explore in the sections that follow.  
3.5 Institutional investor trading, illiquidity, and cross-predictability 
In previous sections I have established that the most useful information is likely to be already 
known by institutional investors and that liquidity of an industry may play a more important role 
than the level of attention an industry receives or level of segmentation. In this section, I am 
going to present evidence of slow reactions by the most sophisticated investor group, namely 
institutional investors trading illiquid industry portfolios.  
It is generally accepted that institutional investors are sophisticated investors and that, 
most of the time, they make informed decisions. In previous literature on cross-predictability of 
economically linked stocks/industries, institutional investors were considered to make informed 
decisions. I find a similar result: that institutional investors in international settings react to 
useful information. Moreover, I add to the existing finding that there are some industries that do 
not act as intelligently in trading as others, which could possibly explain the cross-predictability 
we see in certain type of industries. 
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An informed trader would acknowledge cross-linkages between international industries 
and trade based on positive signals observed in linked industries. Moreover, investors will trade 
the relevant industries simultaneously in order to fully utilize the information. We test these two 
implications and further explore the cases where institutional investors do not behave as 
informed traders.  
In order to test the simultaneous trading of related industries by institutional investors, I 
estimate panel regression of the following form: 
, , , 1 ,
customer customer
i t i t i t i t i tIO IO IO e             
where ,i tIO  is change of institutional ownership of  industry i  and ,customeri tIO  is changes in 
institutional ownership in customer industries. The change of institutional ownership of customer 
industry is calculated in a way that is analogous to customer and supplier industry returns. To 
test whether institutional investors trade the same way across industries with different liquidity 
levels, I interact the liquidity dummy variables with the changes of institutional ownership in the 
customer industry. I include industry-level fixed effects i  and quarter fixed effects t  to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity across different industries and systematic fund inflows over time. 
A lag of change of institutional ownership is included to control for persistence in change of 
ownership by institutional investors. 
Results are reported in Table 3.7. In line with results found in previous literature, I also 
find evidence of simultaneous trading of related industries, as seen in the first and second 
columns of Table 3.7. Interestingly, however, institutional investors do not behave the same way 
with illiquid industries. The third and fourth columns of the table report estimation results of the 
above regression using interactions of change of customer industries institutional ownership with 
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Table 3.7: Institutional investors and informed trading 
 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions. The dependent variables are quarterly changes of institutional 
ownership in the country-industry portfolio. The explanatory variables are previous quarter’s change of institutional 
ownership in the country-industry portfolio, quarterly change of institutional ownership in the customer industry, 
and its interaction terms with dummies representing liquidity levels. Country-industry fixed effects and time fixed 
effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d_IO_customer(t) 0.079 0.080
(3.37) (3.39)
d_IO_customer(t) × Q1 least liquid -0.246 -0.227
(-6.18) (-5.50)
Q2 0.001 0.004
(0.01) (0.08)
Q3 0.206 0.186
(5.56) (4.77)
Q4 0.157 0.131
(4.08) (3.28)
Q5 most liquid 0.178 0.196
(5.19) (5.53)
d_IO_customer(t-1) × Q1 least liquid 0.006
(0.14)
Q2 0.061
(1.26)
Q3 0.130
(3.12)
Q4 0.158
(3.89)
Q5 most liquid 0.009
(0.23)
d_IO(t-1) 0.048 0.047 0.046
(8.28) (8.19) (8.02)
R squared 0.0688 0.0709 0.0746 0.0753
Number of observations 30949 30947 30947 30947  
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Table 3.8: Action of Institutional Investors 
 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions. The dependent variables are quarterly changes of institutional 
ownership in the country-industry portfolio. The explanatory variables are previous quarter’s change of institutional 
ownership in the country-industry portfolio, customer industry portfolio returns, their interaction terms with 
dummies representing liquidity levels, and positive and negative customer industry returns. Country-industry fixed 
effects and time fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CR(t) 0.016
(5.37)
CR_pos(t) 0.013
(3.16)
CR_neg(t) 0.029
(5.28)
CR(t) × Q1 least liquid 0.004
(0.92)
Q2 0.012
(3.04)
Q3 0.023
(5.86)
Q4 0.017
(4.30)
Q5 most liquid 0.025
(6.52)
CR(t-1) 0.006
(2.14)
CR_pos(t-1) 0.009
(2.38)
CR_neg(t-1) 0.001
(0.26)
CR(t-2) 0.001
(0.36)
CR_pos(t-2) 0.001
(0.24)
CR_neg(t-2) 0.001
(0.14)
d_IO(t-1) 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048
(8.19) (8.23) (8.25) (8.31)
R squared 0.0716 0.0711 0.0714 0.0727
Number of observations 30947 30947 30947 30947   
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Table 3.9: Action of Institutional Investors 
 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions. The dependent variables are quarterly change of institutional 
ownership in the country-industry portfolio. The explanatory variables are the previous quarter’s changes of 
institutional ownership in the country-industry portfolio, positive and negative customer industry portfolio returns, 
and their interaction terms with dummies representing liquidity levels. Country-industry fixed effects and time fixed 
effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
CR_pos(t) × Q1 least liquid -0.001 (-0.10) -0.001 (-0.25)
Q2 0.010 (1.84) 0.009 (1.50)
Q3 0.021 (3.91) 0.019 (3.51)
Q4 0.017 (3.17) 0.017 (3.08)
Q5 most liquid 0.020 (3.66) 0.020 (3.67)
CR_neg(t) × Q1 least liquid 0.010 (1.50) 0.016 (2.31)
Q2 0.021 (3.14) 0.020 (2.84)
Q3 0.035 (5.31) 0.032 (4.56)
Q4 0.027 (4.16) 0.023 (3.38)
Q5 most liquid 0.043 (6.68) 0.045 (6.65)
CR_pos(t-1) × Q1 least liquid 0.011 (2.01)
Q2 0.012 (2.37)
Q3 0.010 (2.14)
Q4 0.006 (1.16)
Q5 most liquid 0.004 (0.82)
CR_neg(t-1) × Q1 least liquid -0.015 (-2.16)
Q2 0.003 (0.37)
Q3 0.008 (1.16)
Q4 0.010 (1.44)
Q5 most liquid -0.003 (-0.47)
d_IO(t-1) 0.048 (8.25) 0.048 (8.22) 0.043 (6.68) 0.048 (8.25)
R squared 0.0714 0.0717 0.0724 0.0730
Number of observations 30947 30947 30947 30947
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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liquidity level dummies. The results indicate that moderately to highly liquid industries are 
traded simultaneously with customer industries, but do not behave the same way as illiquid 
industry groups.  
I do an additional analysis replacing changes of ownership of customer industries with 
returns. This analysis is designed to measure the responsiveness of institutional investors to 
useful information. If institutional investors are behaving as informed traders, they will react 
positively to the current period customer returns because these returns are known to predict 
future returns of an industry portfolio. I also include the previous quarter’s customer returns to 
assess responsiveness to past information, as well as to current information. Responding to past 
information would indicate that investors are not reacting to a signal to the full extent. In the 
following analysis, I separate customer returns into positive and negative customer returns to see 
if institutional investors react differently to positive and negative signals from economically 
linked industries.  
Estimation results analyzing institutional investor reaction to customer industry returns 
are reported in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. Results in the first column of Table 3.8 indicate that 
institutional investors indeed react to current signals from customer industries. Moreover, we see 
evidence of lagged response to past signals. Results from separating positive and negative signals 
are reported in the second and third columns of the table, and we see that there is no evidence of 
lagged response to negative signals from customer industries, yet there are some lagged 
responses to positive signals. So, we could deduce that lagged responses are likely to come from 
positive signals. Lagged responses to positive signals are in line with what I find in the section 
on portfolio formation. We saw that most predictability or profit came from the long leg of the 
long-short portfolio, and that the selection of industries in the long leg portfolio was in the top 
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quintile, sorted by customer industries.  
The fourth column of Table 3.8 also reports results similar to the change of institutional 
ownership according to liquidity levels. In line with what I found in Table 3.7, we see 
institutional investors do not react to customer industry signals when trading the least liquid 
industries.  
One may argue the non-existence of reaction in the most illiquid stocks may be in the 
nature of how institutional investors trade illiquid industries, and not related to lack of informed 
trading or slow reaction. To address this issue, I provide two additional results that shed light on 
institutional investor behavior and illiquid industries. In Table 3.8 we see that institutional 
investors  react to negative customer returns in the way that an informed trader would, and 
lagged reaction to positive customer returns. If it is simply that institutional investors do not 
adjust their holdings of the most illiquid stocks for whatever reason, then these investors should 
not react to negative customer industry returns, either, and moreover should not show lagged 
reaction to positive customer industry returns. On the other hand, if institutional investors show 
immediate reaction to some signals and lagged reaction to other signals in trading illiquid 
industries, we would have more support to our explanation.  
To test this prediction, I estimate institutional investors’ change of holdings of industry 
portfolios in reaction to positive and negative customer industry returns for different levels of 
illiquidity. Estimated results are reported in Table 3.9. In this regression analysis we see 
evidence of immediate responses to negative signals from customer industries, even for the most 
illiquid industries (see column 3 and 4) and lagged responses to the positive signals concentrated 
in illiquid industries. These results are in line with our initial conjecture that cross-predictability 
is caused by lagged response in illiquid industry portfolios.  
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4. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that industry stock returns can be predicted from internationally linked 
industries, and finds that slow reaction to known information is more likely to be an explanation 
for cross-predictability, rather than slow information diffusion or investor inattention.  
Trading strategies utilizing this cross-predictability result in monthly returns as high as 
1.57%, with a significant part of these returns coming from the long leg of the long-short 
portfolio. We see greater returns from trading strategies in the latter sample where snapshots of 
the economic linkage are more accurate and trade volume is greater.  
The international testing ground in my paper is suitable for testing existing theories of 
cross-predictability because the conditions upon which these theories rely, such as informational 
segmentation, illiquidity, and other market friction, are more natural in international settings. I 
explore possible explanations for cross-predictability, including slow information diffusion and 
slow price reaction due to liquidity. Among these possible explanations, I see liquidity 
explanation as most in line with my findings. According to my findings, the existing theory of 
investor inattention doesn’t fully explain the predictability because the most relevant information 
for the prediction was likely to be known by investors, either by analyst co-coverage or 
institutional co-ownership. Moreover, I find evidence that institutional investors do not promptly 
react to signals obtained from linked industries when trading illiquid industries, while they 
quickly react to news, hence behaving more like informed traders, when trading liquid industries. 
Lagged reactions were most prominent in most illiquid industries in response to positive signal 
from their linked industries, but not so much for negative signals. Such lagged reactions to 
positive signals by investors are in line with the fact that most of the cross-predictability is 
coming from the long leg of the long-short portfolio.  
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Table A3.1: Industry classification 
 
Industries Description French SIC30 GTAP industries
1 Food Products 1
pdr,wht,gro,v_f,osd,c_b,pfb,ocr,ctl,oap,
rmk,wol,fsh,cmt,omt,vol,mil,pcr,sgr,ofd
2 Beer & Liquor, Tobacco Products 2,3 b_t
3 Recreation 4 ros
4 Printing and Publishing 5 ppp
5 Apparel 7 wap, lea
6 Chemicals 9 crp
7 Textiles 10 tex
8 Construction and Construction Materials 11 for,lum,nmm,cns
9 Steel Works Etc 12 i_s,nfm
10 Fabricated Products and Machinery 13 fmp,ome,omf
11 Electrical Equipment, Business equipment 14, 23 ele
12 Automobiles and Trucks 15 mvh
13 Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment 16 otn
14 Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and Industrial Metal Mining 17 omn
15 Coal 18 col
16 Petroleum and Natural Gas 19 oil,gas,p_c
17 Utilities 20 ely,gdt,wtr
18 Communication 21 cmn
19 Personal and Business Services 22 obs,dwe
20 Transportation 25 otp,wtp,atp
21 Wholesale, Retail 26, 27 trd
22 Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 29 ofi,isr
23 Everything Else 6, 8, 24, 28, 30 osg
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Table A3.2: Time-series averages of market capitalization 
 
Time-series averages of market capitalization for all firms in the country-industry portfolio in billions USD. Sample 
period is from January 1980 to March 2009   
(continued) 
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Argentina 1.32 0.41 0.02 0.16 0.39 0.54 3.61 0.10 0.29
Australia 7.21 6.48 4.61 3.99 0.36 4.02 0.07 6.27 7.54 0.58 0.94 0.88
Austria 0.63 0.37 0.80 0.50 0.07 2.56 2.25 0.83 0.41 0.50
Belgium 0.68 7.18 0.23 0.35 0.38 5.30 0.23 2.48 1.61 0.19 1.68
Brazil 1.96 9.26 0.07 0.16 0.83 42.54 2.98 18.30 14.60 1.03 1.82 25.93
Canada 7.55 9.75 0.40 16.09 0.14 4.33 0.62 5.00 3.91 2.43 35.66 4.53
Chile 2.57 2.93 0.32 0.06 1.11 0.12 2.77 2.72 0.02
China 11.77 14.26 8.75 1.03 3.13 27.93 6.21 15.43 41.98 15.92 32.88 17.14
Colombia 1.20 2.09 0.05 0.09 3.04 0.10 0.02
Czech Republic 0.03 0.68 0.01 0.06 1.17 0.07
Denmark 0.64 1.90 0.77 0.20 0.31 3.57 0.08 1.96 0.60 3.77 1.25 0.05
Finland 0.71 0.48 0.81 1.70 0.10 1.56 0.30 1.49 3.96 6.79 57.93 1.82
France 19.16 7.64 8.32 2.29 24.03 12.61 0.40 28.67 12.01 13.19 44.24 17.51
Germany 4.41 2.42 1.45 2.55 6.16 27.27 0.43 16.47 9.99 11.49 50.09 70.42
Greece 5.26 0.45 3.00 1.00 0.20 0.34 0.51 4.99 2.91 0.34 0.67
Hong Kong 4.67 1.44 2.18 1.91 3.62 2.72 1.49 6.61 5.62 2.64 9.70 1.91
Hungary 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.09
India 4.44 9.65 0.67 0.57 0.42 8.90 3.07 21.61 25.17 15.10 7.98 11.44
Indonesia 3.81 5.47 0.15 0.04 0.23 1.20 0.64 3.85 0.25 0.08 0.01 1.67
Ireland 2.92 2.44 0.73 0.86 0.04 6.10 0.13
Italy 2.58 1.00 1.90 6.04 2.70 0.99 0.77 4.66 2.20 4.05 2.46 10.78
Japan 62.56 32.78 159.67 15.58 12.95 107.38 20.64 132.96 108.96 135.93 254.56 247.06
Korea 4.70 3.08 33.99 0.32 0.92 6.62 1.70 14.93 15.32 4.71 18.59 11.40
Malaysia 13.07 2.89 5.46 0.93 0.18 1.45 0.35 9.05 2.23 1.33 1.74 3.54
Mexico 8.70 4.37 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.64 0.07 5.03 0.96 0.01 0.09
Morocco 3.08 0.40 0.11 2.65 0.58 0.06 0.02
Netherlands 4.10 9.21 20.49 10.85 0.05 10.76 3.63 8.68 5.17 3.73 0.34
New Zealand 0.48 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.11 2.82 0.16 0.11 0.15
Peru 0.57 0.98 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.74 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
Philippines 0.64 2.10 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.77 0.12 0.13
Poland 0.57 1.25 0.16 0.86 0.29 1.09 0.09 1.99 0.77 0.79 1.01 0.42
Portugal 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.03 5.78 0.01 0.09 0.17
Singapore 4.43 1.41 0.40 4.27 0.40 0.34 0.28 3.54 1.04 1.33 4.52 1.31
Spain 3.33 0.42 0.11 1.88 0.30 1.53 0.12 39.25 3.17 4.62 0.42 0.67
Sweden 0.68 1.77 0.49 1.11 11.26 1.84 0.02 7.56 2.87 12.19 30.85 8.99
Switzerland 2.61 0.08 0.17 0.50 0.06 2.04 1.53 0.40 6.49 3.38 0.40
Taiwan 5.10 0.03 4.53 0.08 2.84 29.21 8.88 11.22 15.59 2.54 159.41 5.83
Thailand 2.22 0.40 0.41 0.50 5.49 0.34 3.33 0.90 0.19 1.84 0.37
Turkey 1.19 1.32 0.71 1.43 0.07 1.89 0.50 5.40 2.10 0.16 1.06 3.14
United Kingdom 58.61 97.36 18.75 42.79 3.04 24.32 2.87 43.89 9.28 18.16 37.04 11.29
United States 253.03 109.24 122.93 77.29 28.17 140.51 7.95 100.06 64.26 308.46 832.25 107.96
Number of 
countries with 
the industry 41 40 37 36 32 40 36 41 37 36 36 33  
(continued) 
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Argentina 15.29 1.28 8.90 0.06 0.01 0.27 4.11 0.09 17
Australia 0.26 58.31 3.92 13.51 6.15 26.65 13.36 8.26 23.82 76.51 15.41 23
Austria 5.39 4.60 6.75 1.07 1.35 0.65 15.11 1.77 18
Belgium 0.08 0.06 0.01 6.13 14.41 4.14 0.65 0.98 7.49 40.26 5.11 22
Brazil 2.10 24.68 31.64 29.08 17.65 0.93 2.75 10.69 34.41 3.94 22
Canada 1.71 62.31 0.34 91.83 15.71 28.20 11.42 9.95 17.20 116.69 13.61 23
Chile 0.65 0.07 8.88 21.03 5.81 0.37 2.53 8.33 11.33 4.19 19
China 3.84 8.52 8.44 35.37 34.01 7.86 6.22 36.51 24.55 75.94 36.42 23
Colombia 0.08 1.44 0.37 0.04 0.02 0.69 6.60 0.28 15
Czech Republic 0.85 10.74 5.77 0.01 0.24 2.96 0.69 13
Denmark 0.09 0.06 0.48 6.64 1.44 11.56 1.48 18.49 14.82 21
Finland 1.86 2.66 10.35 8.58 2.31 1.52 1.81 7.65 14.00 21
France 16.56 4.03 86.33 39.43 42.31 16.36 10.31 67.61 106.84 127.62 22
Germany 0.87 2.22 0.82 2.38 65.39 86.63 27.49 17.43 26.11 148.02 55.55 23
Greece 0.30 0.98 4.26 5.91 10.35 1.56 1.41 3.43 25.20 3.26 21
Hong Kong 0.78 0.73 0.78 12.41 24.01 87.68 3.17 38.00 12.12 113.13 10.67 23
Hungary 5.26 0.92 4.85 0.05 0.01 3.91 2.67 15
India 0.23 3.80 0.27 64.18 17.27 27.71 39.18 3.64 1.68 41.52 36.11 23
Indonesia 1.80 1.64 0.94 2.82 10.17 0.27 0.73 4.23 11.72 5.41 22
Ireland 0.24 0.66 0.44 0.83 2.07 1.60 16.24 5.88 15
Italy 3.21 1.50 77.32 31.19 32.93 5.52 7.56 3.71 119.33 8.74 22
Japan 4.79 4.45 0.25 32.16 131.78 191.53 77.61 141.97 222.93 488.57 279.52 23
Korea 7.36 0.65 3.46 17.91 18.23 5.56 4.48 9.70 28.89 9.00 22
Malaysia 0.34 0.36 1.77 13.89 12.13 3.12 8.45 3.77 23.03 5.62 22
Mexico 2.20 2.30 13.71 0.63 18.57 13.37 3.44 18
Morocco 0.43 0.84 0.34 14.44 0.01 0.27 6.36 0.12 15
Netherlands 0.02 70.05 23.30 7.04 6.22 22.02 49.07 3.97 19
New Zealand 0.07 0.45 2.89 6.99 0.35 2.08 2.37 0.05 1.55 20
Peru 3.76 0.35 1.66 2.07 0.03 0.27 3.41 0.01 18
Philippines 0.05 0.40 0.01 0.89 1.79 5.31 0.26 0.64 1.15 7.78 0.68 20
Poland 2.79 8.10 0.55 9.85 0.83 0.17 1.20 17.17 2.02 21
Portugal 0.12 11.50 11.68 10.01 0.64 0.07 4.70 8.31 2.06 19
Singapore 8.48 1.43 1.65 0.24 28.51 3.00 17.75 2.42 26.44 6.13 22
Spain 0.30 0.28 0.04 19.25 55.37 61.28 4.45 7.96 19.70 96.42 5.27 23
Sweden 1.43 1.35 1.34 1.54 15.04 5.73 1.91 4.16 33.65 21.08 22
Switzerland 0.07 6.05 0.11 2.52 1.39 2.70 22.67 26.96 19
Taiwan 0.10 18.83 0.56 22.86 3.42 9.33 7.26 19.34 8.18 21
Thailand 0.01 0.19 0.85 11.66 1.44 9.55 0.87 2.52 2.17 17.14 3.39 22
Turkey 0.07 2.73 1.71 8.20 0.04 1.35 3.74 15.00 3.79 21
United Kingdom 19.15 102.99 0.56 240.96 73.47 184.15 70.87 36.65 133.66 319.44 243.10 23
United States 87.68 30.15 8.65 486.08 300.82 471.15 533.08 118.97 523.45 1323.91 1170.78 23
Number of 
countries with 
the industry 24 33 16 39 38 41 39 38 41 41 41
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Table A3.3: Number of firms 
Number of firms that ever existed in each country-industry portfolio. Sample period is from January 1980 to March 
2009. 
(continued) 
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Argentina 12 3 1 2 8 10 4 4 4
Australia 48 18 36 12 6 16 2 51 19 26 56 17
Austria 7 4 3 3 4 16 5 10 6 5
Belgium 7 4 3 4 1 7 5 9 7 4 12
Brazil 21 3 5 3 4 18 10 23 22 12 9 11
Canada 24 10 25 19 2 27 3 54 19 37 115 19
Chile 19 7 7 1 6 2 13 9 1
China 57 26 20 4 12 115 47 82 92 71 139 60
Colombia 4 2 1 3 10 2 1
Czech Republic 1 1 1 2 2 1
Denmark 8 5 13 5 3 8 3 21 2 12 16 3
Finland 6 2 5 10 1 3 3 8 4 16 22 3
France 50 20 46 20 22 19 12 59 24 57 115 21
Germany 19 23 47 15 12 26 14 56 14 77 133 25
Greece 31 6 6 10 5 6 18 42 19 3 10
Hong Kong 28 7 49 15 30 24 24 44 18 24 105 10
Hungary 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
India 50 13 22 9 8 93 53 83 68 67 56 44
Indonesia 39 5 1 3 11 13 13 16 13 5 2 12
Ireland 8 1 1 1 1 8 1
Italy 12 2 10 10 11 11 11 31 8 22 20 9
Japan 174 9 126 49 39 186 50 421 103 321 487 137
Korea 64 9 63 9 37 78 44 145 90 108 304 80
Malaysia 92 3 19 13 15 26 12 151 41 41 60 27
Mexico 10 1 2 1 1 3 2 9 4 2 1
Morocco 7 2 4 4 2 1 1
Netherlands 5 2 4 8 3 7 22 5 6 26 3
New Zealand 17 3 3 2 1 3 4 7 2 4 3
Peru 19 3 1 2 4 3 3 1 1 1
Philippines 13 2 6 1 4 1 13 3 6
Poland 16 3 1 4 6 8 4 40 10 7 16 5
Portugal 8 2 6 5 2 4 14 1 3 1
Singapore 40 2 20 14 6 17 6 49 24 44 104 5
Spain 10 5 1 4 3 4 1 23 5 7 2 3
Sweden 5 2 17 9 5 8 2 24 7 37 82 11
Switzerland 10 1 4 2 1 5 15 2 32 24 1
Taiwan 32 1 30 4 15 56 57 58 53 59 548 22
Thailand 54 14 13 12 19 14 44 25 10 25 9
Turkey 26 3 5 7 7 14 25 34 12 4 12 14
United Kingdom 83 33 165 88 30 52 31 166 24 100 218 26
United States 355 74 523 211 198 252 139 571 208 546 2176 193
Total number of 
firms 1495 323 1310 587 510 1157 630 2451 972 1780 4916 784
 
 
(continued)
 142 
 
Country Ai
r c
raf
t, s
hip
s, 
rai
lro
ad
Pr
ec
iou
s M
eta
ls
Co
al
Pe
tro
leu
m 
& 
Na
tur
al 
ga
s
Ut
ilil
itie
s
Co
mm
un
ica
tio
n
Pe
rso
na
l &
 B
us
 Sr
v
Tr
an
sp
ort
ati
on
W
ho
les
ale
, r
eta
il
Fi
na
nc
e
Ev
ery
thi
ng
 el
se
To
tal
 nu
mb
er 
of 
fir
ms
Argentina 7 9 3 1 1 4 9 5 87
Australia 2 526 44 132 21 49 212 29 102 94 146 1664
Austria 2 7 3 10 4 7 18 15 129
Belgium 2 2 1 1 7 7 21 6 18 25 19 172
Brazil 1 3 5 39 29 8 7 23 43 25 324
Canada 9 967 20 478 31 52 237 26 85 99 172 2530
Chile 2 2 2 23 7 3 9 16 22 15 166
China 10 16 20 12 59 5 32 67 114 83 198 1341
Colombia 1 3 1 3 1 3 12 7 54
Czech Republic 2 9 2 1 1 3 5 31
Denmark 1 1 3 2 19 14 23 67 22 251
Finland 1 3 3 6 22 8 15 14 21 176
France 15 6 14 13 30 255 30 151 96 178 1253
Germany 8 7 1 4 33 24 191 26 87 130 117 1089
Greece 2 6 3 3 13 18 12 72 30 36 351
Hong Kong 3 10 7 8 19 30 97 34 115 80 125 906
Hungary 1 3 3 2 4 5 9 39
India 5 6 1 27 25 23 90 21 20 80 163 1027
Indonesia 8 5 7 2 9 13 17 29 55 40 318
Ireland 6 9 2 10 4 10 11 13 86
Italy 1 3 4 26 12 23 25 18 82 45 396
Japan 12 10 1 18 27 44 520 158 747 222 460 4321
Korea 9 4 7 12 21 128 30 98 56 216 1612
Malaysia 3 2 20 18 18 99 43 73 91 111 978
Mexico 2 1 8 4 12 16 12 91
Morocco 3 2 1 1 1 5 12 3 49
Netherlands 1 2 6 33 6 36 16 27 218
New Zealand 2 2 9 5 13 13 29 7 13 142
Peru 12 1 8 3 1 4 24 4 95
Philippines 1 14 1 10 8 9 9 6 10 41 10 168
Poland 1 4 5 13 22 2 31 24 25 247
Portugal 1 1 1 8 8 4 12 17 17 115
Singapore 11 1 19 4 7 51 34 75 43 91 667
Spain 1 2 1 3 17 7 7 7 16 28 19 176
Sweden 2 13 9 5 15 108 26 42 27 71 527
Switzerland 2 10 1 19 12 28 50 46 265
Taiwan 1 2 8 7 57 25 68 58 94 1255
Thailand 1 2 4 11 6 15 24 13 48 48 82 493
Turkey 2 1 9 1 2 3 23 28 40 272
United Kingdom 16 152 14 125 60 90 676 88 341 170 397 3145
United States 98 190 29 871 302 660 2649 408 1755 3935 3263 19606
Total number of 
firms 215 1983 152 1832 848 1251 5694 1224 4370 5971 6377
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Figure 3.1: Cross-sectional regression coefficients (customer) 
 
Time series of the monthly long-short portfolio sorted based on lagged customer industry returns. For each month, the long-short portfolio is formed from a long 
top quintile portfolio of equal-weighted industry portfolios and a short bottom quintile portfolio. The portfolio is rebalanced each month. 
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Figure 3.2: Cross-sectional regression coefficients (supplier) 
 
Time series of the monthly long-short portfolio sorted based on lagged supplier industry returns. For each month, the long-short portfolio is formed from a long 
top quintile portfolio of equal-weighted industry portfolios and a short bottom quintile portfolio. The portfolio is rebalanced each month. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INFORMATION BASED TRADING IN INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURES 
1. Introduction 
The importance of information in security trading has been widely recognized by academic 
researchers, industry practitioners, and regulators. If private information is impounded in security 
prices through trading, then the outcome of trading activities may predict the future movements 
of security prices. The main focus of academics has been on the information content of trading 
activities on equities. If there are alternative linked investment vehicles, such as options and 
futures, which may be used by informed traders in exploiting their private information, then the 
trade outcome of these linked securities may portend future movements in prices of the 
underlying securities. As Black (1975) hypothesizes, informed traders may have greater 
incentive to participate in stock option trading instead of stock trading due to greater leverage 
and lower transaction costs that option trading offers. 
Theories and models of informed trading, in general, are concerned with how private 
information is incorporated into asset prices. However, as Vega (2006) argues, it is possible that 
the private signals that an agent receives are acquired from an agent’s superior processing skills 
of public information, such as macroeconomic news. It is this interpretation of information based 
trading that motivates our study on informed trading in Korea Stock Index 200 (KOSPI 200 
hereafter) options and futures market. Furthermore, considering the fact that individual stock 
option trading is still at nascent stage and that KOSPI 200 return is dominated by a handful of 
index heavyweights, it is also possible that investors who possess private information concerning 
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future returns of index heavyweights use KOSPI 200 index options and futures as trading 
vehicles in exploiting their private information. 
In this article, using intraday trades data of KOSPI 200 options and futures from January 
3, 2005 to March 20, 2009, we examine whether there is evidence of information based trading 
in index options and futures market. We investigate two types of intraday information based 
trading, directional and volatility trading. More specifically, we test whether trade imbalances in 
options and futures market predict intraday returns and realized volatility of KOSPI 200 index. 
We base our empirical design in testing directional information trading on Easley, O’Hara, and 
Srinivas (1998) model. Furthermore, we analyze intraday directional and volatility information 
based trading by investor types, domestic brokerage proprietary, individual, and foreign 
investors. 
First, in directional information trading, we find that the trade imbalance of index options 
with the largest leverage, the out-of-the-money options (OTMs hereafter), is a better predictor of 
intraday KOSPI 200 returns compared to that of options with smaller implicit leverage. Our 
result agrees with the intuition that options with higher leverage are preferred vehicle to options 
with smaller leverage in exploiting the directional information on the underlying securities.  
Secondly, we find that the trade imbalances of domestic (Korean) brokerage proprietary 
traders for both call and put options possess better predictability on KOSPI 200 intraday returns 
among investor types. To the contrary to the findings of Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008), we do not 
find convincing evidence that foreign traders possess superior information or information 
processing skills on macroeconomic news in index options directional trading. However, we 
document that the futures trade imbalances of foreigners have some predictive power on KOSPI 
200 intraday return movements. In particular, we show that the futures trade imbalances of 
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foreigners contain larger information content in predicting KOSPI 200 intraday return 
movements during the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the developed world (between January 2008 
and March 2009). Furthermore, unlike in Kang and Park (2007) in which they find evidence for 
directional information based trading but not for volatility information trading, we find evidence 
consistent with the presence of volatility information trading in index options market. Among 
investor groups, the options trade imbalances of domestic brokerage proprietary traders for both 
call and put options contain information on future intraday KOSPI 200 realized volatility.  
 Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. A long line of research has been devoted to 
uncovering the importance of information on interrelationship between stock and options market 
[Manaster and Rendleman (1982); Anthony (1988); Bollen and Whaley (2004); Stephan and 
Whaley (1990); Easley et al. (1998); Pan and Poteshman (2006); Ni, Pan, and Poteshman 
(2008)]. These papers mainly focus on lead-lag relationship or linkage between equity and equity 
options. Our focus is on the analyses in the information content of index options/futures trading 
on the underlying stock index.42 We acknowledge that we are not the first to examine 
information based trading in KOSPI 200 index options and futures market. The recent studies of 
Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008) and Kang and Park (2007) investigate informed trading in KOSPI 
200 index options market. However, our empirical results differ from those of Ahn et al. (2008) 
and Kang and Park (2007) as we mentioned previously. 
 We also contribute to the literature in international finance. There is no consensus on the 
issue of whether domestic investors have informational advantage over foreign investors in 
trading domestic securities [Brennan and Cao (1997); Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005); Dvorak 
(2005); Froot and Ramadorai (2001); Greenblatt and Keloharju (2000); Froot, O’Connell, and 
                                                 
42 There are only a few empirical papers that investigate the role of information in index option trading. Pan 
and Poteshman (2006) examines information based trading in index options market in the US, but they find no 
evidence of it. 
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Seasholes (2001); Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004)]. We re-examine the issue of informational 
advantage of domestic versus foreign investors in an extreme setting in the sense that we 
examine whether there is intraday information based trading potentially on news related to a 
handful of index heavyweights or on local macroeconomic fundamentals by investor type 
(domestic versus foreign investors). In this setting, foreign investors may be at greater 
informational disadvantage as local “proximity” may be critical in trading on very short-lived 
informational advantage. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our sample. Section III introduces 
Easley et al. (1998) model and discusses explanatory variable construction. Section IV reports 
the results on directional information based trading in the index options and futures market. 
Section V discusses and reports the results on volatility information based trading. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
2. Sample description 
Our KOSPI 200 options and futures data are obtained from Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). Our 
data ranges from January 3rd, 2005 to March 20th, 2009. The KOSPI 200 futures debuted in 
May 1996, and the KOSPI 200 options started trading in July 1997. Although it is a relatively 
young market, the KOSPI 200 options market has grown dramatically over the past few years. 
The KOSPI 200 options market has been the largest derivative market in the world in terms of 
trading volume since 2001. As of 2008, the KOSPI 200 options market was approximately four 
times as large as (in terms of trading volume) the second largest derivative market in the world, 
the Eurodollar futures market. Over the sample period, the average daily option trading volume 
is approximately 10 million contracts. The KOSPI 200 futures are also fairly liquid with daily 
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average trading volume topping 210,000 contracts during our sample period. For both KOSPI 
200 options and futures, most of the trading volumes are concentrated in the nearest maturity 
contracts. 
The KOSPI 200 options are European options, and they mature on every second 
Thursday in each month. On the other hand, the KOSPI 200 futures mature on second Thursday 
of March, June, September, and December. Both options and futures markets use cash settlement 
system on the day after the maturity date. The leverage of the KOSPI 200 options is 100,000 
Korean Won (KRW) times the KOSPI 200 cash index level. The minimum tick size of the 
KOSPI 200 options is 0.05 points (5,000 KRW) for any contract with quoted price equal or 
larger than 3 points. The minimum tick size for the contracts with quoted price smaller than 3 
points is 0.01 points (1,000 KRW). Four consecutive nearest maturity KOSPI 200 option 
contracts have nine different strike prices spaced evenly by 2.5 points for each maturity 
contracts. Further, the leverage of the KOSPI 200 futures is 500,000 KRW times the KOSPI 200 
cash index level. The minimum tick size of the KOSPI 200 futures is 0.05 points (25,000 KRW).  
Our data set consist of all trades and quotes (TAQ) for both KOSPI 200 options and 
futures between January 3rd, 2005 and March 20th, 2009. Both TAQ data are time-stamped to 
one hundredth of a second. The KOSPI 200 options and futures markets are order-driven 
electronic call markets. There are neither market makers nor liquidity providers in these markets. 
The regular trading hours for both options and futures markets are from 9:00 to 15:15; the 
KOSPI 200 cash market is open between 9:00 and 15:00. Furthermore, our data set includes 
trading statistics by investor categories for both options and futures. There are ten investor 
categories, which include individual traders, brokerage proprietary traders, and foreign traders. 
Trading statistics by investor categories consists of 30-second aggregation of call/put trading 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics, daily options transaction amount and volume by investor 
type 
 
This table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of daily transaction amount and volume of 
call and put options initiated by each investor type. Trade amount and volume of buy and sell trades are identified by 
the Korean stock exchange and are not estimated. Sample period is from 3 January 2005 to 20 March 2009 
consisting of 1044 trading days. 
 
Mean Std Min Max
Panel A: Transaction amount in 1 billion KRW
Brokers Call Sell 100.852 41.812 22.426 353.815
Buy 100.467 42.143 21.828 355.145
Put Sell 93.051 44.428 26.218 439.786
Buy 92.562 44.046 26.038 425.128
Individuals Call Sell 143.700 62.458 35.385 506.595
Buy 145.021 62.885 38.082 518.953
Put Sell 137.650 64.505 39.635 457.761
Buy 139.238 66.630 39.542 505.420
Foreigners Call Sell 122.619 88.918 19.518 593.434
Buy 121.913 88.272 18.888 568.883
Put Sell 143.905 119.011 21.631 938.660
Buy 142.923 116.479 21.286 952.858
All investor 380.093 175.427 92.595 1293.826
388.116 220.338 105.168 1722.169
Brokers / All Investors 0.271 0.068 0.086 0.409
Individuals / All Investors 0.380 0.049 0.214 0.527
Foreigners / All Investors 0.317 0.104 0.124 0.627
Panel B: Traded volume in million
Brokers Call Sell 2.115 1.191 0.197 8.181
Buy 2.056 1.142 0.191 7.520
Put Sell 1.755 1.129 0.243 7.654
Buy 1.698 1.084 0.244 7.032
Individuals Call Sell 2.007 1.081 0.354 6.839
Buy 2.078 1.120 0.376 6.944
Put Sell 1.712 0.945 0.323 7.018
Buy 1.771 0.980 0.303 7.108
Foreigners Call Sell 0.983 0.544 0.191 3.189
Buy 0.983 0.545 0.183 3.170
Put Sell 1.044 0.512 0.291 3.271
Buy 1.053 0.510 0.279 3.244
All investor 5.315 2.675 1.010 17.544
4.684 2.383 1.308 15.289
Brokers / All Investors 0.374 0.069 0.139 0.524
Individuals / All Investors 0.375 0.043 0.249 0.530
Foreigners / All Investors 0.217 0.085 0.062 0.546
Call
Put
Call
Put
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volume, call/put traction amount for each investor category. The summary statistics on trades of 
major three investor types (brokerage proprietary trader, individuals, and foreigners) are reported 
in Table 4.1. However, this data set does not have the breakdowns for each option contract. 
More importantly, the KOSPI 200 options and futures markets are different from well-
studied US index options and futures markets, such as S&P 500 and S&P 100 options and 
futures markets. First, in the KOSPI 200 options market, call option trading volumes exceed 
those of put options unlike in the US index options markets; in the US index options, typically, 
put option volumes tend to be larger than those of call. During our sample period, call and put 
option trading volumes are approximately 5.6 million and 4.9 million contracts, respectively. 
Secondly, there is active participation among individual traders in the KOSPI 200 options 
and futures markets unlike in the US index options and futures markets; institutional investors 
dominate trading activities both in the US index options and futures markets. The individual 
investors’ trading volumes account for 36% to 38% of the daily total options trading volume in 
the KOSPI 200 options market. About 35% to 40% of the daily total trading volumes come from 
the brokerage proprietary traders, and foreign traders’ activities constitute approximately 20% to 
25% of the daily total trading volumes. The rest of option trading volumes mainly come from 
mutual funds and insurance firms. In the KOSPI 200 futures market, approximately 40%, 31%, 
24%, and 2.5% of daily total trading volumes come from brokerage proprietary, individual, 
foreign, and mutual fund trades, respectively. Brokerage proprietary traders tend to be option 
sellers/writers, and individual traders are often option buyers. This phenomenon may be 
attributed to the fact that it is easier for brokerage proprietary traders to meet margin 
requirements compared to individual traders; the margin requirement for option writers is much 
more restrictive as they assume large risk. It is also important to note that these individual and 
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brokerage proprietary traders in the KOSPI 200 options market are not generally considered as 
hedgers; they are typically known as speculators.  
As earlier studies suggest, different types of traders may possess different levels of 
information, information processing skills, and trading skills that lead to superior trading profits. 
Together with the fact that majority of trading volume comes speculatively-motivated trades, 
active participation from various investor types, such as individual, brokerage proprietary, 
foreign traders, in the KOSPI 200 options and futures markets provide an ideal setting for 
studying information-based trading. 
 
3. Directional trading model & variable construction 
3.1 Directional informed trading hypothesis: across option leverage 
In this section, we introduce our directional informed trading hypothesis. Our directional trading 
hypothesis is based on the prediction of information trading model of Easley, O’Hara, and 
Srinivas (1998). One of the key features of Easley et al. (1998) model is that it allows the 
informed traders to elect their trading venues, either in stock or in options market, or in both. 
Easley et al. (1998) develop an asymmetric information model in which the participation of an 
informed trader in stock and in options market is endogenously determined. According to their 
model, an informed trader chooses to trade either in or both in stock and options market 
depending on the depths of the markets and leverage available to the market. In particular, an 
informed trader prefers to trade both in stock and options market, i.e., in a “pooling equilibrium,” 
when the proportion of informed traders is large, when the liquidity in the stock market is low, or 
when the leverage implicit in options is large enough so that an informed trader would favor 
trading in options market. 
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Easley et al. (1998) demonstrate that “specific” options volumes have information 
content for future stock price movements. They first categorize informational news events into 
positive and negative news on the underlying security. When there is positive news, an informed 
trader would have a choice among trading strategies of buying the stock itself, buying call 
options, or selling put options. On the other hand, an informed trader would choose among 
trading strategies of selling the underlying stock, selling call options, or buying put options if 
there is negative news on the underlying security. Call option buy volumes and put option sell 
volumes are denoted as “positive news” option volumes. Conversely, put option buy volumes 
and call option sell volumes are labeled as “negative news” option volumes. They show 
empirically that in a pooling equilibrium, these “positive news” option volumes and “negative 
news” option volumes impound information about future stock price movements. In our 
empirical implementation, we test whether these “positive news” option volume and “negative 
news” option volume impound information about future KOSPI 200 index returns. 
Easley et al. (1998) model further includes the following feature. Easley et al. (1998) 
model may be extended so that informed traders not only elect to trade between equity and 
options, but also between equity and options with different leverage levels. To test whether 
option leverage is an important factor in predicting future KOSPI 200 index intraday returns, we 
subdivide call buy/sell and put buy/sell option volumes into moneyness categories. Options with 
larger leverage may be a preferred vehicle in exploiting informational advantage for informed 
traders. We hypothesize that the trading outcome of index options with larger leverage have 
higher information content in predicting return movements of the underlying stock index. 
Moreover, liquidity is also an important factor for informed traders in choosing in which markets 
(equities or options or both) to trade and also which options to trade within options market in 
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Easley et al. (1998) model. By subdividing call and put option volume into moneyness 
categories, we are essentially incorporating liquidity factor into our analysis because trading 
volumes monotonically increase with option leverage for both call and put options. 
 
3.2 Directional informed trading hypothesis: across investor group 
There has been a long debate in the international finance literature on who has advantage in 
trading domestic securities, domestic versus foreign traders. To date, there is no clear consensus 
on this issue. Advantage in domestic stock trading depends on which group of investors 
possesses superior information. Some articles find evidence indicating that foreign investors are 
better informed and sophisticated in processing information [Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); 
Seasholes (2000); Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001); Froot and Ramadorai (2001)]. 
Leading explanations for foreign investors’ informational advantage have been that foreign 
institutional investors may be more experienced and have access to better proprietary research.  
On the other hand, some papers demonstrate that foreign investors are at informational 
disadvantage in local stock trading compared to local traders [Dvorak (2005); Hau (2001); Choe, 
Kho, and Stulz (2005); Kang and Stulz (1997); Shukla and van Inwegen (1995)]. One of the 
common sources of foreign investors’ informational disadvantage is that foreign investors may 
be “distant” from the local markets where information mostly originates. Foreign investors may 
be at disadvantage in accessing and processing local information because of geographical 
distance, language differences, and cultural differences. 
 In this paper, we investigate which group of investors has informational advantage in 
trading local securities by examining trading activities in the KOSPI index options and futures 
 155 
 
market.43 More specifically, we examine whether the information content of KOSPI 200 index 
options and futures transactions are different across investor groups in predicting intraday returns 
of the KOSPI 200 index. Foreign investors trading in Korean markets are mainly institutional 
investors [Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005)]. To compare the information content of foreign 
institutional investor transactions to that of domestic institutional investor transactions, we 
further subdivide domestic investors into two groups, domestic brokerage proprietary traders and 
retail traders in our analysis. As we are examining intraday options and futures transactions, 
foreign investors may be at disadvantage if local proximity is an important factor in exploiting 
very short-lived informational advantage.44 
  
3.3 Explanatory variable construction 
We discuss explanatory variable construction in this section. Our explanatory variable 
construction is based on Easley et al. (1998). Our goal is to investigate whether call and put 
buy/sell transactions contain information about future intraday KOSPI 200 index returns. More 
specifically, we test whether information content is different across option type (call or put 
options) and also across option moneyness categories in predicting future price movements of 
KOSPI 200 index. For this purpose, we use trade and quote (TAQ) data. Buy and sell trades are 
classified using Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm and transaction price for each trade is 
multiplied with the corresponding volume to obtain transaction amount. Although we have trades 
                                                 
43 Using intraday TAQ data over one year, 2002, Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008) examines informed trading in 
the KOSPI 200 index options market. Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008) conclude that foreign traders have an edge in 
trading KOSPI 200 index options over domestic traders based on spread decomposition analysis. 
44 Foreign institutional investors in Korea are required to register with the Financial Supervisory Services 
(FSS) and obtain identification number before they can start trading. These ID numbers are used to distinguish 
whether a transaction is made by a domestic or foreign investor. However, our data does not provide further 
information on the identity of foreign investors. Consequently, we are unable to identify trades made by Korean 
investors who set up a foreign nominee company to trade on the KOSPI 200 index options and futures market if 
there are any such trades.  
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and quotes after the close of the KOSPI 200 index, we limit our sample to intraday trades 
between 9 am to 2:50 pm where intraday return of the stock index is available. We group options 
into three moneyness categories using the absolute values of delta from the prices at end of 
previous trading date. An option is defined as ATM (at-the-money) if the delta is between 0.4 
and 0.6, OTM (out-of-the-money) if the delta is smaller than 0.4, and ITM (in-the-money) if the 
delta is greater than 0.6. We then aggregate transaction amount (in Korean Won) over one-
minute interval for each moneyness category to construct transaction amount variables. We use 
the delta values from the day before in assigning moneyness category. In Panel B of Table 4.2, 
we report mean, standard deviation, and 95th percentile statistics of for each option type and for 
each moneyness category. The average transaction amount increases as both call and put options 
are further out-of-the-money.  
To examine whether the information content of KOSPI 200 index options and futures 
transactions are different across investor groups in predicting intraday returns of the KOSPI 200 
index. Among ten investor groups available in our data, we only consider proprietary brokerage 
traders, individuals, and foreigners as these three investor groups make up about 95% of the total 
transaction each day both in the KOSPI 200 options market and in the KOSPI 200 futures 
market. We use investor trading statistics which is provided by KRX every 30 seconds.45 The 30-
second trading statistics include call options/put options/futures buy and sell volumes and 
transaction amount for each investor group. We add up the 30-second statistics every minute to 
compute 1-minute transaction amount for each investor group. Furthermore, for call options, put 
options, and futures and for each investor group, we construct 1-minute net buy transaction 
amount by subtracting the 1-minuie sell transaction amount from the 1-minute buy transaction 
                                                 
45 We do not use Lee and Ready (1991) buy/sell algorithm in classifying each trade by each investor group. 
The KRX intraday data set precise trade classification from each order filled.  
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics, daily futures transaction amount and volume by investor 
type 
 
This table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of daily transaction amount and volume of 
futures initiated by each investor type. Trade amount and volume of buy and sell trades are identified by the Korean 
stock exchange and are not estimated. Sample period is from 3 January 2005 to 20 March 2009 consisting of 1044 
trading days. 
 
Mean Std Min Max
Panel A: Transaction amount in 1 billion KRW
Brokers Sell 5361.533 2386.086 1094.493 12411.470
Buy 5370.445 2392.602 1090.650 12567.296
Individuals Sell 6906.418 2260.745 2536.985 14023.832
Buy 6887.574 2259.592 2518.366 14277.224
Foreigners Sell 4433.881 2378.329 820.801 16501.653
Buy 4418.094 2345.693 894.624 16698.928
All investors 17833.558 6784.645 5474.076 43496.986
Brokers / All Investors 0.296 0.056 0.143 0.463
Individuals / All Investors 0.398 0.056 0.251 0.568
Foreigners / All Investors 0.242 0.055 0.122 0.468
Panel B: Traded volume in million
Brokers Sell 0.059 0.024 0.017 0.139
Buy 0.059 0.024 0.017 0.140
Individuals Sell 0.078 0.028 0.032 0.203
Buy 0.078 0.028 0.030 0.199
Foreigners Sell 0.049 0.025 0.012 0.192
Buy 0.049 0.025 0.013 0.188
All investors 0.199 0.075 0.079 0.517
Brokers / All Investors 0.296 0.056 0.143 0.463
Individuals / All Investors 0.398 0.056 0.252 0.568
Foreigners / All Investors 0.242 0.055 0.122 0.468  
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of regression variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics of variables used in our regressions. Panel A reports underlying index return 
and realized volatilities in 1, 10, 30 minute windows. Basis point and basis point squared were used as units for 
return and realized volatility respectively. In Panel B and C, we report transaction amount in 1 billion KRW for each 
option and futures classification in one minute window. In Panel B, the options are classified according to 
moneyness. We classify an option as ITM if absolute value of delta from previous trading date is between 0.6 and 1, 
ATM if between 0.4 and 0.6, and OTM if between 0 and 0.4. Buy and sell trades were identified using Lee and 
Ready algorithm. In Panel C, options and futures are classified according to investor types. Buy and sell trades are 
obtained from Korean Stock Exchange not estimated. 
  
Panel A
Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl
Index return 0.01 5.97 -8.20 8.33 0.10 21.14 -31.54 30.54 0.11 35.11 -52.74 49.17
Realized volatility 0.37 1.40 0.04 1.10 3.67 3.32 1.38 7.57 10.85 8.04 4.89 20.71
Panel B
Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl
Call Sell 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.02 1.05
Buy 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.02 1.01
Net 0.00 0.11 -0.10 0.09 0.00 0.10 -0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.19 -0.31 0.27
Put Sell 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.31 0.39 0.40 0.02 1.15
Buy 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.02 1.09
Net 0.00 0.13 -0.10 0.08 0.00 0.09 -0.12 0.11 -0.02 0.19 -0.31 0.24
Panel C
Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl Mean Std 5th pctl 95th pctl
Call Sell 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.78 0.40 0.35 0.06 1.07 0.34 0.39 0.02 1.09
Buy 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.78 0.40 0.35 0.06 1.05 0.34 0.39 0.02 1.10
Net 0.00 0.10 -0.15 0.15 0.00 0.19 -0.28 0.28 0.00 0.17 -0.24 0.24
Net ratio 0.00 0.25 -0.38 0.40 0.01 0.22 -0.35 0.36 0.00 0.30 -0.51 0.51
Put Sell 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.73 0.38 0.35 0.05 1.05 0.40 0.50 0.02 1.33
Buy 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.73 0.39 0.34 0.05 1.03 0.40 0.49 0.02 1.33
Net 0.00 0.10 -0.15 0.15 0.00 0.20 -0.26 0.26 0.00 0.19 -0.24 0.24
Net ratio 0.00 0.26 -0.41 0.41 0.01 0.21 -0.33 0.35 0.00 0.27 -0.46 0.45
Futures Sell 14.85 15.68 0.18 45.48 18.94 17.94 1.10 53.95 11.88 14.40 0.13 37.06
But 14.85 15.57 0.19 45.29 18.91 18.01 1.06 54.09 11.86 14.41 0.13 37.11
Net 0.00 7.39 -11.90 11.81 -0.03 10.36 -16.34 16.39 -0.02 9.64 -15.18 15.20
Net ratio 0.01 0.38 -0.67 0.69 0.00 0.31 -0.53 0.51 0.00 0.46 -0.80 0.81
1 minute 10 min 30 min
ForeignerIndividualBroker
OTMATMITM
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Table 4.4: Directional trading, by moneyness 
This table reports time-series regression results. Dependent variables are index returns during different time 
windows. Column header indicates the size of the time window from which we calculate index returns used in the 
regressions. Main explanatory variables used in the regressions are option trade amount categorized by option type, 
moneyness, and whether the trades were buy or sell trades estimated by Lee and Ready algorithm. The following 
specifies regression model: 
0 ,
1 0
, {1,5,10,60},t j k k t l t l t
l
j
K L
k
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where t jR   is return of the underlying index from time t  to t j , ,k tX are traded amount of sell and buy orders 
on calls and puts in moneyness categories as described in Table 3. Only 1,..., K   are reported in this table. First 
10 minutes of each trade date were excluded from the regression. 
 
1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Call ITM Sell -1.1625 -1.4888 -1.2481 -1.8791 -2.8109
(-12.41) (-5.98) (-3.61) (-3.17) (-3.20)
Buy 1.4034 2.4311 2.1908 2.2821 3.4544
(14.58) (9.51) (6.16) (3.75) (3.86)
ATM Sell -2.5715 -4.0438 -3.5920 -1.4286 1.2203
(-24.08) (-14.26) (-9.11) (-2.10) (1.21)
Buy 3.1817 5.3533 5.1163 4.6611 2.2604
(29.37) (18.61) (12.79) (6.80) (2.23)
OTM Sell -3.7062 -6.1055 -5.5900 -6.6513 -7.3989
(-63.79) (-39.58) (-26.05) (-18.02) (-13.46)
Buy 4.0353 6.8161 6.3309 7.8645 7.9840
(66.86) (42.53) (28.40) (20.53) (14.00)
Put ITM Sell 1.1016 1.3412 1.0058 0.7307 -1.0729
(12.95) (5.94) (3.20) (1.36) (-1.35)
Buy -1.3144 -2.0425 -1.9228 -1.5320 -0.8583
(-14.28) (-8.36) (-5.65) (-2.62) (-1.00)
ATM Sell 2.4883 3.0347 3.0198 3.0913 3.1904
(21.91) (10.06) (7.20) (4.30) (2.99)
Buy -3.2361 -4.7044 -4.3441 -7.1021 -9.2621
(-27.76) (-15.20) (-10.09) (-9.62) (-8.45)
OTM Sell 2.7118 4.6130 4.3128 4.6674 5.4433
(47.54) (30.46) (20.47) (12.88) (10.06)
Buy -3.1560 -5.2866 -4.5599 -3.8988 -2.9252
(-52.18) (-32.92) (-20.41) (-10.17) (-5.12)
0.0778 0.0254 0.0130 0.0059 0.0028adjusted R2  
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amount. Panel C of Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics of 1-minute transaction amount by 
investor groups for the index options and futures. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Results on directional informed trading in index options market 
We discuss our regression models and results on intraday directional informed trading 
based on Easley et al. (1998) model in this section. We test whether call buy/put sell transactions 
predict positive returns on the underlying stock index (KOSPI 200) and call sell/put buy 
transactions predict negative returns on the underlying stock index. Furthermore, we examine 
whether information content is different across moneyness categories for aforementioned 
specific index option transactions. We regress future returns of the underlying index on buyer 
and seller initiated transaction amount of call and put options of different moneyness categories. 
Our dependent variables are 1, 5, 10, 30, and 60-minute future (ahead) returns of KOSPI 200 
index, respectively. The explanatory variables are defined in the previous section. All regression 
models include lag returns of KOSPI 200 index to account for possible time-series correlation.  
The regression results are reported in Table 4.4.  The estimated coefficients on the 
constant and lag returns of KOSPI 200 index are not reported. The signs of all statistically 
significant coefficients (at 1%, 5%, and 10%) are consistent with the prediction of Easley et al. 
(1998) directional informed trading model. Index option transactions contain information on 
future underlying index returns as positive future returns of the underlying stock index (KOSPI 
200) are associated with the decrease in call option sell transactions and put option buy 
transactions and with the increase in call buy and put sell transactions.  Furthermore, our results 
demonstrate that the options with larger leverage contain higher information content in the sense 
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that the estimated coefficients monotonically increase (in absolute values) with option leverage; 
OTM option transactions have higher information content. Our results are robust to alternative 
explanatory variable specifications. Instead of using transaction amount, we re-construct our 
explanatory variables measured in trade counts and trading volume. Our main results are 
unchanged.  
 
4.2 Results on directional informed trading across investor groups 
We investigate which of the three major investor groups (domestic brokerage proprietary, 
individual, and foreign traders) are better informed about KOSPI 200 intraday returns using 1-
minute transaction amount statistics by these three investor groups. We examine the information 
content of trades for each investor class by regressing the subsequent 1, 5, 10, 30, 60-minute 
returns of the underlying index on the net buy amount of each investor group. Our regressions 
are estimated separately for each investor group, and then with all three investor groups’ net buy 
transactions. If a group of investors has superior information processing capabilities on news 
related to the future returns of the underlying stock index, then the investor group’s net 
call/futures (put) buy amount should be positively (negatively) related to the future returns of the 
underlying index. 
The regression results on the index options are tabulated in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. Our 
dependent variables are 1, 5, 10, 30, and 60-minute future (ahead) returns of KOSPI 200 index, 
respectively. In Table 4.5, the regressions are estimated separately for each investor group. We 
find that the brokerage proprietary traders’ net buy amount has predictive power on intraday 
returns of the underlying index. Table 4.6 shows the regression estimates when net call/put buy 
transaction of investor groups enter the estimation altogether. Entered jointly, the results indicate 
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Table 4.5: Directional trading, by investor type 
This table reports time-series regression results. Dependent variables are index returns during different time 
windows. Column header indicates the size of the time window from which we calculate index returns used in the 
regressions. Main explanatory variables used in the regressions are option net trade amount categorized by trader 
type and option type. Net trade amount is calculated as buy minus sell trade amount. Buy and sell trades are 
identified in the data, but the trades are aggregated by investor type and option type. The following specifies the 
regression model: 
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where t jR   is return of the underlying index from time t  to t j , ,k tX  are net buy transaction amount calculated 
by subtracting sell from buy transaction amount for each investor’s trade and option type. Only 1,..., K   are 
reported in this table. First 10 minutes of each trade date were excluded from the regression. 
 
1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Net Buy Call 0.7337 2.4260 1.3049 -0.4322 -2.7934
(4.20) (5.24) (2.03) (-0.39) (-1.73)
Net Buy Put -3.0613 -4.5359 -5.1260 -5.3301 1.0214
(-15.82) (-8.86) (-7.20) (-4.38) (0.56)
Net Buy Call -2.5387 -3.8137 -4.6405 -6.7066 -8.0968
(-17.06) (-9.68) (-8.48) (-7.20) (-5.93)
Net Buy Put 3.1430 4.4451 3.4111 3.9788 10.0688
(19.05) (10.18) (5.62) (3.84) (6.51)
Net Buy Call -0.0836 -0.4389 -1.8838 -4.0019 -6.3993
(-0.58) (-1.16) (-3.58) (-4.48) (-4.89)
Net Buy Put 2.2006 3.3303 2.8763 4.2302 11.0441
(13.71) (7.84) (4.87) (4.20) (7.35)
0.0643 0.0185 0.0099 0.0041 0.0015
Brokers
Individuals
Foreigners
adj. R2  
  
 163 
 
Table 4.6: Option directional trading, by investor type 
Regression variables used in this table is identical to that of Table 5. The only difference is that only subset of the 
main explanatory variables are used in the regressions to examine explanatory power of the net transaction amount 
of each investor type.  
This table reports time-series regression results. Dependent variables are index returns during different time 
windows. Column header indicates the size of the time window from which we calculate index returns used in the 
regressions. Main explanatory variables used in the regressions are option net trade amount categorized by trader 
type and option type. Net trade amount is calculated as buy minus sell trade amount. Buy and sell trades are 
identified in the data, but the trades are aggregated by investor type and option type. The following specifies the 
regression model: 
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where t jR   is return of the underlying index from time t  to t j , ,k tX  are net buy transaction amount calculated 
by subtracting sell from buy transaction amount for each investor’s trade and option type. Only 1,..., K   are 
reported in this table. First 10 minutes of each trade date were excluded from the regression. 
 
1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Panel A: Brokers
Net Buy Call 0.0288 0.0568 0.0541 0.0559 0.0467
(27.66) (20.64) (14.14) (8.50) (4.79)
Net Buy Put -0.0652 -0.0948 -0.0907 -0.1011 -0.1001
(-63.91) (-35.18) (-24.24) (-15.75) (-10.52)
Panel B: Individuals
Net Buy Call -0.0314 -0.0479 -0.0430 -0.0454 -0.0369
(-59.38) (-34.29) (-22.14) (-13.65) (-7.51)
Net Buy Put 0.0192 0.0262 0.0206 0.0157 0.0106
(38.18) (19.74) (11.16) (4.97) (2.28)
Panel C: Foreigners
Net Buy Call 0.0253 0.0343 0.0267 0.0242 0.0141
(44.70) (22.99) (12.91) (6.86) (2.72)
Net Buy Put -0.0023 -0.0009 0.0036 0.0121 0.0235
(-4.42) (-0.64) (1.91) (3.76) (4.97)  
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Table 4.7: Futures directional trading, by investor type, before and after 2008 
 
This table reports time-series regression results. We divide regression sample into two subsamples: before 2008 and 
after 2008. Dependent variables are index returns during different time windows. Column header indicates the size 
of the time window from which we calculate index returns used in the regressions. Main explanatory variables used 
in the regressions are futures net trade amount categorized by trader type. Net trade amount is calculated as buy 
minus sell trade amount. Buy and sell trades are identified in the data, but the trades are aggregated by investor type. 
The following specifies the regression model: 
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where t jR   is return of the underlying index from time t  to t j , ,k tX  are net buy transaction amount calculated 
by subtracting sell from buy transaction amount for each investor’s futures trade. Only 1,..., K   are reported in 
this table. First 10 minutes of each trade date were excluded from the regression. 
 
Panel A: all sample 1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Brokers Net Buy Futures 4.8792 7.0393 5.8821 5.7753 3.2454
(21.10) (11.58) (6.97) (3.95) (1.49)
Individuals Net Buy Futures 0.3481 -3.3817 -4.4734 -4.7206 -10.1863
(1.61) (-5.95) (-5.67) (-3.45) (-5.01)
Foreigners Net Buy Futures 6.2216 9.0171 8.0896 8.8218 8.7932
(29.03) (16.00) (10.34) (6.51) (4.36)
adj. R2 0.0509 0.0170 0.0097 0.0040 0.0020
Panel B: after 2008
Brokers Net Buy Futures 1.7521 1.4031 -1.4945 -2.3507 -7.4839
(3.22) (0.93) (-0.72) (-0.65) (-1.39)
Individuals Net Buy Futures -2.6816 -7.1502 -10.9473 -12.4005 -22.4732
(-5.31) (-5.10) (-5.67) (-3.69) (-4.50)
Foreigners Net Buy Futures 6.3438 11.3861 8.8026 8.2086 3.9795
(12.56) (8.13) (4.56) (2.44) (0.80)
adj. R2 0.0945 0.0199 0.0101 0.0046 0.0020  
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that the domestic brokerage traders possess superior information on the intraday returns of the 
underlying stock index, which is consistent with our finding in Table 4.5. From Table 4.6, there 
is some evidence that foreigners are informed traders. 
 In Panel A of Table 4.7, we report the estimation results for the KOSPI 200 index futures 
market. Our dependent variables are 1, 5, 10, 30, and 60-minute future (ahead) returns of KOSPI 
200 index, respectively. The results in Panel A of Table 4.8 indicate that the domestic brokerage 
traders and foreigners possess superior information processing skills on news related the intraday 
stock index returns. This result is consistent with our findings in the index options market. 
 
4.3 Results on information based trading during the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
In this section, we investigate which investor group possesses informational advantage during 
the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. It is unlikely that foreign investors are 
systematically better informed than domestic investors about events that affect the country as a 
whole is unlikely.46 However, informational advantage of one investor group over another may 
depend on from where the information originates. If a country’s return relevant information 
originates from outside of the country, which may be the case during the recent sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, then foreign investors could be better informed than the domestic investors. 
We use the intraday trading statistics by investor group for the KOSPI 200 index options 
and futures to test whether foreigners are indeed better informed traders during the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis. We use the 1-minute transaction amount statistics of domestic brokerage 
proprietary, individual, and foreign traders. We define the sub-prime mortgage crisis period to be 
from January 3rd, 2008 to March 20th, 2009. 
                                                 
46 The information asymmetry in favor of domestic investors is one of the main explanations of the home 
bias phenomenon. 
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Table 4.8: Futures directional trading, by investor type, before and after 2008 
 
1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Panel A: Brokers
Net Buy Futures ratio 0.1972 0.5701 0.5540 0.6889 0.9054
(7.65) (8.44) (5.92) (4.33) (3.88)
Panel B: Individuals
Net Buy Futures ratio -1.3056 -3.0054 -3.1180 -3.2331 -4.1481
(-41.82) (-36.69) (-27.46) (-16.71) (-14.55)
Panel C: Foreigners
Net Buy Futures ratio 0.5818 1.3477 1.4906 1.7218 2.5516
(27.32) (24.11) (19.25) (13.04) (13.15)
Panel D: Brokers after 2008
Net Buy Futures ratio 0.1853 0.1222 -0.1011 0.3820 1.7400
(1.80) (0.43) (-0.26) (0.57) (1.78)
Panel E: Individuals after 2008
Net Buy Futures ratio -2.8851 -5.9474 -6.2307 -6.1107 -7.5143
(-26.80) (-19.96) (-15.22) (-8.70) (-7.25)
Panel F: Foreigners after 2008
Net Buy Futures ratio 1.7842 3.8138 4.0361 4.1031 5.2033
(23.95) (18.51) (14.26) (8.43) (7.24)  
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 Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 report the regression results on the index options and futures 
market, respectively. Our dependent variables are 1, 5, 10, 30, and 60-minute future (ahead) 
returns of KOSPI 200 index, respectively, for both Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. From Table 4.8, in 
the KOSPI 200 index options market, we observe that the net put buy transaction of foreigners 
possesses some predictive power on the intraday return of the underlying index during the recent 
sub-prime mortgage crisis. However, the results are much stronger in the index futures market. 
In Table 4.9, among the three investor groups (domestic brokerage proprietary, individual, and 
foreign traders), we find that the foreigners’ transaction in the index futures market contains 
better information content on the intraday returns of the underlying stock index during the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. This may indicate that foreigners are superior in processing country return 
information originating from outside of Korea.  
  
5. Volatility information based trading 
In this section, we investigate whether index options are used for volatility informed 
trading. Our analysis of volatility informed trading is motivated by the fact that options are 
uniquely suited securities for investors who have information on future volatility. Unlike 
investors with information on underlying index returns who can choose to trade among in cash 
market, in index futures markets, or in index options market, investors with volatility information 
can only exploit it by participating in index options market. In addition, although there are a 
multitude of articles that examines directional information based trading in options market 
[Stephan and Whaley (1990); Amin and Lee (1997); Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998); Chan, 
Chung, and Fong (2002); Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004); Cao, Chen, and Griffin 
(2005); Pan and Poteshman (2006); Ahn, Kang, and Ryu (2008); Kang and Park (2007); Ni, Pan, 
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and Poteshman (2008)], volatility information based trading in options markets is not well-
studied.47 
Our empirical analysis examines whether index option trading outcome contains 
information about the future volatility of underlying stock index. More specifically, we test 
which investor group (domestic brokerage proprietary traders, individuals, and foreigners) 
possesses information on the future intraday realized volatility of KOSPI 200 index. If some 
traders indeed possess superior information processing skills or even private information on 
future volatility in the KOSPI 200 index options market, then one would expect the net demand 
for volatility to be positively associated with the future volatility of underlying stock index as 
traders with information on future volatility would buy (sell) options when volatility is expected 
rise (fall).   
In our empirical implementation for volatility informed trading, we take the similar 
approach as in Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008). We construct the demand for volatility from buys 
and sells of call and put options. We measure the net demand for volatility by each investor 
group in terms of net call and put option buy amount. Both call and put options have positive 
exposure to volatility, and thus we treat buy transaction amount for both call and put options as 
positive demand for volatility and sell volume as negative demand for volatility. We use the 1-
minute transaction amount (of call and put options) by investor groups for the index options as 
our measure of investor net demand for volatility.
                                                 
47 Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008) test whether there is informed volatility trading in equities options 
market. By taking advantage of their unique data set, they construct non-market maker net demand for volatility 
products, such as options, from the trading volume of individual stock options. They find that the non-market maker 
net demand to be informative about the future realized volatility of underlying equities. They further document that 
the price impact on option contracts increases as informational asymmetry on the underlying stock volatility 
intensifies in the days leading up to earnings announcement dates when there is greater volatility uncertainty. 
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Table 4.9 Volatility trading 
1m 5m 10m 30m 60m
Panel A: Brokers
Net Buy Call 0.0004 0.0018 0.0028 0.0047 0.0071
(4.38) (7.77) (7.84) (5.47) (4.40)
Net Buy Put 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0036
(5.15) (3.47) (2.04) (-2.79) (2.29)
Panel B: Individuals
Net Buy Call -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0020
(-3.53) (-4.12) (-4.94) (-4.37) (-2.36)
Net Buy Put 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0010
(-0.85) (1.16) (0.05) (1.71) (1.22)
Panel C: Foreigners
Net Buy Call 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0012 0.0017
(1.53) (0.02) (0.90) (2.47) (1.97)
Net Buy Put -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0046
(-3.14) (-6.49) (-4.89) (-4.02) (-5.65)  
Dependent variable ,t t jRV   is realized volatility of the underlying index from end of period t  to 
t j . Net buy transaction amount is calculated by subtracting sell from buy dollar volume. Lags 
of returns and realized volatilities were included in the regressions but not reported. First 10 
minutes of each trade date were excluded from the regression. Regressions are run for each 
investor type 
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To investigate whether any group of investor net demand for volatility in the KOSPI 
index options market predicts future volatility of underlying stock index, we regress future 
realized volatility on each investor net transaction amounts (domestic brokerage proprietary, 
individual, and foreign traders). The realized volatility is calculated from summing the square of 
10-second log returns in a given time interval; we consider 1, 5, 10, 30, 60 minute intervals. The 
realized volatility is a sample equivalence of quadratic variation, which theoretically converges 
to the spot volatility [Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2001)]. We used the 10-second 
stock index returns because it is the highest frequency, which we could obtain from the KRX.  
The regression result on intraday volatility information based trading in the KOSPI 200 
index options market is presented in Table 4.9. Our dependent variables are 1, 5, 10, 30, and 60-
minute future (ahead) realized volatility of KOSPI 200 index, respectively. The lag terms of 
realized volatility and returns are included in the regression specifications to control for time-
series correlations, but the coefficients of lag terms are not reported to conserve space. Our 
regression estimates suggest index options are used to exploit volatility information on the 
underlying stock index. We find that brokerage proprietary traders engage in volatility 
information based trading. The estimated coefficients of brokerage proprietary traders’ call/put 
net buy are mostly positive and statistically significant indicating that brokerage proprietary 
traders buy (sell) call/put when the future volatility of underlying stock index is expected to rise 
(fall).  
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate two types of information based trading, directional and volatility trading, 
in our study. We further analyze directional and volatility information trading by investor types: 
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brokerage proprietary, individual, and foreign investors. First, in directional information trading, 
we find that the transaction amount of options with the largest leverage, the out-of-the-money 
options, is the best predictor of intraday KOSPI 200 returns compared to options with smaller 
implicit leverage. This result confirms and agrees with Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) 
model that options with higher leverage are preferred vehicle to options with smaller leverage in 
exploiting the directional information on the underlying securities.  
Secondly, we find that the domestic brokerage proprietary traders’ net buy transaction 
amount of call/put options and that of futures possesses the best predictability on the KOSPI 200 
index intraday returns. To the contrary to Ahn, Kang, and Ryu’s (2008) findings, we do not find 
convincing evidence that foreign traders possess superior information or information processing 
skills in directional trading. However, during the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008, we 
find that the foreigners’ transaction in the index futures market contains better information 
content on the intraday returns of the underlying stock index. This may indicate that foreigners 
are superior in processing relevant country return information originating from outside of Korea.   
Thirdly, unlike in Kang and Park’s (2007) work, which they find evidence of directional 
information based trading but not of volatility information trading, we find empirical evidence 
consistent with the presence of volatility information based trading. The domestic brokerage 
proprietary traders’ call and put net buy transaction amount has predictive power on the intraday 
KOSPI 200 realized volatility. Our results indicate that brokerage proprietary investors possess 
superior directional and volatility information among investor groups, and they exploit these 
information using KOSPI 200 index options and futures. 
 172 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahn, H., J. Kang, and D. Ryu, 2008, Informed trading in the index option market: The case of 
KOSPI 200 options, The Journal of Futures Markets, 12, 1118-1146 
Andersen, T.G., T. Bollerslev, F.X. Diebold, and P. Labys, 2001, The distribution of realized 
exchange rate volatility. Journal of the American Statistical Association 96, 42–55. 
Anthony, Joseph H., 1988, The interrelation of stock and option market trading-volume data, 
Journal of Finance, 43, 949-96 
Black, Fisher, 1975, Fact and fantasy in use of options, Fianacial Analyst Journal, 31, 36-41, 61-
72 
Choe, H., B. Kho, and R. Stulz, 2005, Do domestic investors have an edge? The trading 
experience of foreign investors in Korea, Review of Financial Studies, 18, 795-829 
Dvorak, T., 2005, Do domestic investors have informational advantage? Evidence from 
Indonesia, Journal of Finance, 60, 817-839 
Easley, David, Maureen O’Hara, and P. Srinivas, 1998, Option volume and stock prices: 
Evidence on where informed traders trade, Journal of Finance, 53, 431-465 
Froot, K., P. O’Connell, and M. Seasholes, 2001, The portfolio flows of international investors, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 151-193 
Froot, K. and T. Ramadorai, 2001, The information content of international portfolio flows, 
working paper 8472, NBER 
 173 
 
Grinblatt, M. and M. Keloharju, 2000, The investment behavior and performance of various 
investor types: A study of Finland’s unique data set, Journal of Financial Economics, 55, 
43-67 
Hau, H., 2001, Location matters: An examination of trading profits, Journal of Finance, 56, 
1959-1983 
Kang, J. and H. Park, 2007, The information content of net buying pressure: Evidence from the 
KOSPI 200 index option market, Journal of Financial Markets, 11, 36-56 
Lee, Charles and Mark Ready, 1991, Inferring trade direction from intraday data, Journal of 
Finance, 2, 733-746  
Madhavan, A., M. Richardson, and M. Roomans, 1997, Why do security prices change? A 
transaction level analysis of NYSE stocks, Review of Financial Studies, 10, 1035-1064 
Manaster, Stephen and Richard J. Rendleman,1982, Option prices as predictors of equilibrium 
stock prices, Journal of Finance, 37, 1043-1057 
Ni,Sophie , X. Pan, and Allen Poteshman, 2008, Volatility information trading in the option 
market, Journal of Finance, 53, 1059-1091 
Pan J. and Allen Poteshman, 2006, The information in option volume for future stock prices, 
Review of Financial Studies, 19, 871-908 
Seasholes, M., 2000, Smart foreign traders in emerging markets, working paper, Harvard 
Business School 
 174 
 
Shukla, R. K. and G. B. van Inwegan, 1995, Do domestics perform better than foreigners? An 
analysis of UK and US mutual fund managers, Journal of Economics and Business, 47, 
241-254 
Vega, C., 2006, Stock price reaction to public and private information, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 82, 103-133 
 
